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"Thera Is much to support the belief 
that there le a struggle for existence 
among ideas, and that those tend to 
prevail vhieh correspond with the 
changing needs of humanity."
• S* Inge,
Outspoken Sasayg

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction; The Eature of Underdevelopment; 
The Role of Agriculture
In a sobering analysis of the prospeots for man­
kind's progress in the face of tremendous population growth, 
Harrison Brown,'*’ geochemist at the California Institute of 
Technology, declares i "Industrialization of the underdevel­
oped areas of the world is perhaps the most formidable task 
confronting mankind today." Taking Into consideration the 
various faotors of population, natural resources, cultural 
patterns, and technological propensity, Brown oonoludes 
that even if somehow the underdeveloped lands can manage 
to oontrol population growth, "the path of industrialization 
would still be extremely difficult, and it would still be 
fraught with Innumerable dangers.,1,2
Difficult and unoertain though it may be, the 
advancement of underdeveloped areas has beoome one of the 
major enterprises of the world in the mld-20th century. The 
emergence of new nations in the aftermath of colonialism, 
"the revolution of rising expectations," and the "population 
explosion" are all phenomena closely associated with the 
glgantlo problem of raising to deoent and humane levels the
^The Challenge of Man's Future (New York* The 
Viking Press, 19ol], p, 243*
gIbld., P, 244.
1
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living conditions of the human race, the majority of which 
Is deplorably Impoverished. To accomplish this great task 
requires not only enormous effort but also Involves Innova* 
tlons which will profoundly alter traditional patterns of 
life*
Novhere—with the possible exception of Afrioa—
Is the need for economic development greater, the processes 
more far-reaohlng, or the baslo philosophies more contrasting 
than In China and India. Both countries are beset by the 
familiar problems of underdevelopmenti rapid population In* 
crease, Inadequate food production, extremely low Income per 
oapita, low Industrial capacity and efflolenoy, primitive 
transportation systems, and Insufficient educational facili­
ties. In an endeavor to surmount these adversities the
People's Sepublio of China has marshalled the efforts of the 
Chinese people within the oonflnes of a totalitarian polit- 
India, by oontrast, has embarked upon the taskloal system,
of development within the framework of a democratic political
system.
The remarkably divergent responses of China and 
India to very similar challenges Invite comparison and have 
attracted considerable attention from interested observers, 
particularly those with special Interests in the outcome. 
The efforts of China and India have become factors In the 
Cold Var.
»:
.
\ V
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The undertaking commonly referred to as "eoonomlo 
development” involves additionally a combination of ldeolog*
3
leal, sociological, national and International factors* 
Although these several elements are complex and need to be 
Investigated separately, their Interrelated nature must 
also be understood*
It is fitting, therefore, that inter-disciplinary 
studies have risen rapidly to prominence la recent years as 
an important field of inquiry In the social solenoes* Com­
parative polities and comparative economics are two of the 
more recently developed disciplines in this field, plaelng 
greater emphasis on the need for the integration of polities, 
economics, history and sociology in contemporary research la 
social science.
This study is an endeavor to integrate these 
fields to eome extent in a comparative analysis of the 
problem of economio development In China and India, with 
special attention to tha baslo problem of agrloulture during 
the eruolal period, 1951-1961* This decade eonstltutes a 
oonolse period for purposes of analysis* The year 1951 
marked the beginning of full-scale eoonomio planning in 
Oommunist China, although tha First Five Tear Flan was not 
officially announced until 1953* By 1961 tha "Great Leap 
Forward," which waa supposed to have led to the fulfillment 
in two years of tha Seoond Five Tear Flan, was clearly a 
miserable failure* India's First Five Tear Flan waa 
launched in 1951 after more than three years of preparation. 
Although it failed to achlevo all its objectives, this first 
Indian plan succeeded in preparing tha economy for planned
i
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development* By the end of the eeoond plan In April* 1961 
the basic pattern of development in India had been estab­
lished* In both Communist China and India 1961 was the year 
of sober reevaluation of the place of agriculture in dev el* 
opment plans* It was* moreover* the year of ideologioal 
reassessment in China leading to at least the temporary 
abandonment of the rural commune system#
Ihe fundamental ooncern of this study—the role of 
ideology and political organisation in the overall scheme of 
eoonomio development—is based on the premise that political 
factors are fundamental to the eoonomio advancement of 
underdeveloped areas* Moreover* those political systems 
engaged in far-reaching social and economic movements are 
lnollned to develop and rely heavily upon ideology—a body 
of politlool ideas, dootrines and basic beliefs* designed 
to facilitate the development process* This is particularly 
true of authoritarian regimes, of oourse* but ideology is 
by no means absent in the democratic system* especially if* 
as in India* the government ie wedded to a philosophy of 
planned* socialist development*
Of necessity* then, there ie an important connec­
tion between eoonomio planning and innovation on the one 
hand* and politloal and ideologioal aotivity on the other. 
This is espeoially true in those situations where eoonomio 
innovations run counter to established ©ustoms and time- 
honored practioes, a oondition whloh frequently is the case 
in underdeveloped countries.
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The question Immediately arises as to which kind 
of politioal system or ideology is better suited to the 
elicitation of popular support for and participation in 
economio development* the totalitarian or the demooratio?
It is of such fundamental importance to the course of events 
in Asia and much of the world that every effort should be 
made to examine the evidenoe as it becomes avallabl 
if conclusions from these data are only tentative.
Until recently* most studies of the Chinese and 
Indian programs* such as those by the eminent economist 
Wilfred Malenbaum, indicated that the Chinese were clearly 
in the lead.*1 But events within the past twenty months 
give some basis for the view that the totalitarian system 
of development may not possess all the advantages which it 
appeared to have earlier. China's "Great Leap forward" 
beginning in 1958 was an enormous ideologloal as well as 
eoonomlo drive* consisting of feverish aotivlty on all 
fronts* but particularly in agriculture. By contrast* India 
plodded along* endeavoring as it had been for several years 
to improve agrioulture through the National Extension Serv­
ice and the Community Development Program* both based on 
voluntary participation of farmers and villagers* and both 
very slow in showing progress. But the "Great Leap Forward"
even
H‘ilfred Malenbaum* "India and China* Contrasts 
in Development Performance,American Economic Review* XL-IX 
(June* 1959), 204-309. See also iiatxHew J. Xust, ' economio 
Development and Agricultural Surplus," Foreign.Affnirs,
XXXV (Ootober, 1956), 105-115, and Guy wint, "the Oration 
of State Power," China Quarterly. No. 1* p. 29. For Indian 
views on the competition, e«e “x " pp. 203-207, 210, 266-
267-
/
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turned out to be & great disaster, with dislocating and 
debilitating effects still being felt In China,1 Although 
India's Improvements in agriculture have failed to keep paoe 
with population growth, she has at least avoided self-imposed 
catastrophes# Beoent events tend to Indicate that the sta­
bility of a democratic system may be a greater advantage to 
economic development than the fcree of a totalitarian 
system.
!
In view of all these factors, then, it le appro-* 
prlate to examine the relationship between ideology and 
economic development*
THE NATURE OP UNDERDEVELOPMENT
■
The word "underdeveloped" has become a common term 
used to desoriba the statlo economies and societies of many 
nations whloh have won indopendenoe sinoo World War II, 
Whatever its shortcomings,2 "underdeveloped" is a more dip-
" backward, "\nd is a mors accurate wordlomatio word than
an^fc-’i,***7 111 tr®ated ** greater length, ftnfra,,
2An Indian politleal figure# V, 3, Mahejan, has 
heatedly insisted that "underdeveloped" is "not a satisfac­
tory description of the oountrles to which it is applied*
But he offers no substitute# See "Character!stios of Under­
developed Oountrles," All-India congress Committee Economic 
Review. XIII (October ai/^uiTTprii#
•*See "What is Economic Development?"
tions Review. V (^iaroh, 1959), pp* 19-27# reorinteflaT/s 
Veres.* shTony (ed.), Thf\ Landsi A, Dilemma
of the International Ec^---->2 latui rjaxuvisoQt C^anuxer
PiTESisEtng Co,# AywCJ#
chaps, lv
I'
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than "retarded,* It hae therefore become the accepted 
usage In describing the emerging nations of Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East* In this study under­
development refers to the whole range of eoonomlo ilia that 
constitute backwardness from the perspective of the advanced 
oountries of the Vest* A number of social and polities! 
corollaries of economic stagnation are basio to the oonoept 
of underdevelopment and must be considered simultaneously 
with the eoonomie aspeots* There are, moreover, interna­
tional political ramifications to the problem of under­
developed areas which need to be clarified at the outset*
Indeed, it was International polltloe which first 
brought out a concern for the problem ef underdevelopment* 
Backward economies are certainly not new. By the last quar­
ter of the 19th century, when Western Europe and the United 
States were reaping the fruits of the seientlfle-teehnolo* 
gieal revolutions, these regions were already In the process 
of advanced eoonomie development* Ae a ooneequence# even 
befbre the twentieth oentury the areas now associated with 
underdevelopment were in a relatively static condition* The 
sociologist, Gunnar Myrdol,* observes that the long-standing 
disparities between rloh lands and poor have increased 
greatly In reoent decades, Hot until the end of World War 
II, however, were these differences the cause of Interna­
tional concern*
^nieh Lends and Poor (Hew fork! Harper A Brothere,
1957), P. 7*
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Four Important considerations help to aoeount for 
this oonoemt (1) many underdeveloped peoples under Euro- 
pean political domination von independence* (2) the newly 
Independent people were aware of the enormous disparity 
between their own living standards and those of advanoed 
nations* (3) the Soviet Union, endeavoring to expand its 
influence, inaugurated a program to subvert some of the 
underdeveloped nations, such as Qreeoe, and eourt others, 
suoh as India and China, offering its own eoonomio system as 
a model for development* and (4) the United States, together 
with other Western powers, reacted to the Soviet initiative 
by embarking upon programs of assistance to the underdevel- 
oped countries.
Largely because of rivalry between big power bloos 
in the Cold War, eoonomio development of backward areas 
became a major enterprise in the world, Ihs international 
political ramlfloatlons of the development of underdeveloped
areas, therefore, cannot be overlooked. Indeed, one eoono- 
mle observer sees this as the major faotort
The choice of these [underdeveloped} countries 
between taking the Communist path or modernizing 
with Western aid and friendship will probably de­
termine whether the totalitarian or the demooratlo 
way of life eventually aoqulres throughout the 
world a preponderance of eoonomio, psyohologioal, 
and military power. In other words, it will pro­
bably determine our own seourlty 
of world civilization,1
How soon and to what degree the course of olvlli-
and the course
*Eugene Staley, Jhe Future of Underdeveloped 
(New York* Harper & SrotEersT 1954/,~ J>«
£2112,-
triea
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zatlon may b» signifloantly altered by the successful effort 
of one or the other power bloca to assert leadership over 
the "emerging" nations Is eonjeotural. Tet over and above 
the selfish polltloal reasons for dealing vlth underdevelop* 
ment, there are oompelllng human reasons for Western nations 
to oops vlth the backwardness that grips nearly two billion 
peoples
Allowing for dangers of generalisation, 
what these peoples have In common are their 
problems and their history of misery. They are 
poors they are diseased| they are hungry| they 
are badly housed; they oan neither read nor write} 
they die young} they are Increasing by more than 
a million a month. And for the first time they 
have a common awareness of their problems.1
Their problems In terms of food, national wealth, 
literacy, education and other indioea of development are
Ogigantic. Some figures on theee Items, comparing China 
and India with the United states and the world mean, are 
illuminating.
Calories per capita per dayi 
China (1949*50)
India 
U. S.
world mean
2,030
2,000
3,100
2,470
^Forrest D. Hurden, "Revolution of Rising Expec­
tations," In Psntony, op. cit.. p. 7*
2The data In the following tables are from Worton 
Gins burg, Atlaa pfJEccnomi p Pevfflonmert (Chi carol Unlver* 
aity of OhVoagorrsss, lyul). host oi ths Figures cited 
ars originally from United Rations sources.
!
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Gross national product par capita (In tJ« S. dollars)i
% 56*00
72.00 
2,343.00 
200.00
China
India'
U. S.
world mean
Percentage of adults literate!
China
(including Taiwan) 45-50#
15-20# 
96-97#
India 
C. S*
rend mean 56#
Peroent of aotive pop.ilatlon in agricultural ccoupa- 
tionsi
69#China (1950)
India 
V, S.
world mean
Primary school enrollment (percentage of ohildren 
5-14 in primary school)t
China
India
U. S.
world mean
Percentage of total population In eeoondary and 
higher educations
China
India
U» 8.
world mean
Kilometers of railway per 100*000 populations 
China 
India 
C. S.
world mean
71#
12#
59#
32#
22#
86#
42#
0,77#
1.88#
6,02#
2.29#
5
15
214
49
u
Kilometers of roads per 100,000 populations 
China 
India 
U, S.
world mean
Consumption of stool (metric tons per 100,000 popu­lations
31
134
3,298
496
China1 
India 
U. 3.
world mean
Electricity generation (kilowatt-hours per oaplta)t 
China 
India
U, S.
world mean
6*
7.4
622*
100,
21
23
3,797
570
YJhnt these figures point up is the tremendous gap 
between developed and underdeveloped nations, as veil as the 
enormous obstac7.ee to economic growth. Indeed, a vioioua 
oyole of poverty is suggested. People do not get enough to 
eat because they do not produoe enough food} they do not 
produce enough food because they do not poseees the tech­
niques and tools necessary? the tools and techniques are 
lacking because there is insufficient Industry and education! 
Industry and eduoatlon are Inadequate because the country 
lacks the capital and facilities to sustain the"1* capital 
and faculties are lacking because the vast bulk of energy 
ie spent on agriculture which le not sufficiently advanced
1This figure is from the Chinese Communists Sta­
tistical Bureau Report for 1955* Bata for 1958 place China 
at 12.5 tone per 1,000 persons, but 1958 figures havs become 
subject to serious question.
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to feed the people adequately, to say nothing of producing 
a surplus for Investment purposes*
Agriculture, thus, Is central to the problem of 
underdevelopment* Because of the non-industrial character 
of backward economies, the beslc, and often the only sig­
nificant sector of the economy is agriculture, The major 
Internal source of capital generation for industrialization 
in agrarian nations is agricultural surplus* Therefore, no 
large scalt economic development is possible In underdevel­
oped countries until the methods and output of agriculture 
are advanced. Herein lies ths most fundamental difficulty 
in the development of retarded economies* how to advance 
from subsistence agriculture to surplus agriculture.
The great majority of farmers in underdeveloped 
areas product barely enough food to sustain themselves.*
In such countries as China and India, however, farmers have 
to soma extent produced commercially. But during the past 
ten years in China food production has barely Icept pace with 
population increase,2 and slnos 1259 apparently not oven 
this minimum has been achieved. India has likewise had 
great difficulty in mooting food requirements, ** Tet, des­
pits the obviously fundamental rola of agriculture in
*Penteny, op>_ _cit.» p, 95.
SReed J. Irvine, "Phantom Pood in Communist China," 
Asian Survey. No* 1 (ilaroh, 1961), p* 25*
^Paul Crimes, "Indians Econonto Well-Being is 
Still Par Ofti* The lire? York Tines (January 9, 1962).
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eoonomlo development, there have been attempts In both 
China and India to plaoe first priority on heavy industry
and move forward into industrialisation without first devel- 
oping agricultural resources Both have found that this is 
impossible, and in plans announced in 1962, both have plaoed 
highest priority on agriculture,®
It is not difficult to understand why planners of 
development, eager to demonstrate tangible proof of eoonomlo
progress, should by-pass agriculture in favor of heavy in­
dustry* Faotories, smokestaoks and steel ingots symbolise 
industrialisation, and with technical as si stance from ad­
vanced countries these monuments to progress can be erected 
relatively swiftly* But the modernization of ancient 
agrarian systems is a very slow, difficult and uncertain 
undertaking*
Peasant resistance to new methods in agriculture 
is one of the primary obstacles to rapid economic advance­
ment* farmers are well known for their conservative char­
acter, This is particularly true of illiterate peasants 
whose inability to read plaoee them beyond the reach of 
even the most rudimentary agricultural education programs* 
Moreover, they are almost completely Isolated from the
^Choh-ming Li, "Economic Development*** The Chine 
Quarterly. Bo* 1 (January-Karoh, I960), pp# 35-3°, *3*
®See Grimes, op. clt.. for analysis of Indian r 
cognition of agricultural priority* Noting China's recog­
nition of the basic role of agriculture was Chou En-lai in 
a speech before the People's Congress in April, 19o2« See
!£££&•• pp. 290-291.
"■
\
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far-reaching changes and tremendous progress being achieved 
in farming elsewhere in the world*
Another obstacle to agricultural Improvement 
in underdeveloped areas is the system of land tenure* Land* 
lordisn is one of the predominant features of backward agrar­
ian economies. Tenant farmers are in many eases hopelessly 
in debt to the landlord* Sven when he farms his own land* 
the peasant is frequently confronted with a parcel too snail 
for effective farming* Yet he is usually unwilling to merge 
his land with others in cooperative agriculture* Land re­
form , therefore* is often the most important initial step 
towards increased agricultural output*
Developing nations are thus faoed with the dual 
problem of carrying out land redistribution and inducing 
farmers to adopt modern teohnlques* Because powerful land­
lords are frequently reluctant to give up their power* and 
beoauee peasants are usually tradition-bound and unreoeptive 
to technical change, improvements In agriculture are ex­
ceedingly difficult to aohieve* If landlords resist land 
reform* a demo ora tio government euoh as India has only 
limited means of conducting the land redistribution essen­
tial to economic advancement.1 If the government Is obliged 
to rely entirely on persuasion and education in order to 
induoe peasants to ohange teohnlques* increased output will 
prooeed at a very slow paoe* On the other hand* If a
■fee# iaca«» pp. 249-267.
3
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regime resorts to force in meeting these problems it runs 
the serious risk of causing tremendous economic and social 
dislocations! with the attendant difficulties of dsollne 
in peasant morale and output.
In short, there seem to be no simple or quick 
solutions to ths baslo problem of underdevelopment which is 
the retardation of agriculture. But emerging nations vlth 
enormous populations supported largely by an agrarian econo* 
my, such as China and India, simply cannot circumvent the 
problem of agriculture, however difficult it may be to 
solve. There are basically two reasons for this. First, 
these countries are dependent upon agriculture for the bulk 
of their national income. Therefore, initially at any rate, 
oapital for investment in Industry must oome from the agri­
cultural sector. Seoondly, if these countries cannot achieve 
self-sufficiency in food production, they must expend large 
quantities of foreign exchange In purchasing food abroad, 
thus losing precious oapital needed for Industrialisation.
So long as agricultural production is low, the primary 
source of financing Industrial development will be strictly 
limited) and to the extent that food must be imported, the 
industrialization process will be held back. For these 
reasons, agricultural development is the key to eoonomie 
growth in China and India.
CHAPTER TWO
Government and Ideology in Economic Development
Because of the scope and the enormity of obstacles 
In the path of economio growth, government has oome to plsy 
the leading role In planning and Implementing development*
The rationale behind government directed development has 
simply been that in backward economies there are no other 
agenoies vhloh can generate the tremendous energy and momen* 
turn necessary for the "big push" required to free the economy 
from the cycle of poverty* This role of the government le 
emphasized by Myrdal, who observeri
It Is assumed by all that it Is the state 
that must be responsible for both initiating the 
over-all plan and seeing that it Is oarried out 
• • • Beoause of the various defioienoiee in a 
backward country it is also aooepted by every­
body that the government will have to take over 
many functions which in most advanoed countries 
in the western world are left to private business*1
One of the leading Amerloan experts on underdevel­
opment ooonomios, Alexander Eckstein of Harvard University* 
holds that the very nature of backward economies is such as 
to narrow greatly the soope of individualism in the eoonomio 
sphere if rapid growth is desired* His theory is that
a* the greater the range of ends and the 
higher the level of attainment sought!
b* the shorter the time horizon within 
whioh ends an to be attained* that is the more 
rapid the rate of eoonomio growth desired!
1;3yrdal, op* cit.« p* 61*
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o. the more unfavorable the faotor and resource endowments)
d. the greater the institutional barriers 
to eoonomio change and industrialisation) and
e. the more backward the aoonomy in relativeterns
the greater will tend to be the urge, push, and 
pressure for massive state intervention and ini­
tiative in the process of industrialisation, and 
at the same time, the greater will be the need 
for I government] Intervention if a breakthrough, 
rather than a breakdown, is to be attained
This is essentially the viewpoint held by many 
Western economists, writers, soholars and government leaders
who have made publlo their views on development of baokward 
nations.2 Ths state-directed "big push" is the basis 
assumption of ths ?ivs Tear Plane ef both China and India.
There is, then rather wide acceptance that government must 
of neoes8ity be the dominant agenoy of eoonomio development* 
The only serious opposition to this view has been 
presented in e number of books, articles and lectures by 
Peter T. Bauer, Professor of Koonomics at Cambridge Univer­
sity. Professor Bauer takes to task every one of the assump­
tions which underlie the development plans of most emerging 
oountrles as well ae the pollelse of advanoed nations In 
support of those plane. Among the general ideas which
*Alexander Eckstein, "Individualism and the Role 
of the State in Economic Growth," Economic Development .and 
9711 tura Chancre. VI (January, 1958), 83.
2In addition to Myrdal, tfalenbaua and Eckstein 
already mentioned above, other prominent spokesmen of this 
View art John P. Kennedy and Sherman Cooper, co-authore 
of the Senate Resolution of February 19* 1959 pledging U.S. 
support to India's Second Five Year Plan, Adlai Stevenson, 
Avcrall Hsrrlaun, Hubert Humphrey, Christian liortor, J. £. 
Galbraith, Max F« Millikan and W. W, Roe tow.
!
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Myrdftl says are "accepted by everybody" and which Bauer 
refutes are the followings^ (1) that economic development 
depends basically on capital expenditures (2) that develop* 
sent can take place at a satisfactory pace only along social* 
1st lineaj (3) that in a planned economy, the rate of 
lnorease of the national income, the volume of total Invest* 
ment, and ths other elements oomprising the economy should 
be eentrally determined by the government] (4) that heavy 
Industry has a special role to play as an instrument of 
eeonomio advancement] and (5) that private enterprise does 
not and oannot contribute significantly to eeonomio develop* 
mont and that vher# it is temporarily allowed la certain 
sectors it must be oloeely and directly regulated by the 
■tats.
Lauer contends that these ideas are either “over* 
simplified or outright fallacious,"2 he holds that agrioul* 
ture rather than industry should reoeive first priority# 
that Individual and private enterprise should be allowed 
full and free development, that consumer Industry should 
take precedence over heavy industry, and that ths "big push" 
theory has failed to improve significantly living standards
where it hoe been appled. Moreover, Bauer sees gov a 
directed development as
ths pursuit of a primarily political aim• « •
APctnr T. B*«er, r-«*~^j**~*
F—--- * o T1 -- (WashiL^
AamiWMt a«.vM, P, 91*
« ▼« r
P. 90.
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la an Intellectual climate permeated by ever* 
simplified, or outright confused economic ideas, 
which explains the paradoxical and costly poll* 
ciea whioh a pov erty-sfcrloken, materially back* 
ward country, with a large subsistence eeotor 
can ill afford*1
Bauer's views, however, are decidedly In the nl* 
nority. The generally accepted notion In both baclward and 
advanced nations. Communist and non-Communist, is that rapid 
economic development of underdeveloped areas demands the 
vigorous leadership, planning and direction of government* 
Sight or wrong, tills is the view which prevails.
The Nature of Ideology
The powerful role of government In economic devel­
opment suggests the importance of the political philosophy 
represented by the government* Regimes which eonduct far* 
reaching economic and social reforms predicated on the 
assumption that the traditional economic and social order
le unsatisfactory, do so obviously in terms of oertaln norms 
If the aim is to "advance" and "better" certainand values*
conditions, then the goals being sought have clearly had to 
be established in terms of dsoislone ae to what was wrong in
the old order, what is right about the proposed new order, 
sad how the transition from the old to the new should be 
made* A word whioh describee these assumptions, norms, be* 
llefs and processes of change is ideology* As yet, social
20
eolentlsts have not eomo to any agreement on n preelao def­
inition of ideology* But out of a suramary of different 
interpretations* a oonaensue on the meaning of Ideology is 
possible*
The Amarltwm College Dictionary defines ideology 
as ”1* the body of doctrine* myth and symbol of a social 
movement* Institution* class or group* 2* suoh a body of 
dootrine* etc* tilth reference to some political and cultural 
plan* as that of fasoism along with devices for putting it 
into operation* * Vers it not for the faet that eminent 
sooial scientists have differed at length on the meaning of 
Ideology* this definition would seem Quite adequate* It is 
supported by Robert Haelver^ in his epitome of modern govern* 
mont where he remarks that "at the present time •ideology* 
has bsooms current to mean any scheme of thinking character* 
istie of a group or olase*”2 Perhaps the moot eueoinot 
definition is that given by historian Clanton W, Williams«3
In its simplest sense the word "Ideology" 
means a political philosophy* But it also Implies 
a plan of notion to bring that philosophy into 
actuality*
But there art many Interpretations of the meaning 
of ideology* Por example, two specialists in the nature of 
ideology* Hwrmah irsndt and Joseph Rouoek* emphasize that it
*The Web of Government (Mew Torki The Macmillan
Oo** 1947).
gIbld.* p* 454.
3 (Maxwell Air Pores Basecowni
Alabama! Air University, 19jl), p* 5*
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la pssudo-Bolantifio# As Arendt notes, "ideologic* art 
known for their selentiiMo character! they combine the 
Bciantifio approach with reoulta of philoaophleal relevance, 
end pretend to ha aolantlflo philosophy.111 Rouoek haa ob- 
served that "the ideologies most effecting the course of 
aooi&l events have been presented In supposedly 'scientific' 
forms—Liberalism, Democracy, Socialism, racial theories 
and vhat not.”2 fat, as both Arendt and Rouoek point out, 
despite the scientific facado of ideologies, they are so* 
tually more akin to theology, because faith—and in nany 
instances ritual and mythology—is mors hasio to the concept 
of ideology than to soienoe. Ideological prlnolples art 
looked upon by those who espouse them se "sacred and timeless 
lavs vhloh cannot be contaminated by experl meate slnoe [ the] 
creed eoeke to be a smooth and consistent flow sf absolute*"'* 
Moreover, "that [the ideologist] uses the methods and phras­
eology of soienoe oannot conceal his true nature) his is the
Atheologioal temperament applied to polities.
According to this view, then, ideology io a syn­
thesis of faots and assumptions. To the extant that it
^Hannah Arendt, yv« ~
(Cleveland World Publishing c«s., iyw), p. 
book first appeared in 19r>l and eo<- *e one of the p 
tailed end euxhoritetiv# analyses of iacolegy ave
^Joseph Rrmeak, "Ideology es a Me*** of 8* 
Control" in B. C. 6 svoer and H. h. Wilson, J 
cl P —* -r (hew larky Aaerioan Booa Co,,
PP. 522-523.
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• ee
I'IXtt Sf A
/l| k* ~
22
hold* dear oertaln assumptions, Ideology la lese the logic 
of an idea, as the void suggests, than it ie an effort to 
demonstrate an ideal which nay differ radically fron the 
soolal realities* But it would be unfortunate to dismiss 
or denounce ideology simply beoauae it is unscientific or 
beoauss it is not as scientific as its jargon might imply| 
beoauae, for all its shortcomings, Ideology can be an <. 
indispensable faotor in the making of human progress* The 
proper combination of reason, faith, and passion, which some 
observer* sssooiats with ideology, can generate ths energy
necessary to produce constructive change la the soolal 
order. As these same observers1 note, "ideologies • « , 
have had [the] capacity to move vast bodies of people, to 
stir dlsoontent, and to bring about reallocation not only
ill,"2of values, but of political pi
This is a most significant observation on the 
revolutionary nature of Ideology, Zt does not msaa that 
ideology is lnno facto revolutionary, but it suggests that 
revolutionary movements rsly strongly on ideology. Inasmuch 
as revolutions may produce either open or closed societies, 
it should bs emphasised that ideology is not to be identified 
solely with totalitarian systems.
There is, however, some disagreement between ex* 
ports as to whether or not dsmoeratlo polltioal systems nay
■
1* . J. Could and £» V, Stasis, T 
Banaom Bouse, lSiui), *•
ZZl?-**-**as
Politic? (Hov Torki
P# 1X5#
I
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be characterized aa ideologies* According to Heins Eulau 
of Stanford University* the political order of the United 
States has, at tines, approached ideology but has never 
actually entered that sphere* Says Eulau
The New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt, just as 
the New Freedom of Ytaodrow Wilson before, and the 
Fair Deal of Harry Truman later, had its quota of 
Ideologues, but was not an ideology) it had its 
following of true believers, but was not a ohil- 
lastlo faith) it produced far-ranging reforms, 
but was not a crusade) it was rich in inventions, 
but was not an experiment) it mobilised huge ma­
jorities, but was not a revolt of the masses) it 
generated forceful national leadership, but was 
not a oharlematlo surrender*
The New Deal and other vigorous, inventive administrations 
in American national government were not manifestations of 
ideology, according to Eulau, because they were not a 
"coherent and oonslstent set of beliefs, values, opinions 
and aspirations.
This view le shared by Arthur K* Schlealnger, Jr*, 
Harvard University historian and advisor to President John ■ 
F* Kennedy, who holds that the "liberal politicians 
Theodors Roosevelt and Voodrow Wilson and Franklin D* Boos 
ignored the philosophers of either/or, and
* * •
vslt
orsatsd mixed societies*"^ Te Behlesinger the American
It*
1"The American Welfare State) Neither Ideology
(ed»), Contemporary Polltl- 
I lAxiXiZiiXat Auaus,* ca*,nor Utoola" in Joseph S* Roueek(Patterson, N* J*ical Ideologies
1961), P*
gIbld*. p. 416,
-*An excerpt from Sehleslnger*e forthcoming book.
The Politics of Hope* published in the Saturday Evening fo-t* OfiZZaV1 llw 13. 1962), 13-14*
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tradition is not an ideology because it is "humane, experi­
mental and pragmatic; it has no sense of messianic vision 
and no faith that all problems have final solutions*"1
But is ideology limited to those political philo­
sophies and programs which take on the quality of chilisstic 
faith, messianic vision, zealous crusades, and charismatic 
surrender? If so, then democratic systems cannot be dis­
cussed in terms of ideology* She relationship between ide­
ology and democracy needs to be clarified because the ideo-
plogical nature of modern totalitarianism has led some people
to equate ideology and total power, thus making it a Con­
'scept alien to democracy* It is true, as Arendt points out/ 
that not until the eras of Hitler and Stalin were the great 
politloul potentialities of ideology discovered* There is 
a strong tendency for ideologies to provide what Arendt 
oalls "total explanation” of things "by the application of 
a single idea to the various roalms of reality,"* This 
view is supported by Alexander Inkoles, who holds that "an 
ideology is a rationalization of the total [aooio-eoonomlo- 
polltioal] situation and of the individual's relation to 
it."^ Thus, the Marxist would explain history, social class
^Ibld*« p* 14*
^See the symposium on "Totalitarianism and Ideol­
ogy* in Carl J. Friedrioh (ed). Totalitarianism (Cambridge! 
Harvard University Press, 1954), pp* 3d-l41*
^Arendt, oa, sit.* p# 463,
4\l?rledriohf op# clt»»
5lbid., p. 137.
p. 133.
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relations, politic*, and all azlologioal problems from the 
standpoint of economic determinism* The Sasl would explain 
these things within the framework of racism. But such total* 
itarian attitudes may be viewed simply as idea*systems 
carried to extremes rather than as examples of Ideology as 
such. In short the matter of whether or not denooratio 
systems may be looked upon as ideologies is determined by 
whether ideology is defined in broad or narrow terms.
Inkoles has suggested that "an ideology is a eet 
of attitudes or perhaps better of positions, toward the 
world.1,1 Certainly there are attitudes and positions with 
which democracies are associated# Few political philosophies 
haws bean expressed with greater firmness, eloquence and 
ideological intensity than the American Declaration of In* 
dependence, which has become almost synonymous with the 
spirit of democracy. "That all men are ereated equal," 
that they ere endowed with the "unalienable rights" of "lift, 
liberty, end the pursuit of happiness" are, according to 
Jefferson, not merely assertions or working hypotheses but 
"self-evident truths.*2 This oreed has become the basic 
charter of the Amerlosn system. As Ralph Barton Perry^ has
■
2?or an account of the Declaration, its euthc 
and an interpretation of the wording eee Lo»* e K* 
c-pfereon the Yl~*l * u (h«w lor*! Little, brown A W.,
/tU/fi
(•«* ***4 Jew (*•* VmnguuNI
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written, "The history of American democracy is a gradual 
realization, too slow for sows and too rapid for others, of 
ths Implications of the Declaration of Independence.” These 
Implications, according to Joseph Rouoek are quite dear, 
and they determine the ldeologloal nature of democracy. 
Rouoek writes!
• . • democracy ... is the only ideology which 
welcomes many opinions, tolerates many oreeds, 
protects minority interests ... It Is the only 
oreed propounding that ths State exists for the 
Han, not Kan for the 8tate, and that the ends of 
organised sooiety, however Important they are, 
be obtained by demooratio means.1
Thus, deaooraoy, even though It connotes an open 
sooiety, tolerant of various Ideas, Is nevertheless a creed* 
Beoause it is, ths demooratio system has deoidedly ldeolog­
loal overtones. The demooratio philosophy, though It may 
not attempt total explanation, does hold Individual liberty 
as an inviolate tenet. And there is a tendency, as Robert 
Hutohlns observed,2 for demoorats to offer demoeraoy as a 
ours for the world's problems and more demooraey for the 
ills of demooraoiee. In order to plaes both totalitarianism 
and deaooraoy in the category of ideology, however, it 
should be emphasised that the totalitarian idea by defini­
tion always employs its idea-scheme totally, whereas the 
deaooraoy, by the very nature of its toleranoe, does not.
But perhaps one observation on ideology which
^Roucek, "Ideology as a Means of Social Control,”
OPm Cltmm p9 526#
2Robert Hutchins, "Is Demooraey Possible?," Jbf 
Saturday Review. February 21, 1955, p* 15*
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would b« almost squally applleabls to ths totalitarian and 
dsmooratle systems Is that of Alexander Gersohenkrom "Id 
ology clearly has two functions! a role as a determinant 
of policy decisions, and a role in shaping ths propaganda 
which makes the policies acceptable*"1 The policy deelslons 
may be different in the two systems, and the propaganda re* 
latlng to the deolslons will be different. But Ideology 
plays a role In both.
It may be seen, then, that there are several as* 
peots to the oonoept of Ideology, But, despite the varying 
Interpretations given to the oonoept, in almost all instances 
the term oonnotes, first ths prevalence of a central Idea 
or set of ideas within a polltioal system, and, second, a 
process or soheme for the Implementation of these ideas. 
Therefore, any government engaged in conducting far-reaching 
reforms would bs inclined to theorise, organise and act 
within the framework of a dlseemable ideology.
Thus, because it Is basic to both theory and 
notion, the Ideology of a government ought to be examined 
closely if one is to understand and evaluate the govern* 
ment'o polloles. This is particularly Important in instances 
where one attempts to oompare divergent polloles of differ­
ent governments faoed with similar problems.
But before dealing with the ideologies behind the 
Chinese and Indian approaohes to eoonomlo development, which 
will be taken up in ohapters three and five, respectively.
Friedrich, on. clt«. p, 137,
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it would bo wall to examine In oono detail the condition* 
prevalent in the two oountrlea at the oneet of planned 
development* In this way it may be poaslble to understand 
the challenges whioh evoked an ldeologloal response*
China At The Onset of Planned Development
When the Chinese Communists won oontrol of the 
mainland in 1949 the economy whleh they Inherited was In a 
state of oollapse*^ Since 1911 the nation had been upset 
by ohronlo civil disorder* revolution* and military up* 
risings* From 1937 to 1945 China was at war with Japan* 
Then* in the period 1946*49* the nation was torn by the 
Hatlonallst-Communist olvil war* whioh resulted In the 
establishment of the People's Republic on Oetober 1* 1949* 
The monetary system left behind by the Kuomintang 
was wreoked as a result of the prolonged inflation which 
oommenoed with the war against Japan In 1937 and grew 
steadily worse* By 1947 the Rationalist government had 
lost all semblanoe of oontrol over eommodity prioes and 
the value of money* As the fiseal and polltioal situation 
deteriorated* the flight of gold and foreign exchange from 
the country accelerated quickly* Hasty attempts to replace
China (Hewlf2JkUU SSSii'AsSScSw^rT'^), pp. U-ouraaA 
J* 1. Hughes and D* S* T. Luard* The Economic .BevslflBaywt 
of Communist China (London* Oxford uxuvoreity Fra*** lso9}* 
PP* 5>o4*jBo of these studies lnolude useful summaries 
of the Chinese eoonomy at the point of Communist takeover*
!o P^rv
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old currency with now issues failed* By August, 1949 the 
Tuan was almost worthless,1 the only valued currencies la 
the economy being United States and Mexican dollars.
The condition of the eoonomy in other respects 
Was equally oritlcal. Agriculture was still based on the 
intensive, subsistence farming of small land parcels, just 
as it had been for centuries. 2 The procurement and market­
ing agencies for grain had virtually ceased to function by
1949. Although the process of industrialization had begun 
earlier in China, largely through the efforts of Western 
investors and manufacturers* Industrial output was still 
exceedingly small and oonoentrated in a few areas. The
^Hughes and Luard, qp.c£fr.P pp. 45-51* 
exohange wast Ctf$1,207>421.87 to USvl.OO*
The rate of
2land ownership, utilisation and tenancy in China 
are matters whloh, because of the lack of euffioient data, 
have long been subject to debate. It is difficult to say 
precisely how long the farming of small paroels has been 
the rule in China, but in the studies of John Loosing Buck, 
who has written the major works on this subjeot, the assume- 
tion is that it had been the rule for a very long time* See 
Buck, ghlneas Perm Economy (Ohioagot University of Onioago 
Press, 19^0)," p. 237 One economic historian sites evidence 
to indloate that subsistence farming of small paroels la 
China dates baok to the fifth century B.C. See bu Oaing- 
chao, “Economic Development* in Harley P. MaoHair (ed.), 
China (Berkeley! University of California Press, Xvjl)t 
PP* 455-456.
Before the Communists imposed collectivisation, 
land holdings avtraged 3.7 acres per farm household eom-rd- 
lng to Ceorge Oreseey, Land of the c*0 Mill n (h«w lo 
KoGraw Hill Book Company, iuc., ip. Tnie » V be
oompared with Buck's figure of 3*3 sores. Although tf**ant 
farming has long been widespread in Onina, the bui ef 
farmer* traditionally owned ail or part ef tn* l*nd tn 
worked. See Buek, P^u-Oit., p. 423. for a fu 
eonsult Buojc, ' *
Committee on 0**■**.»•*—0 >*, uj
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center cf heavy indue try, Manchuria, ni paralysed a* a 
result of the Soviet Union's removal of equipment and sup* 
plies after the edlapso of Japan in 1945* Moreover, the 
complete disruption of transportation and communications 
during the oivll war had brought almost to a standstill the 
industry which was still lntaot,1 furthermore, there was 
not oven any assurance that the Communists had inherited a 
land with significant mineral resources and other raw 
terlals. Despite muoh speculation about China's unexploited 
natural wealth, knowledge about it was incomplete at beet. 
But on the basis of available data, Wu Yuan-1i concluded in 
1956 that "China does not appear to be especially favorably 
endowed by nature, although iron and coal reserve 
basie ingredients of heavy Industry—were believed to bo 
sufficient.
However, in spite of possible future dlseov* 
cries, it is still true that with the exception 
of suoh minerals as antimony, tungsten, and tin, 
known reserves in Communist china are exceedingly 
email in comparison with total deposits in tne 
rest of the world. Thie relative, If not absolute, 
poverty In underground reeouroee stands la su» 
oontraet to tne large population of Onina and *•*•» 
vale tne land shortage • . ■
Thus, when the Chinese Oommuniets established 
their government in 1949 they Inherited on eoonosy la an 
advanoed state of doolino. Hot only wao there the hint
the
Htu Yuan*li
ami*. p. 23. 
3ln.
PP. 25*27.
, OP. C*t.. p. 12.
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deficiency In the agricultural sector, tut also an Indus* 
trial capacity ao small that it offered no basis for rapid 
expansion* What the Ooomunl sts were oonfrented with, then, 
was a long list of eoonomio handicaps which nay be summarised*1 
as followsi (1) what little modem industry China had was 
concentrated in Manchuria and at a few treaty ports in 
China proper| (2) the basic source of capital for modem 
enterprise was foreign investment! (3) there wai 
shortage of such essentials for eoonomio development as 
transport and communication facilities, hydro*electrio power 
and organised investment markets! (4) consumer goods Indus* 
tries vers relatively more developed than heavy industry!
(5) underground raw materials were largely unexploltedf and
(6) rampant inflation had rendered the fiscal system chaotic*
Although the economic retardation which confronted 
the Communists in China waa a sufficient challenge in itself; 
there vere still other factors cf a coclal and cultural na» 
ture which represented perhaps equally serious obstacles to 
economic development* First of all, there was the soolal 
stigma on manual labor and commerce* A second faotor, re* 
lated to the first, was tha non-development of entrepreneur* 
ship* A third condition was the paternalistic, parasitic 
nature of business organization* finally, there was the 
non-development of technology*
According to the classioal ConfUolan ideal, 1 •
ere
.
e
1iriee P. 32.
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gentleman was one vho had risen above the necessity to pro-*
duoe* achieved leisure, and vae able to pursue scholarly 
Interests,1 If It vae not possible tor a man to be a 
scholar, the Oonfuolan tradition held that it vae more 
honorable to be a peasant voicing his own land than a la­
borer working for another, or a merchant living off the
fruits of another1 s labor, This attitude was still prevalent 
in China when the Communists rose to power, as Fairbanks ob­
served i
The relatively well-to-do peasant, though 
still bone poor by our standards, would seize 
the first opportunity to change his status from 
that of laborer who uses his back and hands In 
the fields to that of a gentleman who wears a 
long gown and affeots some literate interest, 
long fingernails of old China were certainly 
the oheapest badge of leisure ever invented,2
The
The entrepreneur, whose presence was crucial to 
the eoonomio development of capitalist Europe and Sorth 
America, never had a counterpart in traditional China, In­
stead of seeking increased prosperity through profits oeouned 
from inorsassd production or the development of now products, 
the Chinese sought an lnoreased share of what was already 
produced. The oreatlon of new wealth through the exploita­
tion of natural resources apparently did not often oeour to 
the Chinese, The result was that for eenturles the Chinese 
economy was characterised by "a maximum of pooplo competing 
for a minimum of natural resources. Instead of great oon-
^VTohn K# Fairbonk, The United States ard China
(Sew Yorki The Viking Froso, lyo2), p7*b,
- aiSU.
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tlnents and new Industrie* to develop."1
Traditionally, business enterprise In China was 
an appendage of the family* As a oonsequenoe, organisation 
and management In business evolved around familial attitudes 
rather than being determined by economic considerations* 
Control of enterprise was kept in the hands of family a 
bars, end the business frequently beoame a plaoe for relief 
of unemployed, and often incompetent relatives.2 Efficiency, 
a prerequisite for progress in ths modem economy, simply 
was not a vital factor from ths Chines* viewpoint*
Equally adverse In its effects on ths development 
of ths Chinas* economy was the absenoe of technology* She 
lack of mechanical skill and technical knowledge on the 
part of vorkere was a serious handicap to the creation of n 
modem economy* Because the difference between following 
an ox-dravn plow in an open field and handling machinery in 
a mechanized factory is fundamental, it requires a basis 
change in mentality if on* is to giv* up ths former for the 
latter. This is one of the b&sio problems of all under­
developed countries. But it has been especially aoute la 
China baoause of the traditional disparity between mental 
and physloal labor* Aa Vu points out, "She factory workman, 
if he was lltorats, not only aspired to aa efflea job, tut 
considered his work with machinery on the produotlea 11 b
1in..
2Wu Tuan-li, op* C*V. P* 35*
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ae a status he should leave behind as soon as possible*"1 
An Important corollary of this general attitude 
was the failure of China to develop the praotloal sciences 
to any great extent* Technical education In China larged 
far behind the arts and letters so that there vas no reser- 
voir of trained manpover on which to draw in the development 
of technology*
Thus* both In terms of the Immediate economic 
conditions they faced* and the long term resources available 
to them* the Chinese Communists might veil have given in to
despair, so unpromising vas the outlook when they came to
Instead* they embarked upon an lm-pover In October, 1949* 
mediate program to restore economic stability and began to 
formulate plans for extensive* future eeonomlo development* 
The Ideological framework for these programs very soon 
became visible*
India At The Onset of Planned Development
Although the economy of India had not been thor* 
oughly disrupted as had China's duxlng World Har II and the 
period immediately following* the eoonomlo conditions In 
India at the time of independence in 1947 were by no means 
reassuring* Considerable disagreement exists over the 
nature of the Indian eoonomy at the tlmei some obse;
lrv«
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(usually British) holding that India had hesn veil prepared 
for eoonomie development, others (Amerioan and Indian) 
elaimlng the opposite. Sir Percival Griffiths, a high of* 
flolal during the latter days of British rule, surveyed the 
situation and oonoluded that, "far from having the 'oolonlal 
economy* which Britain is sometimes alleged to have fostered, 
India had sufficient Industrial oapaolty to provide a firm 
foundation for her further ooonomlo development, 
oontrast, Vera Hloheles Bean commented that "India had to 
modernize an arohalo economy of the type usually described 
as 'colonial'—that is an eoonomy vhloh provided raw mater* 
lals ... for the industries of advanced nations ... and 
Imported the bulk of its manufactured goods."2
But the principal authority on the eoonomy of 
India, Vera Anstey, who has written the definitive study^ 
on tin subject, holds with the latter view. Indeed, she 
desoribes the Indian economy during the British era as 
"medieval." While noting that some Important contributions 
had been made by the British, Anstey concluded!
It Is difficult to reconcile [the facts] 
with a picture of rapidly progressing industrial* 
lzation. In spite of the improvements in pro* 
duotion and policy since the beginning of this 
century it appears that India has not passed out
Hi By
^Percival Griffiths, (New York!
Prederiok A. Praeger, 1957), P*~l<o.~
2Vera Micheles Bean, f**JP*+*
India (Cambridgei Harvard Univb*o*-y
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of the transitional stage from the medieval to
the modern, that a well-balanced eoonomio life 
has not yet been attained, and that the standard 
of life of the masses remains miserably low.*
She noted, moreover, that India, like China was still depend­
ent upon foreigners for the provision of many goods and 
services essential to an advanced economy.
At the end of the war In 1945, India was fiscally 
well off oompared to China, the war had served as a stimulus 
to Indian production, and a restraint on consumption, with­
out any significant daroge to property and resources resulting 
from the war. Because of war-time curtailments in consump­
tion, Imports were diminished at the same time exports in­
creased, leading to a very favorable balance of payments.
As a consequence, India was able to retire most of her
oexternal debt and had large sterling balances in England.
But this situation deteriorated rapidly. In the early post­
war years severe food shortages necessitated heavy importa­
tion of food grains to India, qulokly turning the foreign
"In this and other respects,”exchange surplus into a deficit.
Perclval remarked, ”1947 has rightly been described as 'a 
bleak eoonomio year in India.
The most serious defioienoy in the economy was the 
same in India as in Ohlnat subsistence farming. For cen­
turies Indian agriculture had been characterised by the
XIbld.. p. 8.
2PercivaI, on. clt., p. 186. 
3ibid., p. 187,
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cultivation of small, fragmented plots on the basis of tra­
ditional methods by illiterate, custom-bound farmers* Tra­
ditional agriculture had long since reached the point of 
diminishing returns and offered no hope of Increased pro­
duction*^ Only the introduction of Improved techniques held 
any promise of Increased output for Indian agriculture* But 
government efforts to Introduce new methods had bean met by 
extraordinary resistance and apathy, so that "India on tha 
threshold of independence was thus in the weai position of 
a primarily agricultural country, unable to feed herself*
The roots of India's difficulties with agriculture 
have been traceable, historically, to social and cultural 
factors. In India, as elsewhere, "the really fundamental 
problem* of economic development are noneconomic*In 
addition to the problem of excessive concentration of 
population in agriculture, with the resulting subdivision, 
indebtedness, and underemployment, India has long been 
plagued by a complex of social institutions such as caste, 
the Joint Hindu family, and the Jajraanl system, all of which 
have been fundamental causes of uneconomic, inefficient 
agriculture.* The prevalence of the Joint family system
1Ant,tejr, pp* cit.. p. 155,
?Ferolval, op. c?t«. p, 181,
^Vera Micheles Dean, "The Development Process" in 
Pentony, op* cit.. p. 6,
*Por an intensive examination of these matters eee
8igiglh*.0SSSS5yJU*tS*.rpi HV&U. £UbiSS.°K*
a prerequisite to economic development eee infra* chap, vi*
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pro duo ed the earns effects in Indian agriculture as its 
counterpart did in Chinese business* The Jajmani system,* 
a corollary of caste* is a scheme whereby certain castes 
are bound to serve the dominant agricultural castes with
specific and limited services* amounting to an hereditary 
and inefficient division of labor* Moreover* the subsist­
ence nature of the rural economy, together with the frag­
mented nature of land holdings, had early led to the practiae
of money-lending by the dominant oastes and the hopeless 
indebtedness of many peasants* Tercival depicts a very 
dismal ploturo of Indian agriculture on the eve of independ­
ences
The Joint family systora destroyed incentive! the 
continual fragmentation of holdings made scien­
tific agriculture impossible! the use of oatble 
dung for fuel—itself the unavoidable result of 
ru till ess tree cutting for generations—deprived 
the land of much needed nour? aliment! and the 
conservatism of the cultivator conjoined with his 
lack of capital 
practices.2
to eonflra him in the traditional
The net result of all these depressing faotors 
was that the agricultural sector of the Indian soonomy was 
normally more retarded than that of China, except for the 
dislocations and debilitation oaused by the war in China* 
At any rate, in the period Immediately preceding the war 
the following comparison of crucial erop yields in pounds
*For a thorough analysis of this problem set 
Osoar lewis. Velar s life in 1 " - n I 11 a (Glsnoa
Free Press, lg^J/,
2Perelval, or. c«t.. pp* 181-182*
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per acre tends to confirm this conclusion#1
India China Japan tJ#S#A« World Mean
728 2,433 3,070 1,680
989 1,350
What this Indloates Is, of course, that the Indian farmer 
was not very productive. What is worse, either the cause 
of these conditions or the result of them "left the average 
cultivator with no real urge to better his lot."2
This bad situation was made even worse by the 
partition of Indie end Pakistan which accompanied independ­
ence. That separation placed 68 percent of the irrigated 
area of undivided India in Pakistan, causing a serious 
decline In yield of food grains in India.^ India's inabil­
ities
Wheat
1,440
811 840990
ity to feed hersolf, then, vacs considerably Increased by 
partition.
If agriculture was a source of dismay in India, 
othor natural resources offered come hope. India was well 
endowed In the quantity and variety of underground mineral 
deposits. With the exception of petroleum, India is sup­
plied with virtually all tha minerals and metals necessary 
to an Industrial society, although it should bs noted that
most deposits have by no means been fully assessed or ex-
But tine long presenoe of the industrial Interests4plolted.
^Md.. p. 182.
p. 180.
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of Britain in India resulted in much greater disoovery and
exploration of natural reaouroee in India than in China*
Potential wealth* however* can become actual wealth only
after years of oostly development* For example* India has
one of the world's highest potentials for hydroeleotrio
power* roughly 35 million kilowatts* but less than 5 percent
of this is presently generated despite heavy emphasis upon
power in the Five fear Plans*1
Another source of promise was that India inherited
from Britain the largest railway system in Asia and a modest*
but important start on industrialization* Early in the
twentieth oentury the British embarked upon a policy of en»
eouraglng some private Industrial development in India* so
that India was in a position to reap some advantages from
othe economic stimulus brought on by World War I* Even 
during the depression of the early 'thirties* industrial 
output of ohenloals and metals continued to expand* This 
productive capaoity reoeived further stimulus from World 
War II. Despite these beginnings* industry in India was 
still in its embryonic stage at the end of the British era* 
and* in foot* production had deollned in the post-war period* 
For example* steel consumption* a basic index of industrial 
growth* dropped from 1*06 million tons in 1939 to *9t in;
Planning Commission. Government of India* " 1 
Ine Macmillan Oo** 19^6), p*
2Peroival, cp._ c't.* p, 183*
Y~t Inflf^ (hew lox'xt
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1947.1 Both domestic production and Imports of steel dlmln* 
lshed perceptibly,2
One of the reasons for the "medieval" nature of 
the Indian economy was that Indie, like China, was retarded 
by a number of cultural factors inhibiting economic devel­
opment along Western lines. In the preface to her book, 
Anstey makes broad reference to this problem*
• , , [II became convinced that India's 
economic problems oould never be solved by the 
mere adoption of oertain speoifio lines of 
policy but that obstacles to progress were 
deeply rooted in the everyday life, customs, 
and social organization of the people, Much 
hard thought, end harder persistent effort on 
the part of the governed, as well as the govern­
ing classes will be necessary before these ob­
stacles can even begin to be removed,3
•»
The moat serious hlndranoe to economic progress 
in India, according to Anstey, is that "religion [ primarily 
Hinduism] excludes the economic motive, and replaoes it by
Thus neither sffioisnoy„4the ideas of oustom and status, 
nor entrepreneurship had an Important plaoe in the tradition­
al Indian economy, Kor was there any greater inclination in 
India to the development of scienoe, engineering and teoh-
1IM1 p. 134,
2It should be noted, moreover, that Britain's 
polloy in India regarding cotton textiles had terioufOy 
orlopled this Important industry. By producing text 
England from raw Indian ootton, then exporting the fi; 
eloth Into India on preferential terms, tne British o> 
very adverse eifeots on tills long seta aliened dou 
inaustry. See Bean, Kow Patterns, p«. 6«!«
^Anstey, on, c't
4nu.. p- **.
•ft
P. Til*,• ft
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noloGQT than there was In China. Moreover,
the religious attitude • . • pervades every 
sphere of life In India, and tends to engender 
rigid traditional!sea and conservatism, and to 
present unreasoning opposition to every innova— 
tlon, however enlightened and humane.
This Is tantamount to saying that India at the point of 
independence was afflicted with severe economic stagflation* 
It was an agricultural nation, incapable of feeding its 
population! its industry was embryonic and in a state of 
decline, despite considerable natural wealth! and, like 
China, India had a traditional culture largely antithetical 
to that of the Vest which had made "economic progress" 
possible.
It was in consideration of these enormous diffi­
culties that Prime Minister Nehru was moved to remarks
We are concerned with the shaping of the 
future of India. It is therefore with a sense 
of the burden of history upon me, upon us, 
upon this iiouso, that I face tills problem. It 
is also with a great sense of humility beoause, 
however great, however competent we may consi­
der ourselves, ve are small in relation to this 
mighty theme, that is, the building tip of India, 
taking tills country and its millions of people 
forward.2
The "building up of India" is a mighty task, 
indeed, and one that has required almost all ths energy 
which the people and government of India oaa muster. And 
in pursuit of this great enterprise, India has produoed
*uu.
2Prom Nehru’s speech to Parliament, l' y 23, 1955, 
presenting India's beoond Pive Tear Ixaxu
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an Ideology for economic development which stands in re* 
markable oontrast to that of China*
CHAPTER THREE
The Ideology of Communist China! 
The Power Concept
The primary source of Chinese Communist ideology
is Mao Tse-tung. Sinoe 1935 Mao has been the principal
philosopher and leader of the Communist revolution in China,
and in hie dual role of chief theoretician and taotiolan he
has dominated the polioy machinery of the Chinese Communists?1
oEven as a youngster Mao was a rebel by temperament* 
away from school at the age of ten to protest the stern
He ran
1Por a summary of the complicated Intra-Party power 
struggle which Kao eventually won, see Robert C* North, 
Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford! Stanford University 
Ttobs, lisU)’,'' cuap. xl. lor"a more detailed aooount, Benja— 
min Sohwarts, Chinese Oommunlsm and t^e Rise of Mqo (Cam* 
bridge! harvard” 1i nlv er a ity” T?ress, is^ne euandard
work. Despite the predominance of Kao in the formulation of 
Party policy and ideological principles, another important 
figure with apparently considerable influence on these mat* 
tore is Liu Shao-chi. Liu, wno is Chairman of the People's 
Republic as distinguished from the Communist Party whioh 
Mao chairs, ooraes olose to rivaling Mao in influence accord­
ing to Harold S, Quigley, China's Politics in Pare] 
(Minneapolis! The University of Minnesota Pass*, 
p. 120* In terms of important writings, Liu is second only 
to Mao as an author of widely-quoted Party tracts* It may 
be that some of Mao's principal pronouncements on ideologi­
cal matters have aotually originated with Liu (see 1 
p. 64, n* 1)* In any oase, Liu is a olose eeoond tu ±w*> as 
a eouroe of Party theory and therefore must be given e 
significant measure of credit or blame for major Pa 
loles* For a brief biography of Liu Shao-chi see &■>
R?& V’: itore (Hew fork! Twayne Pubii* *«,
♦
Elegant, China's 
1951)* ohay. —.
^Biographical data herein, unless otherwl-e e< 1* 
are from Edgar Snow, \ (London! VI
Gollanos, Ltd*, 19j7)* IV* i bwOtion of the b
Mao's autobiography as told to Snow,
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discipline of his teacher, and beginning at about the tame 
age he engaged In a constant "struggle" against hie father, 
a "rich peasant" in Hunan. Moreover, Mao developed an aoute 
sense of political strategy at an early age. In 1936 he 
recalled for hie biographer, Edgar Snow, the power structure 
In his family*
There were two "parties" in the family. One 
was my father, the Ruling Power. The Opposition 
was made up of myself, my mother, my brother and 
so tie time a even the laborer. . . * Ky mother ad­
vocated a policy of indirect attack. She criti­
cised any overt display of emotion and attempts « 
at open rebellion against toe Ruling Power A
2ut as for Mao*
... I learned tliat when I defended my rights 
by open rebellion my father relented but when 
x remained raoek and submissive he only cursed 
and beat me toe more.2
Thus, when Mao Too-tung went off to boarding 
school in 1906 at the age of 16 he was a confirmed rebel, 
and he wae unusually sensitive to the practical aspects of 
power. He had reed widely in popular books on romantic 
tales of old China and was especially attracts! to stories 
of rebellions. But he was a peasant at heart and resented 
the foot that "peasants who tilled the land" never vers 
important In ths stories. "Thers was nevsr a psasant hero," 
Mao complained. Although Kao Tss-tung was a voraoious 
reader, he was mors Interested in political aattsrs t'
p. 128. Snow indicated that "Mao uned all 
terns humorously in his sxplanations."
8im*» P* 129.
•fthese
1
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academic pursuits. Ons year, while he was still a student, 
an inoldent occurred which. Mao said, "influenced my whole 
life." There had been a severe famine and the people had 
sent a delegation to the governor in Ohangsha to beg for 
relief, but they were rebuffed. In protest, the peasants 
rose up in violence and drove out the governor. But when 
the new governor arrived he arrested the leaders of the 
uprising and executed many of them as a warning to the 
people. Kao reoalled the event vividlyt
The incident was discussed in my eohool for 
many days. It made a deep impression on me. Most 
of the other students sympathized with the "insur­
rectionists," but only from an observer's point of 
view. They did not understand that it had any 
relation to their own lives. They were merely in­
terested in it as an exciting incident. I never 
forgot it.A
The boarding school which too attended was unusual 
In that its ourrloulum emphasized the "new knowledge of the 
best" at the expense of the Chinese classics, and. aoeording 
to Mao. "tho educational methods wers quits radical," This 
suited Mao's temperament admirably and he beoame deeply ab­
sorbed in books dealing with the reform efforts of K'ang Yu- 
wei and others. "I read and re-read these accounts ." said 
too, lintil I knew them by heart."2 His preoccupation with 
politics never subsided.
Prom boarding school near his hone, Mao moved on
p. 132,
P. 1M.
I
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to middle school In Changsha.It was here that he first 
oasis into oontaot with the revolutionary currents vhioh were 
beginning to sweep China* Mao read in a nationalist journal 
of the Canton Uprising against the Kanchao, and of the re* 
volutionary oause of Sun Yat-sen. "I was so agitated," Kao 
noted, "that I wrote an artiole which Z posted on the school 
wall." This was Mao's first publle expression of a politi­
cal opinion, and he admitted that it was "somewhat muddled*" 
Shortly thereafter, the incident in Wuhan occurred which 
touohed off the Revolution of 1911 and Mao was swept up by 
it, joining the rebel aray to "help complete the revolution,” 
Kao spent mar t of the pay he received as a rebel 
soldier on revolutionary journals and newspapers. It was 
in their columns that he first encountered Socialism, and 
his response was "enthusiastic."2 Kao resigned from the 
army after six months and resumed his studies, first inde­
pendently at the Hunan Provincial Library, then formally at 
the Hunan Normal School where he woo graduated in 1918 after 
five years in residence. From one of his professors Mao r 
oolved old copies of the revolutionary reorle* s from
whloh he learned about the activities of the T*ung Heng Hui, 
the clandestine forerunner of Sun's Xuomintang. Mao was 
deeply influenced by the stories of patriotism and Socialism
* Mao's autobiography oontalns rmiy f«w f'rrn da 
with which to associate the imnortant ev«r 
rents of hieearly life, he probably entered mmole e * 1 
in tne year 1909,
2Snow, on* c*t.» p, 139,
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which he read in these papers, eo much so that he determined 
to organize a group of young men to carry out "patriotic 
work" In the countryside, 
the "New People'• Study Soolety" whloh Kao and hie colleagues
Prom the ranks of this "Study Soolety" 
came several of the early leaders of the Chinese Communist 
Party.
This group became the nuoleus of
founded in 1917.
Upon graduation from normal sohool Mao deolded to 
go to Peking in order to learn more about China, while many 
of his friends in the "Study Society" headed for Europe.*
In Peking Mao obtained a job as an assistant librarian at 
the National University. During this period, said Mao, "my 
interest in polltlos oontlnued to increase, and my mind 
turned more and more radical,"2 In 1919 Mao returned to 
Changsha and "took a more direct role in polltlos," working 
first as editor of the Hunan student paper, which was sup* 
pressed b7 the provincial warlord for its subversive ar- 
tides. As a dedicated agitator, Mao made a trip to Shangbed 
in 1919 for the purpose of disouselng plans for a "Recon­
struction League of Hunan" with Ch'en Tu-hslu, who founded 
the Chinese Oommunist Party three years later. Kao took a 
teaching position in Changsha but devoted most of his 
energies to organising the Reoonstruotion League and extend­
ing the Study Soolety. In 1920 Mao made a seoond visit to
1£11; P* 1*8*
gIvM p. 149.* 9
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Peking where he "read much about the event* In Russia, and
eagerly sought out what little Communist literature was
available in Chinese." Hao addedi
Three books especially deeply carved my mind, and 
built up in me a faith in Marxism, from which, 
once I had accepted it as the cox'reot interprets* 
tion of history, I did not afterwards waver.
These books were the Communist Manifesto . . . 
the first Marxist boot ever puoilseed xn Chinese)
Class gtrurrle. by Kautsky) and A History of 
Soclcl'I^-a. oy Kirkupp. By the summer oflyj I 
Lr;.d become, in theory and to eome extent in action, 
a Marxist, and from this time on I considered my* 
self a Marxist*1
In July, 1921, Mao Ise*tung became a Communist, 
having joined the conference at Shanghai called by Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu for the purpose of founding the Chinese Communist 
Party. Mao was 28 when he joined the Party, and for several 
years he wae a secondary figure in the organization, serving 
as head of the Iiunan provincial committee of the Party.
Prom the very beginning of his association with Communism, 
Mao exhibited unorthodox tendencies. In violation of Party 
and Comintern policy, Mao took It upon himself to agitate 
amongst the peasants and form peasant "trade unions" In 
Hunan beginning in 1922.2 Contrary to the Party line on 
making the urban proletariat the revolutionary base, Mao 
saw the peasants as the most promising class to carry ths 
revolution.
!
Disturbed at Mao's Insistence on advocating
P. !53.
2EL*gant, CP. c't.. p. 239.
*
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peasant agitation, Oh1an Tu-hslu in 1923 refused to publish 
Mao*s articles la the Party organ Guide, to whioh Kao had 
been a frequent contributor*1 This rebuke brought Kao into 
line temporarily! he subordinated hie obsession with the 
peasants to the offiolal line that the proletariat was the 
vanguard of revolution* As a reward for his conformity, Kao 
was steadily moved up in the Party hierarchy* By 1926 he 
had become director of the Party* s Peasant Bureau with head* 
quarters in his home province, Hunan* It was in this capac­
ity that Mao researched and wrote his now famous report On
othe Peasant Movement in ITanan. This work established Mao 
as the foremost Party authority on the peasantry* But the 
Fifth Congress of the Communist Party in 1927 rejected the 
report and its policy implications, resulting in a cleavage 
which cut Mao off from the Party until 1931
In defiance of Party orders to leave Hunan and 
take up residence in Szechwan early in 1927, Mao stayed on 
in Hunan to continue hie campaign to organize a peasant 
movement for exploitation by Communism, It was probably 
his persistence in this effort whioh enabled Kao to emerge 
ultimately as the dominant figure in the Party, because in 
April of that year, Chians Kai-shek led his Kuomintang 
foroes in a devastating attack against the Oosmunlsts in
^bld*. p. 240.
®?or an analysis of this renor* and Its role in 
Mao's advancement see infra* pp* 99-102*
^Elegant, or* c!t*. p. 240*
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Shanghai where they had been centering their campaign to 
organise Chinese workers.1 The Party ranks were decimated 
in the "April 12 Massacre" and those Communists who escaped
with their lives were forced to flee from China's urban 
centers where Ohlang steadily consolidated Kuomintang 
control. As the Communists fled to the hinterlands of 
China in 1927* Mao Tee-tung* s heretical theories on a peas* 
ant*based revolution suddenly were viewed from a new per* 
speotlve. His unorthodox approach became the means by 
which the Chinese Communist Party oould make a virtue of 
necessity.
His heresy having been vindicated, and the Party's
former policy having ended in near disaster, Mao was in a
position to assert his authority. This he did in the region
of Klangsi provinoe where he formed the nucleus of a peasant
army together with another young leader, Ohu Teh. By 1931
Kao and Chu had established a "Klangsi Soviet" which became
headquarters for the Party. It was not, however, until 1935
during the famous Long March2 of the Chinese Oommunists
from Klangsi to Tenan in Shensi provinoe that Kao finally
xwas able to take command of the Party.
^For an aoeount of this event and an analyels of 
its effects upon the Russian and Chinese Oommunists see 
Harold R. Isaacs, JbeT nrr Jv of t « (
(Stanfords Stonxoxu Iiuvhviw/ , w—
2For a detailed aooount of the Long March see 
Snow, cn. c'it.. Part V.
Elegant, c?. c*t.. p. 243.
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Thu a, from his entry into the Party In 1921 until 
his victory over the Rationalists In 1949, Mao was engaged 
almost continuously In the pursuit of power. It Is signi­
ficant that these were the years In vhloh hs forged the 
Chinese Communist Ideology. Analyzing the nature of Lenin­
ism In a recent article, Bertram L. Wolfe,1 the distinguished 
student of Communist ideology, mads several observations 
which Illuminate the evolution of Maoism. Wrote Wolfei
• • . There Is one aspeot of the Communist Ide­
ology which distinguishes Leninism from all 
other varieties of Marxism and it Is central! 
namely, Lenin's absorption not with the dream 
of soolallsm but with the mechanics and dy­
namics of organization and power.
Mao, like Lenin, seized power "not In a land Vipe 
for socialism,' but in a land ripe for seizing power,"2 
Thus, despite references In Mao's writings to the utopian 
aims of Communism, the achievement and maintenance of power 
is at the heart of the Maoist ideology. In an essay written 
in December, 1936, on "Strategic Problems of China's Rsvolu- 
tlonary War," Mao presented in clear terms the power oonoept 
which governed his thinking!
War is the highest form of struggle between 
nations, states, classes, or political groups, 
and all laws of war are appllsd by s nation, a 
stats, a olass or a political group waging war 
to win victory for Itself ... Tna stage of action 
of a militnry sxosrt is built upon objective 
terlal conditions, but with the otage sat, he can 
dlroet the performance of many lively dramas, 
full of sound and oolor, of power and granasur.
‘"Communist Ideology end Soviet Foreign Polioy," 
Forelra A.#*alrs. XLI (Ootobsr, lyo2), lo9.
sjm>. p. is*.
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W« Red Army Commanders must, therefore* on a 
given material basis—military, political, eco­
nomic and natural oondition display our power 
and lead the whole army to orusii the national 
and olass enemies and to ohange this evil world ■ 1• •
What Mao envisioned in 1936 was a protraoted 
struggle for the military, polltloal and economic control 
of China, The ultimate aim, of oourse, was the establish­
ment of a Communist system, with the state withering away 
and the people enjoying complete harmony in line with the 
dootrines of classical Marxism, But that blissful day was 
in the distant future, and in the meantime, the Chinese 
Communists would exercise power in the pursuit of power, 
orushing their enemies and competitors, acoordlng to the 
ruthless laws of war in an evil world. For Mao, the ends 
he sought in revolution justified the means of achieving 
them, "A revolution," he onoe observed, "cannot be carried 
out 'softly, gradually, carefully, politely, plainly, mod­
estly, *"2 As a poet of no mean talent, Mao always has been 
oareful in his oholoe of metaphors. In response to the 
assertion of a comrade that "Communism is love," Mao replied,
"No, Comrade, Communism is not love. Communism is a hammer
,,■5which we use to destroy the enemy,
For a man who has spent mat of his adult Ilfs in 
the midst of a conspiracy, Mao Tse-tung is sometimes sur-
^Hao Tse-tung, Sale^+M V"^s. I (London* Law­
rence & Wlshart Ltd., 195^)* lof-XSd,
2Richard Huahes, "The Long Mar*h of Meo Tso-tung,"
pew Torfc Times Ks.re.ginn. September 21, lyp8, p. 83*
3n*
\
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prlslngly candid. As s prollflo penman for tho revolution 
hs waged, Mao exhorted hie ooarades and followere in ten* 
which left no doubt as to the dootrlne whloh inspired his. 
Speaking on "Problems of Strategy" in 1938, Mae cnee again 
laid bare the power dootrlne of his ideology when he said! 
"Every Communist must grasp the truths 'Political power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun,'"1 Ee was oareful to add, 
"The Party oosmands the gun, and the gun must never be al­
lowed to oommand the Party."2 But he oommented, pointedly,
• • • Everything in Tenan has been built up bv 
means of the gun. Anything oan grow out of the 
barrel of a gun. According to Marxist theory 
of the state, the army Is ths ohief component 
of ths political power of a stats. Whoever 
wants to seizs the polltleal power of the state 
and to maintain it must have a strong army.
Some people have ridiouled us as adveoates of 
ths "omnipotence of wari" yes we are, we are 
advooates of the omnipotence of the revolution­
ary war, which Is not bad at all, but is good 
and is Marxist.'
It is to be expeoted that the leader of an insur­
rection and master of guerrilla warfare might be enamored 
of the gun. But Mao inferred that his "gun eonoept" carried 
over into other aspeoto of the revolution when he remarked 
that "everything in Tenan has been built up by means of ths 
gun." He might well have been referring to the faot that 
land redistribution amongst ths peasantry and ths subordina­
tion of the landlord class in muoh of 8hensi provines was
1Kao Tse-tung, cp. c‘t.. ZI, 872. 
Vm. Italic, supplied*
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the eoonomie foundation of hio revolution.*
Fundamental to the power oonoept la Mao'a ideology 
vae the idea that with the viotory of the Oommuniet revolu­
tion, China would emerge ae a major world power* the "gun 
theory, * whloh wae a central doctrine throughout the Oomnu- 
niet guerrilla oampalga against the Japanese and during the 
civil war against the H&tionallsts, was to be the meana of 
establishing a new China of "power and grandeur," a China 
feared and respected in the eouneils of nations* And all 
faoets of Mao's ideology were Instruments to be used in the 
achievement of this aim, as a recent editorial in the Shang­
hai Party organ makes oleart
Whatever revolutionary work we have carried 
forward, its ultimate purpose is to rally and 
mobilise the hundreds of toousmods of the masses 
to engage in olass struggle and produotlon strug­
gle, with a view to realising step by 
farsighted polltloal goals of soolall 
auniem*2
The goal, as Mao had emphasised earlier, was power*
let the domestio and foreign reactionaries 
tremble before ue. Let th 
good at this and no good at that*
Chinese people's indomitable energies, we wlxl
step tne 
and eo
say that we are no
fnrough the
*See "Decision of the Central Committee on Land 
Polloy in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas” la Conrad Bn 
Benjamin Bohwarts, and John Palrbank, A r 
ef-Phlnaee (Cambridge* Harv-»u o
* py*
M* « WMI* w* «• *
*Chi Teo-wen, "Looking at Pveble-e f^n the P 
tleal Point of Tier," r *
19oO* p* 5, translated xn u*** • • e * 
Service V #5oxl, September 81, lyoO, herein 
oitid
#-a
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steadily reaoh our goal.*
Mao'* phrase for the overall task of visaing power 
and influenoe for China was "cultural construction." First, 
hs said, through "hard work and bitter struggle 
quickly win victory on the eoonomio front."2
we ean• • •
Following the upsurge of eoonomio oonstruo* 
tlon. an upsurge of cultural construction will 
Inevitably arise. The era in whioh the Chinese 
were regarded as unoivilised is now over, be 
will emerge in the world as a nation with a high 
culture.^
The pursuit of that "high culture" began in earn* 
est with the suooeso of the Chinese Communist revolution 
the fall of 1949* As might be expected, the ideology of 
revolutionary war had to bo modified somewhat in order to 
servo as a workable ideology of government. Mao therefore 
altered his former views, adapting them to the new situation. 
Most notably, the "gun eonoept" beoamo the "dootrlne of per- 
Kao did not forsake his desire for total pollt-suasion."
ioal power, but the means of achieving and maintaining that 
power were modified in light of the tremendous task which 
the Communists faoed in controlling some 600 million people 
and marshalling their energies in behalf of the new China's 
"cultural eonstruotlon.”
*From Mao's opening speech at the flret plenary 
saesion of the Chinese Feoole's Political 0*neultetive t in­
ference, September 21, 19*9, published togevuer wi*a t*e 
other soeeohes in a booklet entitled
Ip (Peking! F«u-~«y*
’
P»"ooratlo plotst*^l^^>,
p. 44.
0
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Speaking of the great problems of vInning support 
for the advancement "toward a Socialist and then Communist 
society#" Kao declared In 1949 that "the methods re use in 
this respect are democratic# that la# methods of persuasion 
and not compulsion*"1 
vlnce4 that the alms of his social# political and eoonomle 
revolution could not be produced out of the barrel of a gun# 
although he remained committed to the viev that the Party# 
and its subsidiary# the government# should hold an absolute 
monopoly on political pover. In a speech delivered to the 
eleventh session of ths Supreme Stats Conference# February 
27# 1957# Kao set forth his doctrlns "On the Correet Handling 
of Contradictions Among the People#” which he then expanded 
into a thesis which has had wids circulation in China sines 
and has beooms a baslo source of ideology* In that state* 
ment# Kao declared that "any attempt to deal with ldeologl* 
eal matters or Questions involving right and wrong by ad* 
ministratlvs orders or ooerolve measures will not only be 
ineffective but harmful* "2 Although he said this within the 
context of remarks emphasising the importance of centralism 
and discipline# Mao nevertheless had nsllowsd sonewhat on 
tter of taetioe einoe 1938* • He expended his doctrine 
of "persuasion” by noting#
By 1957 Kao had become oven more eon*
the
^Froa n epeech "On People1■ P 
ship." on. c*t*. p. If*
oratio piotator*
*Mae Tea*Wan*# Pn r---- * * f* ^ * # r
•:
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We cannot abollah religion by admlnistra* 
tiv* ordersI nor can we force people not to 
believe In it* be cannot eoapel people to give 
up idealism, any more than ve can force them to 
believe in Marxism* In settling natters of an 
Ideological nature 
oratio methods, methods of discussion, of orlb* 
leisai, of persuasion, and education, not ooerolve, 
high handed methods,*
Actually, what Mae Tse-tung proposed was not that 
eoerolon be abandoned, but that a new, more practical and 
effeetive fora of eoerolon than the gun be used to continue 
the revolution. Although tho now ooorolon was oalltd "per, 
suasion," it was a moat oppraaslvo fora of persuasion, do* 
signed to produoe a thoroughly reglaanted people, for what 
Mao devised for the implementation of Chinese Ooamunlct 
goals was an alaborata scheme of social and political control 
through the eonoentration ef power in the party, elate war* 
fare, and thought reform of the masses. Involved la this ■ 
sohsas were the interrelated Maoiet-Leninist doctrines on
• • ,
• we can oru.y use demo*» *
the "new demooraoy,” tho "dictatorship ef the proletariat,"
party activism," and "persuasionm m"dsmoeratlo centralism, 
and education," A familiarity with each of those doctrines
le essential to an understanding ef the totalitarian nature 
ef China's Communist ideology.
Governing Ideologies! Principles
Published In early 1940, Kao's C" m' * ” ** 
I—y was a major work devoting its author to V e r
It** a
-a -
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the foremost Communist theoreticians. Moreover, It was 
unique in that it oontalned the whole theoretloal framework 
for • Chinese brand of Communism with its own "historic 
peculiarities" whloh set the Chinese revolution apart from 
the Russian and left Mao relatively free to Innovate* 
ideologically. After summarising the "feudal" history of 
China,. briefly, and asserting the Chinese Communist aim of 
"building a new soelety and a new nation of the Chinese 
people •.♦.*£in which] there will be not only a new polit* 
loal organisation and a new economy, but a new culture as 
wall, Mao introduced the theory which ie fundamental to 
his ideology!
What, then ie the content of the new poll* 
ties end new eoonomy of the Chinos# nation, and 
what can be lie new culture?
The progress of the Chinese revolution muet 
bo divided into two stages! (1) the demooratio 
revolution! (2) the sooiallet revolution.. These 
stages art different in nature. Ins above men* 
tlonad demooraoy does not have the meaning of 
the old demooraoy. but is a new type of demooraoy, 
or new democracy.
To oomprohond this oonoept, It must bo realised 
that Mao never aeoepted the standard definition of democ­
racy as majority rule determined through porlodio, free 
eleotions. Democracies, aooordlng to the Mao thesis, are
*«ao Tee-tung, On The lew (Washingtons
Government Printing OtiieeTly^/, p.fc. a ^rlntad ee a 
supplement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. F • 
port* The S+.’^atagy end fnoMeqj. f -t from as
t.au«xavmH a*/ (umlovaI/ * AtuaJP
All, hew Age Printing Prees, Bemoay, India (unaated).
g^Vi. p. 5.
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•imply dictatorships of one olass over another. The Vest* 
era democracies ho dssorlhod as "dictatorships of the 
bourgeoisie."1 The "new demooraoy" whioh ho espoused was 
to differ from the old* out-dated Western types in that it 
would bo a demooratio dictatorship of the proletariat.
"This kind of republlo,” he noted, "has already arisen in 
the Soviet Union and will be established in every oountry."2
f
The "new demooraoy," then, was a part of the first stags of 
China's revolution, aooording to Mao. This was the period, 
said Mao, in whloh the Communist Party would weld together 
all of China's "revolutionary olasses" into a demooratio 
dictatorship of the proletariat. It was, In essence, the 
preparatory phase of the revolution, during which time the 
Communists would gradually win political and military con­
trol, oonduot economic reforms and make ready for "transla­
tion to socialism." As Mao put it, "The Communist Party 
has a present program and a future program ... At present, 
it is the new demooraoyi in future it is socialism* these 
two organlo components arc guided by the ideological eyst 
of Communism."**
<pn The F*w r---------r was written during the period
of the United front* between the Oommuniots and nationalists
XIVM.. p, 19.
5J£U.. P. 35.
/'t ft detailed enel/elo ef t* o Polled Frost ooo 
Sorth, o^. flit., onapter *ii.
l
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••a brief period (circa. 1937-1941) of eeesatlon of hoetil- 
ltlee while the two factions ooaleeoed to fight the Japanese. 
Vor this reason, and also because the ranks of the Chinese 
Red Armies vers filled with peasants, Mao was obliged to 
play down the more extreme, long-range eoonomlo alms of the 
Communists. He spoke of the need for "restriction of eapl- 
tallsm" in China "In order that private oapital may not 
manipulate the livelihood of the people."* He indloated 
that in the "damooratio" stage all monopolies and other 
enterprises "too largo for private efforts to manage, suoh 
as banks, railroads, airlines, eto., will be controlled by 
the state."2 But inasmueh as these reforms were In line 
with the declarations of Sun Yat-sen In the first Batlonal 
Congress of the Kuomintang In 1924, they were not exception­
ally bold. Moreover, Mao indloated during this first stage 
of the revolution that the slogan and polloy of the Commu­
nists on the subjeot of agriculture should be that "the 
tiller should own his own land."^ To realise this goal he 
oalled for the oonfisoatlon of big landlord holdings for 
redistribution amongst peasants without land or with very 
little land. But ho did not call for oonfisoatlon of land 
from the oo-oalled "middle" and "rloh peasants.” On the 
contrary, he opeolfloally noted that the "tiller-owner" 
polloy "Is not to build up ooolallst agriculture, but to
XMao, On ffta H«w . P. 23.
f tvi
3▼ « • •i P* 23*
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turn laud into the private property of the peasants."3-
Thus, the "democratic" etage ef the revolution 
would aee the eonverslon of China from a "feudal* dictator­
ship of "bourgeois reactionaries" to a demooratio dictator­
ship of the proletariat, characterized by a state-regulated 
economy, some private enterprise, and peasant ownership of 
the land. What Mao significantly failed to point out in 
hie theoretical fou^ de foroe was just how long the "now 
democracy" or the first etage of the revolution would last. 
Although the Ooomunieta did not announce it until several 
years later, the people of China eventually learned that 
tin democratic phase of the revolution ended in 1949, when 
the People's Republio of China was born. Without ao auoh 
ae a pause or formal announcement the Chinese Communists 
moved immediately into the eooiallst phase, Liu Shao-ohi, 
successor to Mao as the powerful Chairman of the Chinese 
People's Rspublio, disclosed In 1959 that "as far as ths 
main question of ths revolution is concerned, l.e, the 
question of state power, the founding of the People's Repub­
lio of China marked the end of the demooratio revolution and 
the beginning ef the eooiallst revolution,"*
This signified that the tempo ef change was to 
inalderably in the drive to eooialise China, with
■
lnoreai
1in-
*Llti Shro-ehi, "The Vlotery ef F«v*i 
in Ohina" In <P '»|Te t *
Pr*«e, I960), p, b. will a o* lies* ■-** ef 
11shed in e oration ef the a*^uv»r« /
People*e Repuoxro,
a If
«mi t
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tht eonoepts of democratic centralism* party activism* and 
"persuasion and aduoatlon" to be the ldeologloal aeans to 
the soolallat end* These terns* It should be noted* con­
stitute a series of euphemisms. First* although "socialism*" 
as Mao used It* ires not the same as ultimate* stateless* 
harmonious Communism* It was nevertheless nr.;oh sore than 
simply the state ownership of the aeans of production and 
distribution* "Socialism" to tha Communists meant* in 
terms of eoonomlos* the abolition of private ownership*
But Mao has not boon oonslstent in his uss of the term* In 
one place he uses socialism interchangeably with Communism* 
referring to the program "of our eoolaliet or Communist 
system."* In another place he ma&ss a distinction between
the two terms* calling for the conversion of China "from a
Hew Democratic into a Socialist and* eventually* a Communist
osooiety* eliminating elaes and realising universal harmony* 
Aotually* the distinction is not economic but politicals 
The system which Mno refers to Is soolallsst while the state 
still exists, and Communism after the state withers away* 
Inasmuch as Communist literature Is exceedingly vagus con* 
earning the matter of when the state will disappear* the 
distinction between socialism and Communism in the Chinos# 
oontext is largely aoadsmio*
But whichever term Is used* tbs politloal sennets*
^Mao Tso-tung, On tvi ? 
*Mao T-e-tung* On ?m
pp* i6-ir.
•z* p. *2*
•*s T
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tions are ae Important aa the economic. The Sooialist or 
Communist system* as depioted in the MaolBt ideology* ie 
fundamentally oonoemed with political matters. In this 
respeot* the elosely related Leninist precepts of deaooratie 
centralism and party activism are crucial to the Ideology 
of power.
The broad political principle of democratic cen­
tral lam was first manifested in Kao's doctrine on Party 
discipline, whioh is that
1. individuals must subordinate themselves 
ganizationi 2. the minority must sub* 
itself to the major!tyi 3. the lower
to the or 
ordinate
level must subordinate Itself to the higher level} 
and 4. the entire membership must 
self to the Central Committee,1
subordinate it*
Extended into the national political situation* 
democratic centralism means that all non-Party factions are 
subordinate to the Party* in which all political power is 
concentrated. Or as Mao put it* "democratic centralism 
[requires that ] the minority shall obey the majority* lower 
organizations shall obey higher organizations* and [all ]
oorganizations shall uniformly obey the control organisation."i
*Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works* II, 254. When the 
Party constitution was revised for the Seventh Party Com? 
in 1945 Liu Snao-ohi, a major contributor to the revision* 
reportedly formulated the provision for "democratic central* 
ism," leading some observers to credit him vita eul 
of the oonoept in China (see Elegant, PP* 17>"175J.
But this is an old Leninist principle luid been adopted
bv Mao long before 1°>45* The passage quoted above was 
written by Mao in 1936.
ow'-l. P"’lor 0“—
Hsport of tne o. u
States Senate* Subcommittee on het'onal P LI ' M 
Both Congress* Second Session (Wasujui&boni l*t»vsj
-• •-* rv*
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The Standing Committee of tho Central Polltloal 
Bureau of the Party Central Committee Is the oontrol organi­
sation, and as suoh is the highest organ of the Communist 
Party* The fundamental importance of democratic centralism 
to the power of the state was emphasised by the editors of 
the Peking People*s Dally in 1956, who pointed out*
* * * The oorrect praotice of democratic central­
ism in state affairs and the proper strengthening 
of leadership by the Party in the socialist oourse 
are the basio guarantees that countries in the 
soolaliat [ Communist] camp will be able to unite
, overooae theirtheir people, defeat their enemies 
difficulties and grow vigorously*1
. »
Thus, the Party, Itself centrally controlled, is
9the central nervous system of the entire body politic,"
the source of all policy, direction and aims of the revolu­
tion* The ooncspt of demooratlo centralism allows no room 
for erltloism or opposition, onoe polioy is made* Mao in 
an article written in 1937 illuminates this point quite 
elearlyt
The prinoiple of freedom is very harmful 
to a centralized organisation* It is a kind of 
decaying agent, breeding disunity * * • laxity 
in organizational relations, and passivity in 
work. It leads a revolutionary foroe to lose its 
rigidity in organisation and disolpllne, making 
it impossible to oarry any polioy* As a result 
[of freedom], the party organisation and the
Printing Offioe, I960), p* A, hereinafter olted T
Policy richlnr -v.
*Prnm an editorial published Deoembar 29* l*1
and reprinted in T*o F^st-o^ £*■
Prole*
i T
fMn of
p* 5->*
Jli v* ■4 A
r*.Ll^lloy ^
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masses led by the party are kept apart* 
one of the worst possibilities.1
It may be conoluded, then* that "democratic cen­
tralism" Is a euphemism for totalitarianism* and that it Is 
eruclal to the doctrine of power in the Ideology of Commu­
nist China*
This is
Another prineiple fundamental to the power doctrine 
in China is one that grows directly out of democratic cen­
tralism* It is the principle of party activism* This term 
refers to the chief processes by which the Party mobilises 
the masses behind Its policies* implementing decisions at 
the grass-roots level* and "persuading” where necessary*
It is primarily through party aotlvlsm that the Communists 
have succeeded la controlling the Chinese people* It is 
through party activism that the socialisation of agrioulturs 
and other eoonomio reforms have been eonduoted*
The baslo elements in the process of party acti­
vism are the cadre and Small Group* The oadrss* thoroughly : 
indoctrinated, disciplined young Communists reoruited from 
student ranks* are the agents of change and soolal control* 
They are the "selfless heroes” whoso eruclal role in the
Communist system led Mao to deolare* "Our revolution depends 
on the oadres."2 The primary means of organising the people 
in Communist China has been the Small Group* multiples of 
whloh are introduced In virtually all organisations* vh<
*Mao Tse-tung* ('*’-«** ♦'*<* V- ‘ 
#6184, Octou-r kx*
2g^lerW Wo-’-s. c*» c*t.. I, 230.
-’iffy la#JFR3 r— -*w#
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the organization Is social, occupational or political in 
nature. Because the vast bulk of adults are members of 
some association or organization with official sanction or
e
relationship, the masses may be brought regularly into 
contact with the instruments of oontrol.
The entire purpose for the existence of Small 
Groups is to elicit the desired response from the people 
to policies of the Party and government. Through astute 
personnel manipulation in the easily managed Small Group 
the Chinese Communists have endeavored to Impose their 
Ideology on the Chinese people. Hence the workings of 
Small Groups and their leaders, the cadres, have been of 
central Importance in the drive for the extension of Com- 
munist power in China.1
The Small Group was devised by no means simply as 
a formality or an empty ritual through which the Chinese 
people were expected to go. On the contrary Small Groups 
were conceived and organized by the Party as one of the 
principal means of conducting thought reform of the assess. 
In line with the Maoist pronouncement to use "demoaratlo 
methods'* Instead of force to spread the Ideology, Chinese 
Communist leaders designed the Small Croup as a means of 
eliciting
^This analysis of Small Group and cadre activity 
is based on K. P. Schumann, "Organisation and Reanonse in 
Communist China," The Annals of t*aAm 
Political and Soeiui y..uu«»^,
r cf
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• • • acceptance or oomnitment on the part of 
[group] members to the goals of the oyateia as 
defined by its leaders and a willingness to 
participate in the activities necessary for 
the attainment of these goals*!
Two techniques, one Leninist and one Chinese, 
were merged early in the Chinese Communist movement to 
produce the tradition of Small Group aotlvity* Soviet 
Russian agents brought in by Sun Yat-sen to reorganize 
the revolutionary Kuomintang in 1924 quickly introduced 
the Chinese Communists—who were then members of the 
Kuomintang—to the standard practice of group study of 
Marxist theory through the familiar unit of the Communist 
coll. Ihon, following their break from the Kuomintang in 
1927 and retreat to remote provinces, the Communist Chi­
nese were faced with the problem of carrying on a social 
and economic rovolution in the countryside while at the 
same time conducting a hit-and-run guerrilla war against 
the Nationalists and, after 1925, the Japanese* In doing 
this the Communists discovered through trial and error 
ono of the basic elements of personnel manipulation* In 
teaching uneducated peasants the rudiments of Marxism, 
the use of weapons, calico Live living, and how to oonduot 
land reform, the Chinese Communists found that the email 
discussion group was a vory effective moans of producing 
understanding and the desired "unity* and Correct
P. 52.• •
1
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thought*"1 The contagious zeal and high morale engendered 
by these techniques helped to veld the peasantry behind the
Communists and produoed the beet-disciplined army in the 
history of China* From that time on* the Small Group con­
stituted the principal means of social control in the Com­
munist-ruled sectors of China* Underlying the aim of this 
activity* as one expert has pointed out* "is the assumption 
that totalitarian collectivism can be Internalized as it 
vere into the very soul of a vhole people by prescribed 
techniques of psychological 'persuasion* and that specific 
therapy is available for the cure of all ideological 'sick- 
"2 The Small Group vas conceived to vin the soulness* • • •
of the Chinese people*
The primary aotivity around vhioh the Small Group 
oentered is "persuasion and education*" or simply* "study*" 
Although there is no absolute size rigidly adhered to for 
these groups* they are Ideally comprised of from seven to 
13 people* Attendance at Small Group "study" meetings is 
compulsory* and presiding over the gathering is the cadre* 
whose responsibility is to keep a careful record of pro* 
oeedlngs and a dose vetch on attendance* The groups vere 
organized to function in factories* shops* stores* rest
^The Soviet "oonfesslonal*" according to Ben 
Sohirartz* "vas undoubtedly one ingredient la tuis [t 
but the Chinese Communist experience of Ten*n period is 
probably more decisive ae a background factor* b 
"Totalitarian Consolidation and trig Ohinsss ftodtl*" l 
Q»«yrt---^1y* I Uanuary-tiaroh* I960)* 20*
rts*
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homes, schools, coned foroes, collective farms end production 
brigade In short, vlthln every significant activity, agency 
and Institution in the oountry, The frequency and length of 
Small Group meetings are largely determined by the intensity 
and urgency of the current government "drive" or "movement."
Meetings are usually held once a week during normal periods, 
but may be Increased to several afternoons or evenings per 
week at the peak of a crucial drive such as the Great leap 
Forward. The only etrlot rule governing the time of Small 
Group "study" meetings Is that they must be held during the 
people's free periods so as not to Interfere with work and 
the meeting of production quotas.
Cadres noxmally introduce the topic under consid­
eration at a "study" meeting, but each person Is expeoted 
to rise and "express his opinions" to the members who cus­
tomarily sit in a circle facing eaoh ether. Curing the 
oourse of a given session, discussion may range from the 
broader aspeots of some political question to the speolfie 
matter of each individual's attitude towards the problem.
In addition, there is a pattern by whloh the oadre often 
Initiates discussion of highly personal matters relating to 
the group's members. These matters may deal with suoh 
topics as the "gaudy, bourgeois" dress of a eertain comrade 
or with the more serious question of a member's abr 
political attitudes. A principal feature of the S 1C 
is the intensive "struggle" whloh le produoed p rlod 
and is marked by severe attaoke upon one er more mamb re by
?1
another*
The main purposes of the [Small Group] are 
to funotlon as a collective work or aotlvltles 
group, to lnduoe collectivist attitudes In Its 
members* The polltloal aspects of the meohanlsa 
are basic, for the Small Group operates as an 
Instrument for control and supervision and acts 
as a channel for communication from leadership 
to masses and from masses to leadership.!
*
The Small Group, then, Is characterized by a 
complex mixture of personal, psychological and polltloal 
faotors manipulated skillfully to bring the thinking of 
group members into line with that of the Party's official 
position on a given topio* Harriet C* Kills, a long time 
Amerioan resident in China, was there during the period of 
Communist take-over and consolidation between 1947-1955* 
Although she spent four of those years in a prison for 
oounter-revolutionaries, Miss Hills was able to observe 
closely the techniques and characteristics of the Small 
Group*2 She emphasizes three essential faotors to which 
she attributes the special character and power of group 
discussions*
First, Miss Kills stresses, the study group is 
recognized by its members as being officially sanctioned* 
Every participant knows that he is constantly in the prooess
^Sohurmann, op. c*t«. p* 53*
2The present writer was one of several reporters 
who interviewed Kiss Mills when she wee released tv 
China through Hong Kong in October, 19“?5* hoot of b«r ob­
servations regarding the Sm«o.l Group cited be 
are drawn malnxy from her ariiole, "Thou* t h l 
logioal Remolding in China," T”e I*1* j 0C«.,
Ho* 6 (December, 1959). 71-77* '
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of being evaluated by the oadre and reported to higher
authorities If his thinking betrays any of the thought-slnsi 
"right-wing opportunism," "reaction,
apolitical attitudes," and "lndifferenoe,"
II Mlbackward, bourgeois
*«tendencies,
Each member knows that his future depends greatly upon eval­
uations of his thinking as reflected in group discussions.
Second, there is no freedom of sllenoe. Everyone
must regularly express his opinions before the group, and
as Hiss Mills points out,
In a small, intimate group, whose members know 
each other well and work and sometimes even live 
together, It oan be very embarrassing to express 
an incorrect Idea , ,
Hothing can be more severe than the scrutiny of one's peers* 
anxious to provs ths correctness of their thought and quick
to discern ideological weakness In another's expressions.
Third, ths simple parroting of theory or the offi­
cial line Is not enough, Hor Is It satisfactory, says Hiss 
Hills, for discussants merely to acknowledge, intellectually, 
the soundness of ths oorreot line. It Is essential that 
group members frequently apply oorrect theory in suoh a way 
as to discredit their own previous lncorreot views, and give 
the Impression that they are enthusiastically rejecting 
their former views and aooeptlng the new line. In subse­
quent meetings, moreover, one is obliged to prove his 
sealous aooeptanoe of ths oorreot polley by indicating the 
various ways in whloh he has act»i on the offiolal line.
^lv*d», p, 72,
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One of the eureet ways to prove one'a seal la to denounce 
an acquaintance who apparently hae not ad Just ad hie thinking 
to oolnolde vlth the oorrect Ideological position.
Zt Is through such processes as these that the 
Small Group serves as an Instrument of the "oontrol organiza­
tion. " The Institution of group discussion In China became 
virtually all-pervasive during the deoade 1951-1961, when 
the Party was endeavoring to aohieve rapid eoonomlo develop­
ment and polltloal regimentation. Thus, the Small Group 
brought Into the intimate oircle almost everyone between 
early adolesoenoe and old age. Refusal to partiolpate in 
Small Group meetings is regarded as extreme devlatlonlsm, 
and results In the denunolation of the deviant by his com­
rades as an "Individualist" and causes him to be Isolated 
for oonoentrated "study," "persuasion" and thought reform. 
The aim of the Small Group in the final analysis, then, Is 
to eradicate individualism entirely. Replacing Individual­
ism are the oentral conoepts of oolleotive living, oolleotlve 
thoughts and attitudes, and eollective responses to Party 
and government oommands.
Mao very early emphasised the key role of eadres 
in the Party’s exerolss of total power, "Onoe the correct
polltloal line has been determined," he noted, "the eadres
. *1 Thtwill be the deolslve faotor [ in carrying It out]• 
cadre*a prlnolpal function is to "maintain discipline,"
which Is a Communist term for manipulabillty. The e
XHao Tse-tung, IT 0^5.%!*
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who "maintains discipline" is one whose group le free from 
"ollquism, n n m nparticularism," or "mountalniem* 
••all of whloh are forms of deviation from the vital doo-
nativlsm,
trine of centralism. Thus, the responsibility of the cadre 
le baslo to social control.
Another one of the oadre's principal obligations 
is to maintain "solidarity" within the Small Group. Group 
members are urged to develop the warmth and closeness of 
family relationships, all being "good Bisters and brothers, 
good classmates, good comrades."* In order for optimum 
solidarity to be achieved the oadre must be closely identi* 
fled with members of the group. Party handbooks for cadres 
emphasize that the Small Group leader must cultivate the 
impression of equality between himself and other members of 
the group. Ideally, "on the surfaee one oannot see the 
dlfferenoe between leaders and led, and only when he must 
funotlon as a leader does [the oadre] then aot as one." 
Moreover, oadrea are warned against excessive authorltan* 
lanism, onoe again on the Maoist premise that "persuasion," 
not eoerolon, is the preferred means of elloltlng popular 
response to the regime's polioies.^
*Schurraann, pT’ft_eit., p. 54, quoting in transla* 
tlon from the Chinese Cv^unTst Party handbook on small
ZZULJrgroup membership and leadership (. lap hul-on. Ill, 186),
2
*The ohlef oooupatlonal hazard of eadres Is "com* 
" a sin which appears to mean ever-sealo a.mandlsm,
Vi hen ever some project or pollov fails to gate ao< 
reauxiy or even meets some popular reslstauee a !•***/
oe
!
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k delicate problem for the Small Group leader in
pursuit of solidarity Is that of achieving ooheslon while 
at the same time "maintaining discipline*" For, in a normal 
human situation, close friends In a small group tend to
develop an attitude of genuine solidarity vhioh Is not 
generally receptive to outside dlreotlon or control, in 
other words, true, primary-group unity does not naturally 
lend itself to the type of group and individual manipulation 
on whloh Communist power in China is based* Uhat the 
Chinese Communists have evolved to cope with this problem 
has been effective if not ingenious, and it introduces still 
another fundamental element of the Ideology of China in the 
eeoond or Sooiall3t stage of the revolution*
The Organizational Base
For a eolutlon to the problem of maintaining 
dleolpllne the Chinese Communists early perfected an old 
Leninist technique of personnel manipulation and made It
common device of the Party le to make a seanegoat of oadres, 
charging them with "oommandlsm." In this way tne Party and 
high leadership avoid blame by placing it on the oaare. 
Frequent exhortations against commandism were raised by the 
Party in early 1956 when the transition from oooperativs 
farming to collectives met with considerable peasant resist­
ance* As this writer observed from Bong Kong, certain 
oadres bore the brunt of responslbility in t± e first o* 
of Party reaction* The eeoond stage consisted of a th 
month slowdown, during which time, presumably, tr>e V 
oadres were replaced by less oonmandistlo, more * 
group leaders* Alter this period tue original drive to* 
oolleotives was resumed at an even greater tempo*
7 6
the fundamental mechanism for indoctrinating the masses with 
the correct ideology. The prooess is that of "criticism and 
self-criticism** and it is illustrative of the new ooerolon 
which Kao terms "persuasion."
Through the cathartlo mechanism of criticism and 
self-orltioism millions of Chinese have experienced the al- 
temate feelings of isolation*.anxiety and in-group-security 
which produce the desired result of the manlpulable indi­
vidual, Because of its devastating power to evoke desired 
responses* criticism and self-orltiolsm is the chief means 
by which "study" is pursued within the Small Group. Basio- 
ally simple* the mechanism of eritiolsm and self-oritloism 
as employed by the Chinese Communists has had astounding 
success in welding the masses behind the "correot line" of 
the regime. In a typical session of criticism one member 
of the group is singled out for oolleotlve criticism by the 
others because of deviant attitudes or "wrong thoughts."
The deviant is subjected to Intense orltiolsm by other mem­
bers of the group* led by the cadre* with the purpose being 
to "oorreot" him. Depending upon the severity of his error 
the deviant may experience alienation from the group for an 
indefinite period and eritiolsm of him may oontlnue over 
several meetings of the Small Group.
The experience of temporary alienation bv 
the one oritiolsed and oolleotlve eritiolsm by 
the group members is* in theory* supposed to 
have the general effect of maintaining the group's 
cohesion and effeotiveness. Great fear exists 
on tne part of those potentially oritiolsasie
77
that they may become Tic time of a more permanent 
'alienation.1 *
This fear contributes measurably to the ooheslon 
and discipline of the group. Indication of tills is found 
In the practice of self-orltlolsra, the process whereby the 
comrade under fire may redeem himself and be "reintegrated* 
into the group, normally, self-criticism is set in motion 
by the concentrated criticism of the group, and if properly 
performed it can bring an end to "alienation." To be ostra­
cised from the Small Group in Communist China is to be out 
off from one's principal source of contact with the regime, 
which, in a very direot manner, controls one's destiny.
Thus, eelf-oriticism is a technique basic to the process of 
central control.
In the act of eelf-oriticism it is not enough for 
a person simply to reveal hie thoughts. To regain his plaee 
within the group one must give convincing reasons why his 
"wrong thoughts" are wrong and demonstrate the intensity of 
his struggle to correct them. If his comrades are Impressed 
with his sincerity but doubtful about the depth of his 
conversion, they will ease the tons of their criticism and 
in a friendly, sympathetic manner help him to understand 
more fully the nature of hie error. Moreover, there are 
powerful faotors mitigating against making a ruse of the 
critloiam sessions. In her analysis, Barrist Mills #mpha» 
sizes.
lSoburmana, c^. p. 57.
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Attempts to avoid the tensions of group 
study by taolt compact to go through the routine 
or to stick to pleasantries are blooked not only 
by the faot of the leader's relations with the 
authorities but by the ever-present possibility' 
that some member, whether motivated by genuine 
change of heart or by a selfish attempt at win­
ning official favor, might report the group,
Thus, there is a tremendous pressure both.to 
fall in line and to want to fall in line,1
This observation Is supported by the findings of 
Robert J. Llfton2 who conducted a study of ths psyohiatrle 
effects of Chinese Communist thought control practices. The 
most effective aspect of thought reform techniques, accord­
ing to Llfton, Is in what hs terms "milieu control." Even­
tually the methods whloh the Chinese Communists employ lead 
to "a blending of external and Internal milieux [so that 
ons's] own attitudes and beliefs beoome Identified with 
those of his outer environment.
It is this quality of milieu control whloh 
gives the thought reform program [In China] Its 
awesoms effeot upon the Individual. It is 
liar to what George Orwell so brilliantly envi­
sioned in his novel, Nineteen Elr:hty-four.
Orwell , • • saw milieu oontrol accomplished 
through meohanloal means suoh as ths two-way 
"telesoreen." But the Chinese have done It 
through a human recording and transmitting ap­
paratus [the Small Group] . •
Thought reform as praotloed in China, says Llfton, "creates
elm-
^Mills, op. olt.. p, 73#
2,,Thought Reform of Chinese Intellectualsi A 
Psychiatric Evaluation," Journal of Aslan Studies, XVI (No­
vember 1956), 75-88. Llfton, an 14.D. specializing In 
psyohiatry, based his evaluation on a series of interviews 
with refugee Chinese intellectuals In hong Kong, 1954-1955.
3ibia.. p. 82.
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what la probably the moat profoundly controlled and manipu­
lated group environment that has ever existed •"
Testifying to thle was Harriet Mills who looked on
i
In awe as one of her Chinese prlson-matesi a Western edu­
cated young woman with strong Christian convictions, was 
slowly "corrected" and molded Into the desired Communist 
form through a classlo oase of "milieu control,"*" Mias 
Mills observed this incredible metamorphosis and several 
similar ones* concluding with Llfton that in the process of 
criticism and self-criticism the Chinese Communists have 
achieved the ultimate in personnel manipulation*
David Nlvison,2 a specialist in the history of 
Chinese thought* suggests that the Communist praotloe of 
self-crltiolsm is derived as muoh from the Confuolan tradi­
tion of "self-cultivation" as from leninism* and is there­
fore not an entirely alien custom* Confucianism, Nlvison 
notes* emphasizes that one should genuinely believe in the 
things he supports*
The idea [oontlnuee Nlvison] is that verbal ao- 
oeptanoe of orthodoxy and ostensibly virtuous 
behavior are corrupt at their very foundations 
if they are motivated by personal interest or a 
desire to impress others* It follows that tha 
test of a really morally superior man is in his 
behavior, his speech and thought, in circumstances 
when these can be known only to himself* If in 
euch circumstances he still never departs even
!
/!•
1Ihld,. p. 74. Mlse Mills gives a graphio account 
of how "alienation and identification," "study," and "crit­
icism" were used to "correct" her friend*
^"Communist Ethios and Chinese Tradition," Journal 
of Asian Studies. XVI (November, 1956), 51*74•
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in the slightest way from virtue, he le fully 
self-cultivated • . * he has attained "sincerity"
to "watoh himself when he lethrough being able 
alone."*
This theme in Confucianism, says Nivison, was "tallomade"
for Communist exploitation in thought reform.
The whole process of social control through mass
regimentation is what Mao oalls the "unity of leadership 
and the masses. Whatever the work to be done may be, Mao 
emphasized, if there were no dependable machinery for wide­
spread ideological indoctrination, then "we Just cannot 
mobilize the broad masses to take action."3 "leadership of 
the masses" meant that anyone holding views contrary or 
resistant to those of the regime must be "persuaded" to 
change; anyone without opinions or without an ideological 
consciousness must be "eduoated." With his customary candoo; 
Mao noted at the point of chengeover from the "democratic* 
to the socialist stage of the revolution that he believed 
most Chinese were in the seoond category!
Apart from their other characteristics,
China's six hundred million people ere, first 
of all. poor, and secondly, "blank." That may 
seem like a bad thing, but it is really a good 
tiling. Poor people wont a change, want to do 
things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper 
has no blotohes and so the newest and most beau­
tiful words can be written on it, the newest and
1Ibid.,p. 69.
^Uao Tso-tung, "On Several Problems Concerning 
Leadership Methods," JPR3 Document #6124, op. oit., p. 46.
3Ibid.
*
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most beautiful pictures oaa be painted on It.1
In addition to the techniques of the Small Group 
and its oorollary, orltlolsm and self-oritiolsm, the regime 
In China devised several other methods of "painting beauti­
ful pictures" on the "blank" minds of the maseee. The 
centrally controlled society is dependent on the smooth 
functioning of its communications system. The communica­
tions system in China, overt and covert, Is an exceedingly 
elaborate device* Moreover, lte contribution to the overall 
ideological scheme le tremendous.
Aside from the controlled press and radio which
9disseminate a continuous din of propaganda morose the land, 
the most important element in the communications network of 
China is a figure without a known title, but who might be 
called the elvllian intelligence offloer. The civilian 
intelligence figure le an ever-present "observer of ideolog­
ical dissaffectlon"3 at the grass roots level. He consti­
tutes an indispensable link in the chain of control and 
information in the People's Republlo of China,
In every village and agricultural cooperative, 
in every factory and sohool, in every street and 
every workshop, a similar [intelligence] figur
*Quoted in Li Fu-ohnn, "On the Big leap forward 
In Ohlna's Socialist Oonstxuetion," Ti r" 
op.clt.. p. 141,
2See Inlia, pp, 85-87,
^David Chios, "How 650 Million Chinese are 
trolled," J*CJ***jr **-*0, p, 21, CL j v .& a a .* w»- d c ja i 
years and traveled extensively during hie assignment th *,
., September 14. 1 <,
.dent In t ana i r t »
1 r\m
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important in the latent power he holds rather 
than his offioial position-*is a constant 
watcher and a civil symbol of the regime's 
authority.1
In addition to the responsibility of watching, 
the civilian intelligence figure serv 
government and Party information. Thus, from him the regime 
receives regular reports on the "Ideological condition" of 
the people, and through him the regime makes certain that 
the masses are informed direotly of the "correct line."
An observer of this prooess indicates that for 
all their practical usefulness as communications links, the 
major contribution of the "observers" to the government is 
psychological. "Their very presence," he points out,"is a 
warning and reminder to people that the Government is omni-
opresent, probably omniscient and usually omnipotent.
As a typical example of how the intelligence 
officer works, the observer cited the ease of "Altlk," a 
veterinary surgeon for an agricultural cooperative near 
Urumohl, a remote portion of Slnkiang Province in northwest 
China.
istrlbutor of
Altlk's tent contained the radio whioh the 
nomad cooperative had bought. He distributed the 
newspapers whioh arrived twice weekly to the lit­
erate few—and read them to the illiterate many. 
In addition, his wife, as midwife and partly 
trained nuree, ran a first-aid post whioh, aoart 
from the immense physioal good it most obviously 
did, proved an Invaluable listening post. Polit­
ical and ideological illnesses and symptoms of 
disaffection cauud often be diagnosed during the
xlh<d.
gIMd«. p. 76.
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Inevitable talk which accompanied treatment for 
physical ills.1
Similar placement of Party surveillance figures in sensitive 
positions throughout the oountry has kept the regime offl- 
daily "in touoh" with China's masses on a two-way olrouit 
vhloh is perpetually open*
Supplementing the surveillance aotlvity of the 
professional "observers" are the thousands of seoret in­
formers, known in Party literature as "patriotic and vigi­
lant citizens*" These are ordinary people who have been 
persuaded by lnoessant appeals from the government to keep 
an eye on neighbors, listen for evidence of "wrong thoughts" ' 
among friends, and denounce close relatives suspected of 
either anti-state aotlvity or any of the numerous thought- 
sins* Newspapers and magazines constantly remind the people 
of their responsibility to be on the look out for criminals 
against the state* The following excerpt from China Touth
Dally is typloali
Every youth should look at things about him 
and see if there are any suspioioue persons whose 
background is not clear and if there are any 
oounter-revolutionary activities and then report 
(verbally or in written form) to the public 
security organ or Party organization and, if 
necessary, give help to arrest the enemies*^
Noting in the same article that "some youths are 
irresolute lest denunciation of relatives, friends and
1Ihld*
8"Let Everybody Denounos Counter-Revolutionaries," 
an editorial in China Touth Daily, August 6, 1935, trans­
lated by Amerioan Consulate General, hong Kong* 3"™** of 
China Mainland Press. No* 1110 (August 16* 1935),~pr**. ..
I
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acquaintances should hurt their feelings and harmony," ths 
newspaper goes on to remind the young people that relatives 
and friends who are counter-revolutionaries are vile enemies 
who would bring harm to their loved ones if they got the 
opportunity. With such people, " it is out of ths question 
to talk about feelings and harmony."
A national student magazine oarries on ths same
themes
There are some students whose fathers have 
already been arrested, and they still would not 
believe them to be oounter-revolutionaries, but 
considered that the Government had made a wrong 
arrest. Suoh thinking is not proper. Ths People's 
Government loves and protects ths people, and will 
not wrongly aocuss a good man
Some students, because of ths arrest of their 
counter-revolutionary fathers, would be given to 
• great grief and oould not bear to part with them. 
Suoh a feeling is not normal. If ons's father is 
a patriotic citizen, it is natural that one should 
love him, and this is beneficial . • • • But if 
one's father is a counter-revolutionary who has 
betrayed ths fatherland. ... then ons's feeling 
for him should be one of hatred, for he is an 
enemy of Socialist construction.1
# • •
Similar appeals for oitlzens to be "patriotic and 
vigilant" can be found regularly In newspapers and periodi­
cals directed at every sogmsnt of ths publio. Ths net 
sffsot is that for the Individual Chinese, whether a member 
of ths Party or not, there is ths constant feeling of being 
watohsd. Moreover, pronouncements by the regime and
1Ko Hsiang-yueh, "Patriotio Toutha Must D*1** A 
dear Lins with Counter Revolutionary Relatives," ] 
student. Movember, 19p5, translated by t e \ 
touwulaW General, bong Kong, i f~~m
Magazines. Bo. 19 (December 19, i
n
a
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activities of the oadree make it plain that oonformity alone 
la not enough* One must be enthuBlaetio in shoving his 
support for "Socialist construction" or run the risk of 
being reported for dragging his feet*
Certainly not the least important instruments of 
regimentation in Communist China are the newspaper and 
radio networks which cover the entire nation with an incred­
ible uniformity of words and unanimity of opinion* From 
urban, sophisticated Peiping and remote, provincial Sln- 
kiang, loudspeakers on street corners and in the center of 
villages blare forth the same martial music, the same 
statistical reports on "Socialist construction," the same 
urgent appeals for the masses to support steadfastly and 
resolutely the latest people's drive for more pig-breeding*^ 
The most essential piece of capital equipment for 
any community in Communist China is a radio and loudspeaker 
system. A oantrally operated radio network broadcasts, 
simultaneously, a single program to all of China* To ao- 
eommodate time differences, local and provincial stations 
reoord and relay network programs* For the mors isolated 
regions, news is broadcast at dictation speed so that it
oan be written down and passed on by means of wall news- 
osheets*
Zn a similar fashion, the newspapers of China—
^Chlpp, op. clt*. p* 78,
gibia.
I
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big city dailies, regional and local weeklies, and minority- 
language editions—receive the major editorials and news 
reports oarried in the eolumns of Jen Min Jlh Pao. Peopled 
Pallyt published in Peking* People's Sally is an organ of 
the Communist Party and also sets the tone for the wlrs- 
servloe reports of the offiolal "Hew China Mews Agency."
The eontrolled press and radio, of course, exist 
primarily to promote the oause of "Socialist construction." 
Reader-listener Interest, then, is not a faotor in the 
selection and placement of stories and programs* Hence, 
the first three pages of all the nation's newspapers over 
several weeks may deal with nothing but the drive to in­
crease steel production, or the dlsoovery and denunciation
of all overt and covert counter-revolutionaries, or the 
campaign to Increase the production of pork.* 
inevitably deal with the same subject whloh dominates the
In the event that someone did not read the
Editorials
news columns* 
reports and editorials, the radio broadcasts them*
In this way the masses of "blank" people hear and 
read of the same policies and pronouncements at virtually
1Chlpp's observation! "For example, one day in 
the fall of 1956, when the national pork supply was running 
short, the State Oounoll {highest government agency, pre­
sided over by Chou En-laij Issued an instruction oalling 
for a great and immediate inorease in pig breeding. It was 
aooompanled by an aooount of how one cooperative farm had 
done particularly well with pigs, together with a commenda­
tion from Chairman Mao. These items, together with pig 
news, took up most of the front page of fha People's.rally* 
Every newspaper in the country that day earrled tne ejuior- 
tatlon*" Ibid.
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tho some time, and presumably begin to dlsouse and act upon 
them as a unit* To expedite discussion and action the Parly 
has Its cadres, olvlllan intelligence figures and other 
aotivlsts organized, ready to be set In motion* These same 
agents, together with the "patriotic and vigilant citizens," 
are ever-present to gauge the people's enthusiasm or laok 
of It*
►* *•
Thus, the control organization of the Party, on 
the premise laid down in Mao's ideoloigr of total power, 
determines policy, sets down the "correct line," and Informs 
the people of the desired response. Next, the regime relies 
upon Its centrally controlled, intricate organization to 
elicit the people's enthusiastic support. Then oomes com­
munication, criticism, education, or 'fcersuasloii' as needed*
The Resistance of Intellectuals
At least one segment of Chinese sooiety has shown 
resistance to the efforts of the Communists to refashion 
and control their minds* That group Is the lntelleotuals* 
The lntelleotuals have been a constant source of frustration 
to the regime, for they are the scientists, professors, 
scholars and writers who possess skills and render servloss 
Important to the regime* 1st, most of them were the prod­
ucts of "bourgeois sooiety,"^ many of than sduoatsd in the
^■S*e Theodors Hel-en Chen, Thouer^^^**—* cf t* i 
ChlnejBSlwt^iieejr^i s (Hong Kongi Hong
5>»b3* ____ _ _______ __—
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Vest or trained In Western oriented schools in China before 
the Communist take over* Moreover* the genuine intellectual 
is one who naturally rebels against dogmatism* indoctrina­
tion, and thought-control devices* The problem facing the 
Communist leadership* then, has been to establish a rela­
tionship with intellectuals by which these valuable individ­
uals could be utilized to the best advantage of the regime* 
But the Party has experienced a long series of frustrations 
in its efforts to achieve that relationship*
Since its establishment in 1949 the regime has 
adopted a variety of measures aimed at winning the loyalty 
of intellectuals and making them useful to the cause of 
"Socialist construction." The first two years were charac­
terized by relatively gentle forms of "study" and political 
indoctrination, with little attempt at coercive measures* 
Indeed* the Communists followed a polloy which allowed 
intellectuals to maintain their "bourgeois" ideology so long 
as they remained quiet about it and did not actually take 
"counter-revolutionary" positions* This was what one ob­
server has desorlbed as "the period of good impressions"* 
but it failed to bring about the desired swing of the in­
tellectuals behind the Communist cause* necessitating some­
what more "persuasive" measures*
The "hard line" towards the intelligentsia was 
adopted in late 1951* Thousands wore concentrated In
^Theodors Hol-on Chen, "China Today," Redlands
Forum Lecture Series* University of Redlands* October 20* 
1953* .... .................................... .... -............. ...... -......
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special centers for Intensive "education and reform" while 
group "study” for others was greatly stepped up, the taotios 
of oritioism and self-criticism being applied forcefully.^ 
This program, aimed at the "ideologioal remolding" of the 
intellectuals, was not confined simply to theoretical "\jtudy" 
but demanded the participation of the intelligentsia in the 
regime's various eoonomio and political campaigns. The in­
tellectuals were sent to the countryside to participate 
actively in the "struggle against the landlords}" they were 
enrolled in the intensive antl-Amerioan campaign which began 
with the Korean war} they were "invited" to participate in 
the activities of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.
All of these aotlvities were designed to "heighten the class* 
consciousness" of the intellectuals and convert them to 
China's new ideology.2
In addition the regime eonduoted a thorough, naticn-
*Chen, "Thought Reform," op. clt.. p. 53.
2It should be noted that the Chinese Communists by 
no means had to struggle to reform all Intellectuals in the 
country. Ae early as 1939 a large number of this group had 
withdrawn support from the Nationalist government and joined 
the Communists at their stronghold in Yenan. This voluntary 
support from many intellectuals increased rapidly in the 
immediate post-war months during whloh time the Nationalist 
regime under Chiang Kai-shek was experlenoing serious dif­
ficulties in reconstruction and resorting to a variety of 
totalitarian methods in order to maintain its position. So 
numerous were the intellectuals who joined the Communist
Insurgents in the northeast that the Party was obliged to 
make certain polioy-pronounoements regarding the role of 
intelleotuals in the revolution. See "Decision of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the 
Absorption of Intellectual Elements," December 1, 1939* 
translated in Brandt, Schwarts and Palrbank, on. clt., 
PP* 349-351*
90
wide drive aimed at wiping out the laet vestiges of the 
"archaic, bourgeois" social and economic system of old 
China. Intellectuals were "persuaded" to give both theoret­
ical and active support to this "Five Anti Campaign" (against 
bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on 
government contracts, and leakage of government eeorets) on 
the premise that participation in this effort would break 
down the "bourgeois" attitudes of the intelligentsia. Si­
multaneously, the regime declared that schools and univer­
sities had been the transmitters of "deoadent Ideologies" 
and called upon educational institutions and teachers to 
purge themselves of all unorthodox beliefs. Pressure was 
put upon leading intellectuals to make publio confessions 
of past errors and pledges of loyalty to the philosophy of 
the revolution and the leadership of Ohairman Mao.
The drive for intellectual conformity eontiuued 
into 1955 with the rallying point and cause oelebre being 
the "Hu Feng oounter-revolutlonary olique." Hu Feng was 
a writer and editor who had been an early supporter of the
Communist movement in China and whose loyalty to the revolu-
But after China's "libera­tion had never been questioned, 
tion" when Communist controls began to envelop all aspeots
of national life, Hu Feng registered some disagreement with 
the "oorrect line" regarding literature and art. This 
dissent, coming precisely at the moment when the regime 
was conducting an all-out drive to bring wavering intellec­
tuals into the fold, oould not be tolerated and Hu Feng and
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all of his supporters thereby beoame the object of Intense, 
official abuse* Long after Hu Feng and his supporters vers 
arrested* their oauos was oeaselessly attacked by the Party* 
This comment In China Youth was typiaali
• one can see how wide an Influence the Hu* •
Feng subverters have gained for themselves, how 
penetrating their act of deoeption and hypocrisy 
Is, and how dreadful and harmful their effects 
are on youth. In order to thoroughly crush the 
Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique, we must * 
continue to carry out a disinfection of ideology*
Indicating clearly that the highest leadership was 
greatly concerned with what it called the "problem of the 
Intellectuals," the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu­
nist Party held a special meeting January 14*20, 1956, to 
evaluate the situation and assess its policies* Hinting at 
the difficulties encountered by the Party, and probably 
referring specifically to the Hu Feng case, Premier Chou 
En*lal observed that!
The wiping out of counter-revolutionaries 
hidden in the ranks of the intelleotuals has been 
attended with great success during the past year*
He are continuing efforts to strive for the basic 
elimination of oounter-revolutlonarles within the 
next two years*2
In his speech, Chou admitted that the intensive
■hfang Tzu-yeh, "Are There Any Merits on the Part 
of Double-orossers?,' China Youth. Issue 14, July 16, 1955, 
as translated by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 
Extracts from China Mainland Magazines* Ho* 4 (September 6, 
1955), PP* 4-6.
2Chou En-lal, ?0n the Question of Intellectuals)! 
Report to the Central Committee, January 14, 1956. This 
report was translated and distributed by the New China Hews 
Agency and obtained by this writer through 
Consulate General In Hong Kong*
the American
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drive to reform intelleotualet 1951-55, had not met vith 
complete success* lie estimated that among the "higher In­
tellectuals" only about forty peroent could be considered as 
active supporters of the regime. Of the remainder he esti­
mated that about forty percent wore doing only vhat was 
specifically required of them, ten peroent were "backward 
Intellectuals who oppose socialism." and the remaining ten 
peroent wore hopeless counter-revolutionaries like Hu Peng* 
Mixing admonition with mollification. Chou de­
clared!
• • • we must not only reform the backward 
elements, but also do our best to educate the 
middle-of-the-road elemente to make them leave 
their present situation and change into progressive 
elements, while the present progressive elements 
must be further aided to make even greater progress, 
to study Marxism-Leninism, to rid themselves of 
the Influenoes of oapitallsm, individualism and 
idealism. V.'e must foster among the higher intel­
lectuals large numbers of "red experts" who will 
resolutely struggle for the Sooialist cause, Today 
some higher intellectuals have already been con­
verted into red experts, while many others hold 
this aspiration. We must enthusiastically help 
them to oorry out self reform, to realize their 
aspirations. Mistaken are all attitudes that . 
tend to boycott and discriminate against them.1
Chou's referenoe to "mistaken attitudes" was a 
mild admission of the Party's unsuccessful steps to ooeret 
intellectuals Into support of ths "correct line." Going on 
to specify certain "shortcomings" in the Party policy, Chou 
set ths tone for ths Oentral Committee's announcement of a 
new line regarding the treatment of intellectual!, It oon-
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slated of a relaxation of Party pressure and a premise to 
Improve the position of intellectuals by giving them higher 
salaries, more lnoentlvea, and inoreased appropriations for 
reference books and equipment.
Although these Improvements vers actually carried 
out through 1936 and were accepted gratefully by the Intel* 
llgentsia, the new, softer line failed to generate the 
enthusiastic response which the regime had hoped for.
Many scholars—dlsoouraged, disillusioned, 
frustrated, humiliated, or Impatient—complained 
that true scholarly work was impossible under the 
rigid regimentation Imposed by Marxist orthodoxy.1
In order to meet this problem in a positive manner, the Par*
ty leadership deolded to loosen the ideological fetters,
and, harking back to an ancient Chinese slogan, Mao Tse-tung
himself exclaimed, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, 1st a
What Mao meant by»2hundred eohoola [of thought] contend, 
this slogan, according to Lu Ting-yl, Direotor of the Cen­
tral Committee's Propaganda Department, was that the "ideo­
logical struggle" of thought reform was simply being carried
In other words, said Lu, the freedomon by a new method, 
of contending sohools of thought would be offered only to
those who supported the Communist Party and its polloles,
^Theodore Hsi-en Oheu, "The Thought Reform of 
Intelleotuals," The Annals of The American Ac-denv of Polit­
ical and Social bclonca. COOxIkI {January. l&w). bo.
%rora a Reuters dispatch datelined Peiping, Novem­
ber 17, 1956, in the New York Times. November 17* 1956.
For a thorough aooount of this convulsive phase of thought 
reform see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Cam­
paign and The Chinese Intelleotuals tuetf Yorks " 1**u>eriok 
X. Praegar, lyoO
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and contention would have to be conduoted within narrow 
limits.
At first the Intellectuals were wary, and only 
oautlously criticized suoh things as working conditions and 
pay, avoiding the polloy issues. But following a speech by 
Hao on February 27* 1957, In whloh he reiterated his "hun­
dred flowers, hundred schools" polloy, the intellectuals 
gradually began to test their new "freedom." Finally, as 
Harriet 14111s observed,
... the Hundred Flowers of criticism bloomed 
wildly for one brief month from Kay 8 to June 8,
1957* One after another, intellectuals delivered 
scathing attacks on monollthio Party power, the 
identification of party and state, the sham of 
ooalition government with minor parties, the in­
competence and arrogance of Party Cadres. •
They Questioned the infallibility of Marxism- 
Leninism. They called the Party incompetent to
• •
lead in science, education, and the arte. They 
deolared that Party bureaucratism was worse than 
capitalism • • •
The Communist response was swift and thorough. By 
July the Party had mounted a vigorous campaign against 
"rightists," a label pinned on anyone who made substantially 
oritloal oomments against the regime and its programs.
Party officials from Chou and Lu on down hurled soorohlng 
denunciations against the "rightist intellectuals" who had 
"slandered" the Party, Lu Tlng-yi, Chairman Mao, and Soviet
■r-.
friendship among other things.
In an extensive analysis of the uproar touched off 
by the blooming flowers of dlsoontent, Tillman Burdin oabled
Hlills, op. clt.. pp, 76«77*
!
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to the gow. York Tinea that tha splurge of oritldam had 
eaught tha Communist leaders by surprise. He observed that 
although no experts viewed the "rightist" outory as a serious 
threat to the regime, nevertheless,
The Communists obviously are taking the dis­
paragers seriously. Chief of State Mao Tee-tang 
In decreeing a policy of "letting a hundred flowers 
bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend," 
released more pent-up dissatisfactions than the 
Communists had bargained for, and the problem 
Is to discredit and isolate the critics.1
The regime wasted no time In Isolating and discrediting its
detractors, for Burdin cabled a month later thatt
the Communist counter-attack phase of the 
purge Is now on. Fearful of punishment and 
badgered by accusers, "rightist" intellectuals 
are making apologies end confessing their anti­
communist thoughts and actions* harsh new mea­
sures have been dooreed In Peiping, providing 
work reform programs in certain situations for 
intellectuals, college graduates and others who _ 
persist in harboring ideas inimical to the regime.2
By January, 1958, the regime had carried the "rightist"
purge into ths ranks of ths government. On January 4,
Peiping radio announced that the vice-governor of Hun
province had been relieved of his post and eharged with
"anti-sociallet crimes" for allegedly using the "contending
now
A*I
schools" freedom to "launch frenzied attaoks on the Chinese
The vioe-governor and four of his«3Communist Party.
"rightist followers" wars dropped from their Party and
government positions.
T--k T*—s. July 14, 1957* 
T—’: T*—9. August 24, 1957* 
3^^, y—v January 5, 1953.
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Thus, the Chinese Communists tried first "par- 
suasion," then coercion, then relaxation In their determined 
effort to elioit support from the nation's intelligentsia.
By 1958 they were hack to coerolon again. That year the 
regime imposed rigid orthodoxy on the Intellectuals once 
more, and Small Groups turned again to intensive sessions 
of erltiolsm and self-criticism. Intellectuals who had 
spoken out against the regime were obliged to reoant and 
publloly promise their desire for reform} those who had 
remained silent stepped forward to reaffirm their loyalty 
to the oouse of "Soolaliet construction." In an effort to 
preolude future difficulties with Intellectuals, the Com­
munists established around the country "Bed and Expert" 
sohools, institutions which would teach young people the 
skills needed by the state while at the same time indoc­
trinate them with "correct thoughts." But in saorlfloing 
scholarship and Intellectual independence for ideological 
conformity, the Chinese Communists took the calculated risk 
that they might produce conformists who were more Red than 
expert. Indications ere that this is preolsely what hap­
pened.^
In any case, it is quite dear that the lntelleo- 
tuals have constituted the most serious obstacle to total 
social oontrol in Communist China. As Chen observedt
^See Srioatl Chandra-sekhar, PM Chirmt MJ~
*w (Now York! Frederick A. Fraeger, 1>>1), p. 10 u.
Tux'V contains a critical assessment of "the no* euueatiou* 
in China.
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If after seven or eight years of thought reform, 
the intellectuals of China did seize the first 
opportunity to attaok the Communists in their 
most vulnerable points and express their ideas 
which had been suppressed for so long, they*
» • • must have managed to keep inviolate a 
small sector of their mind and heart*1
One Party offielal as much as admitted this failure to re* 
form intellectuals completely when he concluded in 1959 that 
on the matter of intellectuals, "We must oonduot long, re­
current, patient, delicate, and persuasive education*
But even though intellectuals may be especially 
influential and possess talents important to the Party and 
to economic development, they are numerically a very small 
segment of Chinese society*
n2
Thus, while the intellectuals 
may have been intransigent in the face of intensive efforts 
by the regime to reform them, giving substance to the belief 
that total soolal control in China is impossible, this hope­
ful sign should not obscure the larger reality that the
I
Chinese Communists succeeded between 1951-1961 in estab­
lishing what may well have been the most thoroughly con­
trolled and efficiently manipulated mass society in the 
history of the world*
In summary* then, it may be said that the oentral 
theme in the ideology of Maoism is power—the unchallenged 
authority to conduct a thorough social, political, economio 
and cultural revolution with the aim being to make the
1Chen, Thought Reform, on. elt 
2ilills, on. clt.. p. 77*
•i p» 195#
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People's Republic of China Into a major force in the world. 
The system by vhloh this aim was to be achieved was totali­
tarianism, with all the Indoctrination, thought reform, 
manipulation and regimentation which that system embraces.
I
OHAPTER POOR
Ideology and Economlo Development In Ohlnai 
The Socialization of Agriculture
Mao Tae-tung rose to power on the strength of the 
Chinese peasantry* He made the peasants the vanguard of 
the Chinese Communist revolution and the reform of agricul­
ture the Initial basis of eeonomie development* In both 
cases the fundamental consideration was political powert 
the peasants were Instrumental in the winning of powers 
agricultural development was to be the basis of maintaining 
it* Ideological and political processes were the means to 
both ends* Eaoh reinforced the other* or as one expert ob­
served!
* * * It may be said that the non-economlo faotors 
play just as important a role in the agricultural 
soene in China [as the economic]• The political 
changes paved the way for economlo transformation 
of the rural economy, and the socio-oulturol re­
forms reinforce the economic development**
Mao's fame as a Marxist theoretician and leader 
was won initially for his successful substitution of the 
peasantry for the proletariat as the vehicle for revolution
*Chao Kuo-chun, Agricultural Development and Prob­
lems In China. Today (Hew Delhii inuian Council of borld 
Affairs, 1998), p* 33* Chao was a Research Associate in 
Chinese eoonomlo and political studies at Harvard and is 
probably the leading authority on the agrarian aspect of 
Communist China* He is presently head of the East Asia 
Department, Indian Sohool of International Studies, Uni­
versity of Delhi*
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la China* As early as 1927 he predicted*
• • • In a very short time, In China's central* 
southern and northern provinces* several hun­
dred million peasants will rise like a tornado 
or tempest* a force so extraordinarily swift 
and violent that no power* however great* will 
be able to suppress it. 
trammels that now bind them and rush forward 
along the road to liberation* They will send 
all imperialists* warlords* oorrupt officials* 
local bullies and bad gentry to their graves* 
All revolutionary parties and revolutionary 
oomrndes will stand before them to be tested* 
and to be accepted or rejeoted as they deoide*
They will break all
To moroh at their head and lead them? Or 
to follow at thoir rear* gesticulating at them 
and criticizing them? Or to face them as op­
ponents?
Every Chinese is free to choose among 
these three alternatives* but circumstances 
demand that a quick choloe be made**
Mao Tse-tung made dear what his choice vast the Communists 
should get in front and lead the peasants* The slogan be­
came! "Get organized I"
Whether or not the hundreds of millions of pea­
sants would have become a violent tornado rushing forward 
to liberation without the exploitation of the Communists is 
a moot question* But there can bo llttla doubt that the 
peasantry supplied the manpower end momentum for ths Com­
munist victory in China* Thus* whan that vlotoxy finally 
cams* Mao had a double obligation involving peasants and 
agriculture* Politically, ha waa indebted to the tiller*
*Hao Tee-tung. SeleotM y<vrire* pn,_ r* t., I* 21-22. 
The quotation le from hle^nw^w* i ox bj In. ~ 
tue Peasant Movement in Hunan*M written in February* \ (•
It is the first major piece of writing by Mao and oo **• — 
tutee a revolutionary olaenlo because it crmtalne ax ■— 
latxon of m-jur euutx-xoutxua to Karxx-<x.
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to whom ho had promised the ownership of land* Theoreti­
cally, he was boundto the unorthodox view that agriculture, 
rather than Industry, would have to he the basis of economic 
development* The latter was a sticky problem for two 
reasons* First, the Soviet Union, the pace-setter and model 
for China despite China's "historic peculiarities," was well 
along towards Industrialization and Stalin had demonstrated 
by 1949 that heavy Industry was fundamental to major power 
status. Secondly, Mao faoed a serious contradiction In 
his two obllgatlonsi he had said flatly that "the tiller 
should own his land}" yet. If agriculture was to be a cru­
cial factor In the development of a "socialist" economy. It 
would have to be socialized*
Mao's solution to these problems was comprised of 
three parts* First, he would renege on the promise of pea- 
eant ownership, through the device of claiming that It 
applied only to the "democratic" stage of the revolution, 
whloh ended In 1949* Second, he would revise his theory on 
the primacy of agrloulture, allowing It and Industry tempoxv 
arily to share top priority in economic development* Third, 
he would gradually elevate heavy Industry to the highest 
priority, using agriculture to eustaln Industrialisation* 
Although It Is the first of these parts which Is 
the basio concern of this study, all three are olosely re­
lated, and together they constitute the complex story of 
economlo development In China during the Aeoade, 1951-61*
It should be emphasized that in all three parts of Mao's
;; /
* * V T -C j w/•
a :•
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scheme, political considerations were governing, economic 
factors being secondary. Only when all these factors are 
considered together, can the failures and disasters which 
the Communists encountered in agriculture towards the end 
of that decade be fully understood#
The Heed for Agrarian Reform
Of all the serious economic problems facing the 
Chinese Communists when they gained control of the mainland 
In 1949, the most urgent matter was agriculture# China's 
historic land scarcity and overpopulation, together with 
very low productivity on available land,1 constituted the 
three baslo elements of the problem in agriculture, and 
these elements were interlocked in a vicious cyole# The 
first two factors*—land scarcity and overpopulation—meant 
that the average farm was exceedingly small, barely enough 
for subsistence,2 and too small to be mechanised. Because 
even In a normal year the average farmer's income was barely 
enough to keep his family alive, It was Impossible to accu- 
mulate savings for investment in farm expansion and Improved 
methods. Thus, the continuation of uneoonomically small 
holdings with low yields was assured. Cognisant of the 
axiom that "the long-term interest of any government in
^u, op# clt.. pp# 113-115, 
8Ibld#
I
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China cannot but be tied to the sucoess of its agricultural 
policy, the Chinese Communists, once they were faced with 
the responsibility of governing, had to find a solution to
the gigantio problem of producing more agricultural products 
and distributing them efficiently. Apparently the Commu­
nists recognized the smallness of the individual farm as 
the basic difficulty, even as early as 1946, while Mao was 
still holding that the "tiller should own his land." In 
that year one of Mao's leading economists wrote.
There is an upper limit to the continuous 
increase in the productive efficiency of the 
email farmer. If we cannot bring about the 
gradual transition of individual peasant farm­
ing to collectivized farming, we cannot expect 
an uninterrupted rise of productivity,2
It would appear, then, that the Communist plan 
was, first, to redistribute land among the peasants for 
political purposes during the initial period of their con­
trol, then, after consolidating power, eliminate Individual 
peasant farming in favor of collectivization. Hence, when 
the Central People's Government promulgated in Jun^ 1950 
"The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China"
its first article guaranteed "the system of peasant land
but this basic law was published together withownership,
the "General Regulations Governing the Organization of
1Ibid.t p. 114,
2Ti Chao-pai, China's Postwar A/rrarlan Problem, 
published In Hong Kong, l~94c^ and' quoted In l-l-i..' P. 1x7.
3?he Ar-rarian Reform Law of the People's Rermblio 
of China and Other Relevant Documents (Peking* foreign 
Language tress, p. JL.
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Peasant's Associations," vhleh provided for the oreation of 
associations "to organize the peasants for production [and] 
to set up rural cooperatives • • •"1 The association thus 
paved the way for the elimination of the individual farmer. 
It was specified that peasant participation in the associa* 
tions be "on a voluntary basis,"2 but it was also specified 
that "the principle governing the organization of a peasants' 
association shall be democratic centralism,"3 and that the 
duties of members would bet "(a) to abide by the rules of 
the association} (b) to obey the organization) (c) to oarry 
out decisions) (d) to pay membership dues.
Shao-ohi, in a report issued with the other two documents, 
made it plain that the peasants' associations would not 
really be voluntary. Noting that "without a thorough agrar* 
lan reform, it would be impossible to realize the Industrie 
alizatlon of New China, 
a systematio end fierce struggle. .
associations should be the main organizational form and
.6executive organs of the forces of agrarian reform." 
the Agrarian Reform Law stipulated that the associations
n4 Moreover, Liu
m5 Liu deolaredt "Agrarian reform is 
[anc| the peasants'• •
Indeed*
1Xbld.. p. 51.
3Jbld.. p. 53.
4Ibi&.
^Llu Shao-chi, "Report on the Question of Agrarian 
Reform," ibid., p. 65.
6Ibld.. p. 79,
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would bs In charge of land redistribution.*
The Initial aim of the Communists* then, was to
paoify the peasants and win their support. But after estab­
lishing firm political control* they would elevate to the 
highest priority the need of getting the peasants to produce 
more. What the regime envisaged for the ultimate solution 
to the agricultural problem was a revolutionary reorganise* 
tlon scheme which would totally transform the means of 
agricultural production and distribution. This vast trans­
formation was accompanied by an unprecedentedly intense 
ideological and political campaign.
Cooperativizatlon
The complete reorganization of agriculture* on 
which the Chinese Communists apparently believed the indus­
trialization of the economy depended* consisted of four 
stages! (1) the period of transition* consolidation and 
land reform* 1950-53; (2) the period of Agricultural Pro­
ducers' Cooperatives* 1953-56; (3) the period of collectivi­
sation, 1956-58; and (4) the period of the communes* 195S-6L 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the regime looked upon 
the first three stages as preliminary steps to the ultimate
^Agrarian Reform Law, on. clt.. p. 4,
This is a summation by the writer rather than a 
specifio plan from which the Communists worked. There is 
no evidence to suggest that at the time they embarked upon 
agricultural development the Communists had a master plan.
2
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system of the communes because the data are conflicting.* 
But la the Ideological drive conduoted to Implement the 
transformation, each stage was treated largely as an end in 
itself, presumably to diminish peasant resistance*
Although Liu Siiao-chi announced in 1959 that the 
"democratic” period of the revolution had ended in 1949,
and Implied thereby that the "tiller*owner" phase of agri­
cultural reform had given way to socialism, actually the 
regime continued to eonduot land reform, confiscating the 
holdings of landlords and distributing the land among the 
peasants until 1953* According to detailed provisions of 
the Agrarian Reform Law, which defined the various classes 
existing in the countryside and stipulated precisely how 
each olass should be treated, the Communists made oertaln 
that the elements of the peasantry to which they were most 
obligated would enjoy the greatest benefits* Land reform,
a
then, was carried out by the Communists as a temporary 
measure which had the double advantage of appearing as an 
immediate reward to the "vanguard of the revolution" and of 
making easier the Communist task of bringing about economie 
recovery following the civil war*
The following table indicates the speed and extent 
of land redistribution in China (excluding Tibet and Sin- 
kiang) between June 1950 and the spring of 1953t
1See Choh-mlng Li, "The First Decadet Eeonomio 
Development [of China]," China Quarterly. No* 1 (January- 
Maroh, I960), p* 45*
_________ i
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Estimated Extent of Land Redistribution 
Program in China3'
Sural pop* affected 
(in millions)
Period Sural pop* still 
unaffected 
(in millions)
June 
Fob.
Sent*
Sept*
Nov*
Spring 1953
It oould not have gone without notice to economists 
and agrarian experts In the regime that the type of land re* 
distribution which they were conducting amounted to a minute 
parcel!zatlon of farms of much the same inefficient, uneco­
nomic proportions whioh had for generations been yielding 
diminishing returns* The average amount of land per capita 
received by the peasants in north Manchuria was approximately 
one and one-sixth acres; in south Manchuria, one-half acre; 
in central China, one-third to one-half acre; and in eouth 
east and north China, one-sixth to one-third acre*2 But 
despite the uneconomical else of holdings, the land redis­
tribution Berved to facilitate the consolidation of Oommunist
1781950
1951
1951 
1953
1952
322161339
400 100
463 376494
497 3
power in two respects* First, it eliminated an entire class 
of people, the landed gentry, historically powerful in China 
and naturally hostile to the Communists* Seoondly, the 
redistribution placed land in the hands of millions of
1Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policy of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Bombayi Asia Publishing house, I90O), 
p* 9*3• l1 ho data are from official Communist sources and 
are adjusted according to the national census of 1954 which 
gave the total rural population of the mainland at about 
500 million*
glbld*. p* 99*
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peasants who had never before owned land, thus giving them 
an Incentive which had not before existed* In any case, 
according to offioial data* agricultural output Increased 
significantly during the period of land reform, the rate of 
inorease, 1950-52, being fifteen percent per annum.1 The
following table shows the year by year Increases
Agricultural Output 1950-522 
(1949 = 100)
1950 1951 1952
145128Food crops 
Cotton 117160 291235
• • /
One offioial publication indicates that the regime 
actually looked upon the program of temporary peasant owner­
ship as a means of quick economic recovery* noting that 
peasants no longer had to pay landlords exorbitant annual 
rents in grain, the publication observed that the peasants 
"began to use this part of the fruits of their labor for 
the expansion of production end the improvement of living 
conditions,
ductlon such as had never been witnessed before* 
came this revealing passage* "At that time this enthusiasm 
for Individual production was good for ths recovery and
Tills generated a "great enthusiasm for pro-
Then*4
1Solomon Adler, T»<e Chinee Economy (Londons
Routledge 4 Kegan Paul, 195/1* p* 2j*
giMd,
^Hsueh Ku-Chiao, So Hslng, and Lin Tso-11,
Trsnflforation 1 F■— V MMIWI- WNMM* ' *|MK
*ma.
iT C
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development of agriculture and the entire national economy. * 
But what was good for the peasants* for agriculture 
and for economic recovery was not necessarily good for the 
Ideology of total power and long**range economic development* 
Hence* the Chinese Communists displayed constant political 
activity In order to prevent the "peasants' enthusiasm for 
production In the field of Individual eoonomy"2 from becom­
ing so Intense that they would not aoqulesce In a "higher 
stage" of "Socialist construction" at a later date* 
ring to this problem* a political commentator noted that 
the Party constantly sought
Refer*
• • • to educate the masses through politics* 
so that they may place their own long range* 
basic interests-*»namely* Interests of the 
Party and the people [state]—in first plaoe* 
and plaoe Individual Interests in the second 
place* And when contradiction occurs between 
the basic interests and certain current inter* 
ests of the masses* the Party seeks to explain 
directly to the masses* and moke them under­
stand correctly the relationship between the 
State* the group* and the individual so as to 
elevate the consciousness of ths masses* s
The "basic interests" were those of the Party* and 
the Party held that individual peasant ownership of the land 
and other means of production were alien to the demands of 
economic growth. Communist economists remarked* candidly* 
that "if such relations of production had been allowed to
^Mutual Aid and Cooperation In China's kr.r\ejil«* 
tural Production '[Peicingj loreVui hauguage Press*
P* 2.
^Ohl Tso-wen, op. clt.. p. 38
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remain long, It would have been impossible to bring about a 
further increase In agricultural output*
Thus, as the drive for "Socialist construction" 
demanded ntuoh greater agricultural output, and as the poll** 
tioal alms of the Party diotated a more eollactively ori­
ented peasantry, the regime took steps to pave the way for 
the cooperatlvlzatlon of agriculture* In 1951* while it was 
still carrying out land reform, the oentral committee of the 
Communist Party Issued a directive, "Decisions on r-Tutual Aid 
and Cooperation in Agricultural Production, "2 which set 
forth policy for the first step towards ultimate collectivi­
sation* It was in 1951, then, that the agricultural mutual 
aid and cooperation movement was launched* But it was 
actually only a year of preparation, and a period for the 
popularization of the plan* The movement did not get under­
way fully until 1952, and progress was slow even then* By 
the end of 1952 only about 40 percent of all peasant house­
holds had joined mutual aid teams,^ and only 3*644 coopera­
tives were in existence,* one-third of them in Hopei province, ̂
^Hsueh, Su, and Lin, op. cit*. p* 89*
2Teng Tse-hui, The Outstanding Success of the 
Agrarian Reform Kovemont la ekingt iorei^a Lan­
guage Press," 1954), p. lJJ,
^American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current 
Background #373, January 20, 1956, p* 1* The document is 
a summary on "Agricultural Cooperatlvlzatlon in Communist 
China,"
4Ibld*. p* 4. 
5Ibld*. p* 5.
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vhioh waa an area the Communists had "liberated" early In 
the olvll war* The cooperativization movement, then, was 
still In an initial stage by the end of 1952,
The year 1953, however, brought on a sudden quick* 
ening of the pace, Zt also produced a serious quarrel within 
the Party which apparently raged bock and forth, unsettled, 
for several years—and which may yet be unresolved. On 
February 15, the Party central oommlttee Issued a detailed 
policy statement, "Decisions on the Development of Agricul­
tural Producers' Cooperatives,"1 This was a more speolfio 
directive than that of 1951, and It revealed for the first 
time a three-stage plan for the accomplishment of coopera­
tives, The first step was to introduce "mutual aid teams, 
voluntarily organized for the mutual benefit of the peasants, 
using collective labor, but on a basis of private ownership 
of property,"2 The next step was designed as "semi-social- 
let," because it called not only for collective labor, but 
for common use of land under single management. It was at 
this point that the Communists introduced the term, "Agri­
cultural Producers' Cooperatives," The third step oalled
. . • . i • • y
for a "higher form of agricultural producers' cooperatives,
the fully socialist agricultural producers' cooperative 
collective farms. But, signlfloantly, the terms "oollec-
^Teng, on. cit., p, 18,
^Ibld, Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives will 
hereinafter"!) cTreferred to as APCe,
X12
tivization" ana "collective farms" were not usea In 
airectlves outlining the program for APCs to peasants' 
associations ana others responsible for implementing it.1 
This wouia seem to inaioate that the regime realized that 
full seals oolleotlve agriculture would be met with serious 
resistance until the peasants could be indoctrinated in the 
"correct line."
In pursuit of that correet line the Party central 
committee had oonvened a national conference on agricultural 
mutual aid and cooperation in Octobert 1953* and adopted a 
resolution to prooeed swiftly in the direction of coopera-
Otives, and give only minor attention to mutual aid teams.
In explaining the need for this policy the de­
cision declaredi
The isolated, dispersed, conservative and 
backward individual economy restricts the de­
velopment of the agricultural productive power, 
and there has become more and more apparent a 
great contradiction between such economy and 
Socialist industrialization. . 
carry out the Socialist transformation of agri­
culture so that our agriculture can be changed 
from backward and small-scale individual economy 
into advanced and large-soale cooperative economy, 
thus to overcome step by step the contradiction 
born of the uneven development in the two econom­
ic sectors of industry and agricultural
But in their drive to implement the new policy on coopera­
tives. the Communists met even mors intransigence on the
he have to» •
^Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policies of Mainland 
ocumontarv Study. o' Tcaiii'brldt-ox"" harvard
Pr e as, l'ysTT, p7X
p. 6*
hinai A 1)§niversity
^Current Backrround #373# op. clt.. 
3Ibld.
113
part of peasants than they had expected. Very little In­
formation on this matter got Into print at the time, but 
In speeches, conferences, and directives of Party leaders 
many months later, It was evident that coopcrativlzatlon 
encountered heavy resistance from the peasants In 1953*
For example, the Party central committee eent out a warning 
to lower officials and oadres In 1955’Which said, "Do not
repeat the mistake of 1953 In dissolving large numbers of 
cooperatives,"1 Then in the October 30, 1955 edition of 
the People's Pally. Lin Tieh, Party secretary for Hopei 
provlnco, revealed that something serious had gone wrong 
in 1953*
In 1953, when the number of agricultural 
cooperatives reached 5,300 in Hopei, we under­
estimated the degree of awakening of the masses 
and the leadership strength of the party and 
mistakenly carried out the so-called "anti- 
adventurist" measure of dissolving 2,150 coop­
eratives (constituting one third of the total 
number) and retaining only 3,645* At that time 
cadres in north China, Hopsi province, and 
Taming district levels went lnto-the Taming 
villages and blew away 350 out of over 400 
cooperatives, leaving only 6o* This was a 
heavy setback to the Soolallot Initiative of 
the masses. The lesson was a most painful one.
It was fortunate that the Party center pointed 
out our error in good time so that we did not 
develop this mistake further,2
tfhen Lin's remarks of 1955 are read in the light 
of the February, 1953 pronouncement on cooperatives, however, 
it becomes apparent that the officials had not really under­
estimated the "awakening of the masses" but had underset!-
^Iblfl,, p* 4, 
2Ibld., p, 5*
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mated the resistance of the massesI Because the directive 
on APOs in 195? was marked by heavy emphasis on the dangers 
of "commandlsm" and too hasty advances, it would appear that 
the central committee wanted to play the role of champion 
of peasant welfare. But it later became apparent that the 
retrenchment in the face of opposition to APCe in 1953 was 
not an error limited to regional, provincial and dlstriot 
officials, aB Lin indicated, but aetually involved the 
control center of the Party as veil.* Between the lines of 
oryptio Party notices, it can be dlsoerned that the peasants 
simply would not Join the APCs voluntarily and were incensed 
at having their newly aoqulred land tampered with, that 
the peasant views were reflected in Party councils is borne 
out by the oautlon contained in the February, 1953 statement, 
and warnings against "adventurism," It can be oonoluded, 
then, that the Communist program for collectivized agricul­
ture suffered a serious setbaok in 1953 and that the Party 
roadbed with considerable oautlon and uncertainty.
These attitudes were still in evidence when the 
Constitution of the People's Republlo of Ohlna was adopted, 
on September 20, 1954. Although in that dooument the regime 
formally announced collectivization ae the ultimate aim of 
agriculture, it did so in guarded terms. Article seven 
speaks of the "advance towards collective ownership," and 
notes that the state "regards the promotion of producers' 
cooperatives as the ohief means for the transformation of
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individual farming.But the People's Constitution did not 
spell out just how the "advance" would be made, nor did It 
mention collective farms, nor did it speoify that "collec­
tive ownership" meant state ownership.
The vacillation of the Party between its theoret­
ical determination to push ahead rapidly the socialisation 
of agriculture, and its actual reluctance to do so in the 
face of strong resistance prevailed until the spring of 
1954, when determination gradually won out. Although the 
target number of cooperatives originally set for the autumn 
of 1954 was 35,800, the number established had already risen 
to 91,000 by March,8 And according to the 1954 Statistical 
Report, 114,000 cooperatives were sharing dividends by the 
time of the autumn harvest, involving two percent of all 
peasants and three percent of all.arable land,^ 
of the quicker pace, the Party caution of 1953 gave way to 
optimism in the summer of 1954, Teng Tso-hui, director of 
the Party's Rural Work Department announced on July 15 that
"it had been planned to bring the number of cooperatives to
•
500,000 before spring farming in 1955, but according to the 
plans of various localities, the number should exceed 
600,000,The course for rapid development was thus set.
As a result
^Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
(Peking* Foreign Language” tress," 1954}', p, 11.
^Current Background #373, op. clt. . p, 8,
5mi-
________ i
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If official data are accurate,^ the determination resulted 
in the establishment of 500,000 APCs by the end of 1954, 
involving 11 percent of all peasant households and 14 per* 
cent of all farm acreage.2 This was a 35-fold Increase 
over the previous year. All of this amounted to a sizable 
leap forward to collective agriculture and would seem to 
have constituted the neoeBsary push to sustain the drive*
But the regime suffered another setback early in 1955.
By February, 1955 Teng Tee-hui*s target of 600,000 
cooperatives had been overfulfilled by 70,000, But events 
in March revealed that the same problem which had plagued 
the program in 1953 had developed again. In fact, it may 
have been a continuation. As observers in Hong Kong noted, 
"A chain of events occurred which betrayed the existence 
of a Great Debate in Communist China on the speed of agrl*
The nature of this conflict«3cultural oooperatlvization. 
was revealed in a "Decision on Spring Farming and Production,"
issued by the State Council on March 3. The document 
painted a somewhat dismal picture of the situation in agri­
culture!
Because the agricultural cooperatives have 
been developed rather quiokly while we lack suf­
ficient experience and preparation, with many
^There is no reason to doubt the figures from the 
standpoint of the Statistical Bureau, although there oould 
have been lnaocurades as a result of inexperience in sta­
tistical work at the lower levels,
Statistical Report, quoted in Current Bnckrronnj 
#373, op, olt,. p. 9.
3ihid.:_________________________________ _
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concrete poliey matters not having crystallized 
Into detailed and unified measures (resulting In 
oommandlsm and over-haste), part of the peasants 
came to have misgivings and misunderstandings 
about cooperatlvization. Part of the peasants 
(mainly middle peasants) were unstable in their 
production feelings and in some districts there 
was even witnessed the steep fall of prioes of 
draft animals, the Irregular slaughter of such 
animals and the indiscriminate cutting down of 
trees, etc.*
As a consequence of these conditions the state Counoil ruleds
In order to ensure the healthy and normal 
development of the agricultural production coop­
eration movement, the pace of agricultural coop- 
erntlvizatlon movement should be slowed down a 
bit* Before tha spring farming, the development 
of new cooperatives should be stopped and efforts 
should be concentrated on reorganizing the ex­
isting cooperatives for their consolidation,2
The Peking People*a Daily confirmed the exlstenoe of diffi­
culties in an editorial of March 14, calling for more 
intensive Ideological activity and propaganda to the pea-
*
sant3 in order to restore the earlier pace in reorganization. 
Amidst these conditions, the Party held its 
fictional Conference, March 21-31, The Conference was held 
for the purpose of discussing the draft of the First Five 
Year Plan, but the communique released after the Conference 
significantly made no mention of the APC movement, confirm­
ing that the Party was again disturbed by an absence of 
"socialist awakening" on the part of the peasants, Mao 
himself admitted the existence of thie problem when he
1aia*
gIbld»
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spoke "On Agricultural Cooperation" In April* 1955*
What still lingers In the countryside is 
capltr.lJ.gt ownership—an ocean of it* Every 
has noticed that in recent years there has b 
a spontaneous and constant growth of capitalist 
elements in the countryside and that new rich 
peasants have sprung up everywhere# Many well- 
to-do middle peasants are striving to become 
rich ones. Many poor peasants lacking sufficient 
means of production* ore still not free from the 
toils of poverty? some are in debt* others selling 
or renting their land. If this tendency goes un­
checked, the separation into two extremes in the 
countryside will get worse day by day.l
In other words, the Communists were confronted with a spread­
ing epidemic of individualism and capitalism which constitu­
ted a fundamental threat to the Party's economic aims* and 
to the whole ideological foundation on which the regime was 
based. Later in the year Mao voloed crltioism of those
■ 4
regional and provincial offiolals who had met peasant re­
sistance with the same "resolute contraction" which oocurred 
in Hopei in 1953* Although he did not specify the guilty 
parties* Mao implied that the Party "control organ" had not 
approved of the slowdowns, "To go ahead with such important 
aotion [as dissolution of APCs] without the agreement of the 
Party Center*" Mao said* "was not proper,"In April*
1955*" he oontlnued* "the Party Center had Issued the 
warning! *Do not repeat the 1953 mistake of dissolving
v
large batches of cooperatives, Othsrwlse there will have 
to be orltiolem,* But some Comrades would not listen to
one
een
■^Hsueh, Su, and Lin* op, olt,« p, 92* 
^Current Background if373* op, clt.. p. 10,
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that. "1 Yet, considering the Iron rule of democratic cen­
tralism, plus the faot that "resolute contraction" had 
taken place in widely scattered regions, it le highly im­
probable that the Party center and Mao himself had not been
aware of the retrenchment In APCs. What is more likely is 
that the highest levels of the Party were torn by basic con­
flicts which became manifest in the contradictory polioies 
and pronouncements during the first six months of 1955.
But in July the conflict within the Party was 
finally settled by the firm hand of Mao Tse-tung. On July 
31, in a major report "On the Cooperatlvlzation of Agricul­
ture," delivered to a conference of secretaries of Provin­
cial, Municipal and Dlstrlot Committees of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Mao at once revealed the extent of the 
cleavage whloh had divided the Party on agriculture and set 
down a hard new line from which, he made dear, no deviation 
would be tolerated. What followed on the heels of the 
July 31 speech was the most intensive ideological campaign 
engaged in by the Party in the area of economic development 
since its establishment in power.
Earlier in the year Mao had reminded hie oomrades 
that "political work is the life line of all economic work. 
This is especially so when basio changes occur in the 
society's eoonomio system."2 Driving home the point, he
1Ibld.
2Mao Tse-tung on "The Socialist High-Tide in 
China's Countryside,” quoted in Chi Tso-wen, on. cit., p. 39.
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emphasized that "the fundamental task of polltioal work is 
to Impart incessantly to the masses of the peasantry the
Socialist ideology* and to critioize their capitalist tend­
encies* 1,1 Ke then proceeded in the July 31 speech to lay 
down the "correot line."
In the rural areas throughout the country* 
a new upsurge in the Socialist mass movement is 
approaching* Certain of our Comrades* however* 
like a woman with bound feet* are walking un­
steadily* and are all the while oomplaining of 
other people that they are going too fast* pro­
ceeding too rapidly* Excessive criticism of 
minor issues* uncalled-for oomplaints* endless 
anxiety* and oountless rules and precautions— 
these are taken by them to be the correot policy 
in the guiding of the Socialist mass movement 
in the rural areas*
No* Such is not the correct policy* It 
is a mistaken policy*2
Echoing his famous remarks of 1927 on the neces­
sity of leading the peasants* Kao demanded a determined 
campaign to settle the problems of agriculture* "We must 
actively* enthusiastically* and with proper planning* lead 
this movement* and not resort to various ways to drag it 
back, he declared* He then proceeded to analyze the 
problems and set forth the policy for their solution*
There were* said Mao* two kinds of mistaken ideas. First* 
there were some comrades who held that the country was not 
ready for APOs* that such ventures were too risky* or that
1Ibld P* 31* '
2Amerioan Consulate General. Hong Kong* Current 
Background #364* a translation of Mao's speech as released 
by the New China Hews Agency, p* 1*
3i£M.
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the lndlvlduallstio economy was preferable* These vers 
people, Kao said, who had never outgrown their capitalist, 
bourgeois tendencies* Secondly, according to Mao, there 
had been the mistake of underestimating the Party's strength 
and Its ability to overcome resistance* Indicative of the 
Internal conflict within the Party on this Issue was the 
faot that Mao spent a major portion of his speech refuting 
the critloism that the APO movement was "adventuristic” In 
contrast to the more oautlous pace recommended In the 9- 
torv of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Mao's retort was that these orltlos did not understand the 
book I All that the Soviet Communists pointed out, he said, 
was that the paoe of collectivisation should not proceed 
faster than the Party's ability to manage It* The Chinese
J
Communist Party, Kao claimed, was fully able to lead the 
movement If It had self-confidence* Much of Mao's lengthy 
speech was given over to generating that self-confidence 
and enthusiasm which he found lacking* Then he gave the 
order to speed up the program In agriculture* By the end 
of the autumn harvest In October, 1956, Mao commanded, the 
oooperatlvlzatlon of agriculture In Ohlna should be 33 per-
*See History of tve C.P.S.TT. (B,) authorised by the 
Party Central CouaYttee, l9>oTsou.. j foreign Lam 
Publishing House, 1954), Mao's critics had strong textual 
support* The book says, p* 476, "The Central Committee ^of 
the C»P*S«U«] most seriously warned Party organizations 
'against any attempts wnatsoever to foroe the collective 
farm movement by "decrees" from above, whloh mleht In 
the danger of the substitution of ®»< 
real Socialist emulation in tne organisation of o< 
farms*'" This warning was to haunt Mae again in ait 
tne failure of tne communes*
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cent completed.1 Mao instructed all responsible officials 
to take whatever action was neoessary to see that this was 
accomplished.
The Party machinery went into action immediately, 
and the drive was conducted intensely beginning in midsummer, 
1955* All of China suddenly broke out with enthusiasm for 
the "oorrect line" on agricultural cooperatlvizatlon. A 
survey of newspaper headlines during this period reveals 
the intensity of the drives "Chairman Mao's Directive on 
Agricultural Cooperatlvization Kins Support in Countryside"} 
"Szechwan to Have 100,000 Agricultural Cooperatives by Next 
Spring" t "Rural Cooperative Movement in Kiangsu to Enter New 
High"| "Mobilize Women to Join the Cooperative Movement"! 
"Members of Democratic Parties' Cultural and Educational 
Workers Work Strenuously for Materialization of Coopera* 
tlvlzation of Agriculture"} "Democratic League Headquarters 
Discuss Cooperativization of Agriculture"! "94# of Kiangsu 
Peasant Households to Join Cooperatives After Three Winter* 
Spring Cycles"} "10,000 New Agricultural Cooperatives Es­
tablished in Hupeh"} "700,000 Youth League Members Join 
Agricultural Cooperatives in Shangtung"} "140,000 Peasant 
Households of Tungtlng Lake Plain Join Agricultural Coopera* 
tlvea"} "Agricultural Cooperative Movement Wins Decisive
^Current Background #364, p. 3*
2The quotations are representative samples of 
newspaper headlines and artloles translated by the U. S. 
Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press 
between September and December,l>_o« 1
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Victory In 1955."
So vigorous was the Party campaign to fulfill 
Mao's target of 33 percent oooperatlvlzatlon of agrleulture 
by autumn, 1956 that the goal vas reached nearly a full 
year In advance, or within four months of the order. Pig* 
ures.released In early November, 1955# Indicated that 
1,300,000 cooperatives, approximately one-third of all 
peasant households in the eountry, would be in operation by 
mid-November.^ The New China News Ageney reported that
between August 1 and November 10, 590,000 new APOs were 
organized comprising 49,400,000 peasant households, 
was desoribed In Party literature as a great "Socialist
Such terms
This
Upsurge" and a new "High Tide in Agrleulture." 
would appear to be forerunners of the "Great Leap Forward" 
oonoept and may lndloate that, so far as Mao was concerned : 
at least, the rapid advance of late 1955 presaged a sue* 
talned effort to aocelerate greatly the oolleotivization 
of Chinese agriculture.
The extent of Mao Tse-tung's responsibility for 
the deoislon to push ahead with oooperatlvlzatlon Is r 
vealed by his enthusiastio comments In the preface of a book 
edited by him and published In December, 1955, entitled, 
Socialist Upsurge In China's Countryside.^ Mao exolalmed
^Current Background #373, P* 20.
2Current Background #378, February 17, 1956, p. 18.
(Peking! Foreign Languages Press, 1957), » of artioles describing the High Tide," of coop*collection *„**»-, ....
erativization, and Intended for further propagation of the 
'fcorrect line."
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that the advance between September and December had been eo
"This
"It tells us that we need
great that he had to rewrite his original preface* 
is a tremendous event," he said* 
only one year-1956—to practically complete the change-over
,.lto semi-socialist cooperation in agriculture* 
added that he expected this achievement to be followed by 
"the transformation from semi-socialist to fully socialist 
cooperatives*" in other words* collectivisation* 
had ordained a sustained push forward is indicated in his 
remark that the rate of eoonomlc and cultural transition to 
"socialism" "can no longer be entirely the same as originally 
All must be appropriately expanded and acoeler-
fie then
That he
intended*
ated.
Is this rapid advance of oooperativisation 
in agriculture healthy? It certainly is. Every 
local Party and organization is giving all-round 
leadership to the movement* The peasants are 
taking part in it with great enthusiasm and in 
a very orderly maimer* Their keenuxu for pro- * 
duction has reaohed unprecedented heights
In the countryside where Mao had charged six 
months before that there had been a "spontaneous and con­
stant growth of capitalist elements*" he now found peasants 
giving up their eoonomlc independence with great enthusiasm* 
This was indeed a remarkable upsurge* Mao was apparently 
convinced that the strides made in 1955 were genuine* for
• * •
xibid*, p. 8.
3Ibld.
^Ibld** pp* 8—9*
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he stressed that the main obstacle to overcome was simply 
an underestimation of what could bo done. "The present 
problem," he Insisted, "Is that many people consider impo 
8ible things whioh could bo done If they exerted themselves*"1* 
But in a remark he might very well have seriously regretted 
after the oommune debacle, Mao also said, "Of course, no one 
should go off into wild flights of fancy, or make plans ux*»
warranted by the objective situation, or Insist on attempting 
the impossible."2 Whether based on an objective situation 
or not, Mao was himself making plans for the next stage in 
the transformation of Chinese agrloulture.
"advanced cooperation," but what he meant was collectiviza­
tion, and he spoke of its oomlng "during the next few years."3
He oalled it
He stated,
When people see that large and advanced co­
operatives are better than small and elementary 
cooperatives, when people see that long-range 
planning brings then a life of a much higher 
material and cultural level, they will agree’to * 
combine their coops and build advanced ones*4
Pointedly, the final article in Socialist Upsurge was entit­
led, "Advanced Coops Are Best, and They're Hot Hard to 
Organize,"^ In his introduction to it, Kao remarked, "This 
article does one's heart good* h6
_1Ibld*« p* 10. 
gIbld*. pp. 9-10. 
3Ibld*. p. 8. 
^Ibld*. p. 478. 
5Ibld*. p. 490.
—- 6im&' ..
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Thus* before the drive for the "semi-socialist" 
APCs vaa actually completed in December, 1955* advanced 
preparations were underway for the next stage, collectiviza­
tion of agriculture.
Collectivization
There la no exact point at whioh It may be said 
the Chinese Communists began their drive to collectivize 
agriculture, wipe out private ownership and totally elimi­
nate the individual factor in the rural.economy. In a real 
sense, any great distinction between "elementary" and "ad­
vanced" APCs is artificial. The latter wae collectivized 
agriculture, and it differed from the former in degree, not ; 
kind. Therefore, in some respects it would be reasonably 
aoeurate to refer to the whole APC movement as simply one 
stags of oolleotlvlzation. But the differences were con­
sidered important by the Communists, Early in 1956, Party 
conferences and publications began to emphasize that the 
newly accomplished APOs were elementary, and that they were ; 
to be distinguished from the fully socialist APCs," Al­
though in the semi-BOciallst APCs the members' incomes were 
determined mainly by the principle of "to eaoh according to 
his work," the land, draft animals and farm tools were pri­
vately owned and were simply pooled for cooperative use,1 
According to official acoounts, these elementary APCs were
^Heueh, Su, end Lin, ox?, olt«. p, 122,
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39*2 percent more productive than individual farmed 
so long as the means of production vers privately owned, 
the Party emphasized, some members, through dividends on 
their privately owned land and equipment, earned more than
But
others and "more or Iobs [took] a part of the fruits of the 
labor of others."8 This, of course, broke a basic rule of 
Marxism and "to some extent adversely affected the members' 
working enthusiasm."^ Thus, In order to restore "working 
enthusiasm," the Party Implied, It would bow to popular 
demand and advance Into fully collectivized farms.
The shift from cooperative to oolleotive agricul­
ture In China may be marked approximately as beginning in 
June, 1956. In that month the Party issued two documents 
whloh made It clear that the official deolsion had been made
and was to be Implemented shortly. One of the documents 
dated June 19, 1956 was a report by Teng Tse-hul, deputy 
Prime Minister, entitled "Agricultural Cooperative Movement 
During the Past Tear, and Our Future Work." Teng hailed the 
"tremendous advances [whlohj have been made on the agrioul-
Atural front In the six short months since last winter,"^ and 
reviewed In glowing terms how swiftly and completely the
XIbld.. p. 124.
2Ibld.. p. 125.
^Excerpts of the dooument are translated in Chao 
Kuo-chun, Arrmrlan Policies of Mainland China, on. clt.. 
pp* 102-105.
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APC objectives had been achieved* He cited statistics 
Indicating that this upsurge had greatly strengthened the
economy, and also that the "bottom is being knocked out of 
the system of exploitation making it possible for 
the peasants to follow the road of common [ collectivised] 
property,"1 Teng was careful, however, to include an escape 
clause in his report: "A rise in output is absolutely sure.
* • «
provided no exceptionally serious natural calamities occur 
and farms are well managed,1,2 As for "future work," Teng 
indicated, by the kinds of problems which he said should 
be solved, that collectivisation Should be the next move,**
On June 30, the Party issued two important docu- 
ments which were closely related. One announced that as of 
that date, 91.9 percent of the country's total peasant 
households had joined Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives** 
Moreover, the report emphasized that as a result of "stream# 
lining, consolidation, and expansion," 63 percent of the 
peasants were in APGs of the "advanoedf' type,® She second 
document issued was entitled "Model Regulations for Higher# 
stage APCs," This was the official adoption by the First 
National People's Congress of the decision to collectivize 
agriculture, and the regulations made it clear that the
1Ibid„ p. 103.
2Ibld.
3IMd., p. 104, '
A Hsueh, Su, and Lin, on, clt*. p* 132*
hm-__ ___ _______ i
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Mhighexv*etage" APOb were a complete break vith the Initial 
policy of peasant ownership vith vhloh the Party had von 
the crucial support of the peasantry years before.
The order ruled that
the Agricultural Producers* Cooperative, In ac­
cordance with the Socialist principles, converts 
the chief means of production owned privately by 
its members into the collective property of the 
cooperative. The members are organised for col­
lective work, and the cooperative applies the 
principle "from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his work,* giving equal pay 
for equal work, regardless of sex or age. • • **
The regulations stipulated that, as in the case of 
the earlier APCs, membership in the oolleotlves should be on 
a voluntary basis, and that members were fres to withdraw,
taking their property with than at the end of a production 
year.2 Furthermore, the regulations stipulated.
Household goods privately owned by members, 
and email holdings of trees, poultry, domestic 
animals, small farm tools and tools needed for 
subsidiary cottage occupations will not be made the common property of the cooperative*3
The Model Regulations mads it quits evident that 
polltioal and ldeologloal considerations were basle factors 
in the transition to eolleetivss, and one entire chapter is 
devoted to defining the "political work" of eollsotivs farms. 
The eolleetivss, eooording to the regulations, vers directed 
to oarry on political work under the guidance of the Com-
1Kodcl Regulations for Advanced Agricultural Pro- 
Tv oa "(Peking.V Foreign LanguagesT'reas,
gIhld., pp. 6-9.
3ibia.. p. io.
dueers* Cooueratfe), p."5.
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muniat Party. Elsewhere, Liu Shao-chl explained that 
"Party guidance means integrating political vork with 
economic work, integrating the political education of the 
masses with material incentives and placing politics in 
command, making it the driving force."*1 This principle was 
applied more specifically to the advanced APOs.
The purpose of political work is to insure 
the completion of production plans, to see that 
the cooperative is run diligently and thriftily 
... to insure a correct integration of the 
collective interests of the cooperative and the 
interests of individual members, and to consoli* 
date the cooperative both Ideologically ganizationally.2
In order to facilitate the wedding of personal Interests to
state interest8 the collectives were directed to "arrange
talks for members during their spare time so that they can
x*. 1 ■
learn ... what the Communist Party stands for, and the 
policies, laws and deorees of the People's Government."^
In addition, the collectives were given the responsibility 
to "educate members in the spirit of patriotism and collec­
tivism" and "raise their understanding of socialism, and
.4overcome survival of oapitallBt ideas."
and or-
That the new,
fully socialized APCs were to employ the familiar techniques 
of sooial control was indioated further in the directive to 
"enoourage criticism and self-criticism, cement the unity
*Llu Shao-chl, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism 
in China," in Ten Glorious Years, op. clt.. p, 23.
^JJoflel Regulations, op. clt.. p. 10.
51SU-
*ma.. p. 26.______________________
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between leading officers of the cooperative and the rank 
and file, between the membere themselves* and between one 
production brigade and another."*■
Thus* the oampalgn for the collectivization of 
agriculture was not only designed for the purpose of Im­
proving the national economy* but also for the purpose of 
further extending the political power of the regime* It 
heralded a major step in the "cultural construction" Kao 
had promised would accompany eoonomie construction* As one 
expert commented* this was an "effort to mold the traditional. 
Chinese villages into a highly organised unit following the 
ldeologloal pattern of Marxism-leninism*”2 The Chinese 
Communist Ideology called for a people oolleotivlsed eco­
nomically* politically* emotionally and mentally* If 500 
million peasants in the countryside could be collectivized* 
the regime would be solidly entrenohed* Realization of 
this was apparently a major factor in Kao's determination 
to push ahead swiftly*
The absenoe of reference to factional strife In 
Party literature during the period of collectivisation 
would seem to indloate that this stage of agricultural 
transformation was achieved with much less resistance from 
the peasants than that met in the ini tied drive for APCs*
By the end of 1956* 88 percent of the country's peasant
i
1Jhid., p. 27*
2Chao Kuo-ehun, Agrp^^u Policy cf tva 
Communist Party» op* clt#■ p7 3Uo«
Chinese
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households had been absorbed Into collectives*'4, Whether or 
not they had joined "voluntarily," in accordance with sti­
pulations In the Model Regulations, is open to speculation*
But C. P, Fitzgerald, a leading expert on contemporary 
China, observed after traveling through the mainland that 
"there is no evidence at all that the establishment of the ! 
Higher Stage met with passive resistance, still less with
Aopen defiance*" On the contrary the peasants hastened "to 
join and establish Higher Stage Cooperatives ahead of the 
schedule expected by the regime*" "But," Fitzgerald added 
with caution, "this strange development still needs to be 
explained. Considering the difficulties encountered in 
1953 and early 1955* it does seem strange that eollectlvlza-
Atlon moved with such apparent ease* Chao Kuo-chun accounts 
for this by saying that "the prinoiple of voluntariness 
emphasized in all government direotives seemed psychologi­
cally to soften the resistance of many peasants to collective 
farming," It is just as likely, however, that there was 
simply a thorough censorship of any criticism of the drive
both in and outside the Party* For, in their history of 
the "Socialist Transformation" published in I960, Heueh, Su
^Hsueh, Su, and I»in, op. clt*. p* 132*
2C. P* Fitzgerald, Flood Tide In China (London* 
The Cresset Press, 1958), p* Iu9*
3Ibld*
^35eonomio Planning and Orranlzatlon in Mainland 
p'ocuaontary Study, "(ljYftAz/ET''tJaiabrlSaei" n-r-
ity "Srass, 1 ioWt p* 11b*
China*
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and Lin alluded to "rightist cadres" who had "incorreot 
ideas about the cooperatives" and who "listened to com* 
plaints about the movement" by "rich peasants who insisted 
on talcing the capitalist road*"3.
• • • It was not until after the rectification 
campaign, the anti-Rlghtist struggle and especially 
the big leap forward in production from the winter 
of 1957 to 1953 that what Lthe rightist cadres and 
capitalist peasants] had asserted about the coop* 
eratives being without advantages was completely 
repudiated* Only then did the bourgeois Right* 
ists who had heaped abuses on agricultural coop* 
eration dearly show their own ugly face as 9 
opponents of the Communist Party and socialism*
This may provide the explanation which Fitsgerald 
eaid was needed* Some Communists and peasants were not so 
enthu8iastio as the control organ made It appear* Opposi­
tion was probably more submerged than eliminated* Heverthi 
less, for the time being at least, the transformation of 
agriculture was proceeding swiftly, and, aooording to the 
Party, was increasing output* Grain production targets set 
for 1957 were exceeded in 1956; and, with the exception of 
areas where "serious natural disasters occurred,” more than
75 percent of the peasant households in the country in-
*creased output over the previous year*-7
The drive to accomplish the collectivization of 
agriculture was accompanied by an intense "rectification" 
oampalgn during 1957 whiteh "was a far-reaching movement of
^llsueh, Su and Lin, on* clt*. p* 137*
gIbld.
3Mm pp. 132-133*
______________ _■
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aoolalist education on a mass Beale,"*' By employing the 
Small Groups, "persuasion," criticism and self-critiolaa 
and all tha other devlooa of thought reform, the regime 
endeavored to consolidate tha gains made In tide socialist 
transformation* The Communists* description of this process 
is q.uite illuminating, and puts the "voluntariness" of 
collectivization in an interesting perspectives
• • • Through free airing of views and debates 
the peasants throughout the country were able 
to distinguish between right and wrong ideas, 
strengthen their own confidence and determina­
tion to take the eooiallst road • 
posed and dealt severe blows to the disruptive 
activities of the former landlords, rich peasants, 
counter-revolutionaries and other bad elements*
All this played an important role in consolidating 
the cooperatives and developing agricultural pro­
duction. 2
They ex-• *
!
The Party hailed the results of the rectification 
caapalcn and olalmed that it marked a "decisive victory in
4
the socialist revolution on the eoonomio front," and also 
that it "brought about a victory on tha political and ideo­
logical fronts*" "The political oonsoiousnsse of the peo­
ple," the Party insisted, "was enormously raised* In a 
report to the second session of the Eighth fiatlonal Congress 
of the Communist Party on Hay 17, 1958# Tan Chen-1 in, a 
member of the Central Committee, delivered a report on 
agriculture in whioh ho confirmed that there had been a 
need for the rectification drive* Ho noted that in
p. 137*
2<£M4., PP* 137-1S8. 
3IvM.. p. 130.
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the epring of 1957* certain persons. In • 
flurry to oppose what they called a "reckless 
advance" threw doubts on the policy of achieving 
greater, faster, better end sore economical 
results in , . , agricultural development. As 
a result the labor enthusiasm of the masses was 
dampened and in 1957 progress on the production 
front, and on the agricultural front In particu­
lar, was retarded , • • These facts are a powerful 
weapon for demolishing right-deviatlonlst, eon- serva 
tura
• * •
jiva Ideas about the development of agrioul- 
But the Party’s draft of the National Program for Agricul­
tural Development In September, 1957* together with the 
"initiative of the masses" spurred by the rectification 
campaign. Tan said, "gave rise to a new upsurge in agrioulm 
tural production,"2 lie affirmed that "a Communist ideolog­
ical emanlclpatlon movement is going on among the people 
throughout the country,"^
In view of the swift events which vers to follow 
shortly, it is interesting to note that the lag range plan 
for agrioulture, which Tan was explaining, contained no 
mention or even a hint of the forthcoming communes. The 
only passage which might possibly have presaged subsequent 
developments was made in section 23* It oalled for strict 
economy which meant "lowering the costs of production and
lwExplanations on the Second Revised Draft of the 
Rational Program for Agricultural Development <1956-1967)"
in Second Session of tvs Eighth Rational Congress of Tbs 
Co-rrSTTib^'party or cLina uekinjuV"-<'or elan LaaataxeaTrcss,
T35ST* pTsi*
’ins.
?m«.. p. 82.
j
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taking a firm stand against vasts and extravagance* "1 
Specifically, it said, "Expenditure on weddings, funerals 
and social occasions should be out down in the countryside, 
and Irrational past customs and habits changed*"2 
these remarks could hardly be interpreted as a harbinger 
of the communes*
But
The original "Draft National Program" had been 
submitted by the Political Bureau of the Party Central 
Committee on January 23* 1956* It was twice revised In 
accordance with the "greater, faster, better" principle, 
and finally approved by a resolution of the Eighth Party 
Congress on May 23, 1958* Inasmuch as the plan made no 
oall for the oommunlzatlon of agriculture but preoeded the 
Inauguration of communes by just a few months, one Is left 
to assume that either the communes came as a result of a 
last minute decision, or the plans for them were a careful 
secret* The evidenoe seems to support the former conclusion*
Communication
The Chinese Communists had at least two good 
reasons for making a hasty decision for the crash program 
of oommunes* One was the persistence of the same problem 
which had plagued the Party in 1953* 1955 and 19571
^National Program for Arrrlcultural Development* 
(Peking! foreign Languages iPresa, l$o6j, p* 2l*
2Ibld.
1956-67
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resistance to the socialization of agriculture* A second 
reason vas the urgent need to get store capital from agricul­
ture for industrialization.
Tan Chen-lln had referred in tils explanation of 
the Draft Plan to unspecified "certain persons" who opposed 
the recklessness of the "greater, faster, better" slogan, 
producing a dampening of enthusiasm among the peasants.
These "oertaln persons" trere probably the same Party figures 
vho had been dragging their feet all along, and vho had 
championed the peasant cause. Among those mho had objeoted 
to the quickened paoe of collectivization were apparently 
some high-ranking army officers. Indeed, opposition vas so 
serious that it resulted in a shake-up of the high command 
in 1959, vith the Defense Minister, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, 
being replaced by Marshal Lin Plao.^ Lin observed that 
"quite a number of comrades" in the array lacked a "high 
degree of Socialist consciousness. "2 His explanation three 
some light on the identity of some of those "certain persons" 
vho had taken the peasants' side. Said Lint
Sinoe the overvhelming majority of the offi­
cers and men of our army come from the peasantry, 
unavoidably some comrades sometimes oonsider ques­
tions from the temporary, partial interests of 
small producers and do not clearly understand 
oertaln questions of Socialist change.3
^Reuters 
Times. Deoember 6
’{Mi-
dispatch from Peking In the Key York
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Others who likely offered opposition to the speed* 
up were the district and local officials, because they had
the responsibility of urging peasants to do "voluntarily and
• <
enthusiastically" what they had previously demonstrated
considerable reluctance to do* Thus, although Party pro*
nouncements exuded confidence and optimism in late 1957 and
early 1958, the regime had serious cause for oonoern, as its
repeated references to Rightists, counterrevolutionaries,
and "bad elements" indicate*
Purges of provincial districts and local leaders
in 1958 lend credence to the theory that apprehension may
have been a major factor prompting the decision to communlse
agriculture* The First Secretary and a largd group of lesser
comrades In Honan province were purged because they
• * * rejected the class struggle, questioned the 
wisdom of agricultural collectivization, charged 
party cadres with extravagance, waste, and eoer* 
olon, with overstressing collectivization at the 
expense of the Individual • « • rendering people * 
homeless, oausing food shortage and loss of life*
In his trial, the First Secretary presented a convincing
case for the opponents of collectivisation, and-spoke in
graphic terms of peasant discontent!
Draft animals are lost and the productive 
force has declined
to look after draft animals and we socialist 
builders do not 
beasts of burden today 
pull ploughs and harrows with their wombs
i
Our ancestors knew how• * •
The peasants are like 
* Girls and women
• • *
• •
1From the Honan Dally* July 4, 1958* Quoted in 
A* V* Sherman, "The People's Commune" In G. F* Hudson,
A* V* Sherman, and A* Zauberman, The Chinese Cor»rouneftt _ A 
Documentary Review and Analysts of. j;! 3 o -4 
(Hew lorki Institute ox Pacific kelatioae, l&bOJ, p* io*
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hanging down • • • Cooperation 
Into exploitation « • ,1
The Honan officials were accused of favoring a relaxation
of collectivization In response to peasants* appeals, and
the charges against then noteds
Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolu- 
tlonarles, had elements and well-to-do middle 
peasants acoustomed to capitalist ways of think* 
lng applauded and agitated for withdrawal fron 
the collectives, saying "big cooperatives" will 
turn back Into "little cooperatives," then Into 
mutual aid teams, and then baok Into individual 
farms.2
is transformed
Similar purges of recaloltrant officials were 
reported from other provinces including Liaoning Hunan, 
Shantung, and Kwangsl between Kay and October, 1958.3 It 
would appear, then, that the Intra-Party quarrel over the 
socialization of agriculture, which broke out in 1953# was 
far from settled In 1958* Kora Important, the evldenoe 
Indicates rather strongly that the peasant resistance to 
socialization which set In at the outset had still not 
been overcome at the time the Communists took the most 
revolutionary step of all.
In addition to Party dissension and peasant resis­
tance, the regime had eeonomlo difficulties whloh may help 
to explain the sudden deelslon for the communes, Despite 
optimistic reports of Increased agricultural output, the 
faot was that the Chinese Communists were Increasingly
&juia.
2Ibld.
3jbld.. p, 17.
!
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dissatisfied with the amount of capital agriculture was 
yielding for investment in industry,* Official figures tell 
the etozyt China led the world in grain produotion in 1957* 
hut the per*-capita share of that produotion was only 286
kilograms, whereas that of the Soviet Union was 655* and 
that of the United States was 928. 
and the U.S.S.R
2 And in both the U. 3.
Industry was able to supply the greater 
part of its own new capital. In China industry was almost 
totally dependent upon agriculture. But, despite this -
• »
dependence, it should be noted that by 1957 industry had
» *?■
officially replaced agriculture as the highest priority In
the Chinese economy.^
*
tolled the virtues of industrialization and subordinated
Increasingly, Party literature ex*
agriculture to the secondary position of supporting industry* 
Therefore, in order to meet their own priorities the Com* 
munlsts would have to demonstrate industrial growth. Simul­
taneously, it became apparent that aid from the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe had not lived up to Chinese expectation^* 
but the Chinese were being asked by their Soviet comrades to 
keep up the heavy payments on earlier loans. If the Chinese 
were to "bring our production up to or above that of the 
advanced countries after several deoadee of effort,as the
» p* 13,
2ileueh, Su, and Lin, on. clt.. p. 241, 
3lbld.. P. 242.
*Sherman, on. clt.. p. 18,
5po I«po, quoted In ibid.
!
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slogans vers calling for in 1957* they would have to squeeze 
more capital out of agriculture by Increasing the amount of 
food sold abroad for foreign exchange and the amount of food 
available for payment to the Soviet Union In return for 
capital equipment*3. In order to accomplish these increases, 
the Chinese Communists had only two possibilities Which 
offered any prospects for success. The first and most 
important of these was to employ manpower more efficiently! 
the second was to practice stricter economy. The communes 
were designed specifically to accomplish both*
One of the ways for the regime to realize net 
savings from agriculture was to obtain more work for lover 
wages on the part of peasants, A second method was to 
employ the agricultural labor foroe more efficiently* Labor 
was in abundant supply in the countryside, but efficient use 
of it was another matter. In between the active periods of 
sowing and reaping, peasants were relatively unproductive.
It was estimated by the government in August, 1958 that men 
worked about 200 days a year and women 100 days a year on 
the collective farms.2 If agricultural production were to 
be inoreased sufficiently to finanoe industrialisation, the ■ 
planners decided that farming would have to be organised in 
such a way as to keep the peasants produotive at all times. 
But the Tarty "made it dear that this extra labor»potentlal
*Seo infra, pp. 273-274. 
2Po I-po, op. cit.. p. 19*
—• r*
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. •!tapped for accumulation [of capital] could not be paid for* 
The major principle behind the communes was that .
the agricultural labor force should engage not only in 
farming but also in other forms of work, such as construe* 
tion and conservation projects and even industry, as needed 
and as available, but without extra pay* A resolution by 
the Party Central Committee on August 29, 1958, emphasized 
the need for greater centralization, stating that
• the establishment of people's communes with: * •
all-round management of agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry, side-occupations and fishery, 
where Industry (the worker), agriculture (the 
peasant), exchange (the trader), eulture and 
education (the student) and the military affairs 
(the militia-man) merge into one, is the funda­
mental polioy to guide the peasants to accelerate 
socialist construction, complete the building of 
socialism ahead of time, and oarry out the gradual 
transition to communism,2
The regime was also interested in exercising 
greater control over private property as Indicated by fre­
quent references la Party publications over the years to 
problems with individual peasants killing draft animals, 
cutting down trees and otherwise "wasting" valuable re­
sources* Reflecting eonoern over this, the Draft Rational i 
Plan for Agriculture had emphasized that greater thrift with 
household goods and personal property would have to be 
practiced* Only by a different kind of farm organization, 
providing for wider collective ownerehip and more stringent
'■mi-
2Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policy of the Chinese 
Communist Party, pp* dt.» p. 163.
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regimentation of peasants, could such strict economy be 
accomplished* The commune contained these provisions*
It is evident* then* that being faced with serious
political end economic problems* the Chinese Communist 
leadership in 1957 and 1953 decided that only a miraculous 
new program with startling and significant results could 
hope to resolve the difficulties* ;
Once this was decided* it was necessary to put in­
to action the same machinery which had earlier evoked
"spontaneous and enthusiastic" popular .demand for mutual
1 •
aid teams* lower stage APCs and collectivization- But an 
examination of Party literature dealing with the origin of 
the communes reveals a highly confusing picture. On the one 
hand the movement is depicted as an unsought* impulsive 
act of the masses* On the other hand it is attributed to 
Mao Tso-tung and the central oommlttee* Still another 
explanation is that the movement was a brilliant idea which 
the people and the Party conceived of simultaneously*
According to one aooount, the peasants raced to 
form oommunes on their own volition quite without any 
inducements other than their own "heightened socialist 
consciousness*"
During the big leap forward in 1953* in 
order to meet the needs of objective conditions* 
the agricultural cooperatives throughout the 
country made consistent efforts to expand and 
Improve their work* In the autumn of that year* 
like thousands of ralloplng horses, t^e peasants 
mi-.iY.-cA tha co'op^ativca to io-A rural "pcc.la13
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communes, heralding a now and higher.stage of 
development In collective ownership.'1
The Peking People's Dally, of September 3, 1958* gave thle
account*
The [commune ] movement was started spontan­
eously by the peasants on the basis of their 
great socialist consciousness. When the small 
number of the earliest communes proved euooeesfuly, 
many agricultural cooperatives Immediately followed 
their example • • » Wow with -the encouragement and 
guidance given by the central committee of the 
Party and Chairman Mao, it is making even bigger 
strides forward.2
The whole commune movement, said Wu Chi-pu, a 
member of the central committee, was complstely unplanned.-5 
"Only after Mao spoke in favor of the oommunes during an
inspection trip in Shantung early in August, did the masses 
learn of the idea and take it up. m4 Tan Chen-lin, In a 
report delivered to the Second Session of the Second na­
tional People's Congress, April 6, I960, affirmed that the 
communes had been a fortuitous creation of the people, the 
value of whloh was immediately reoognized by the Party,
The people's commune is a great creation 
of the masses of the Chinese people evolved in 
accordance with actual needs. The Central Com­
mittee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tee-tung 
attached great importance to this mass creation.
They grasped It in good time, summed up its 
experience, persisted in carrying it out and 
with correct principles guided the people's
i
^Hsueh, Su, and Lin, op. cit.« p. 138, JEmphasle
A
Quoted in Sherman, on. clt.. p, 20.
*ft>id.
4Ibld.
added.
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Tcommunes to advanoe on a sound basis*
According to ths Party Secretary In Hopei province*
the spontaneous end enthusiastic desire of the people to
fora communes left some district officials utterly aston*
lshed, Lin Tleh wrote that "when the leading organs of
certain counties did not have a sufficient estimate of the
development of the situation* the co*ops of themselves
formed up communes* and* beating gongs and drums* went to
[the officials] to report the good news."8
Apparently* however* the peasant parade to com-
munes was not altogether spontaneous* because Lin also wrote
that the Party in Hopei adopted certain "methods and steps
in establishing the people's communes" which included
... inspiring the enthusiasm of the masses by 
giving the lead to polltios* by carrying out ex* 
tensive propaganda work and by airing of views 
and organizing debates; ... organizing discus* 
sions at all levels to achieve unanimity of 
ideology and by mapping out an all-round plan, 
for the merging of townships and co-ops • •
In their summary of the commune movement Hsu eh,
"In the summer ofSu and Lin were moved to poetlo imagery.
[1958]," they wrote, "the people's commune* a new social 
organization, as fresh as the morning sun* appeared in
^•Tan Chen-lln* "Strive for ths Fulfillment, Ahead 
of Schedule* of the National Program for Agricultural Level* 
opment" in National Program* op.clt.. p. 32*
8"The People's Commune Movement in Hopei" In 
People's Communes in China (Peking! Foreign Languages 
Press, 195U), P. 49*
3Iblj|.. p. 50.
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China*a countryside.1*1 Onoe tha commune appeared* however* 
the rapid development of the movement was "the outcome of 
the economic and political development of our oountry, the 
outcome of the socialist rectification campaign conducted 
by the Party* of the Party's general line for socialist 
construction in 1958."2 According to this account* the 
development was exceedingly rapid!
• • • Within a few months [of the first communes 
in the spring of 1958] 
thusiastic demands ox
* in response to the en- 
the peasants all the 
740,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives 
in the country were merged into over 26*000 
people's communes. Over 120 million peasant 
households of various nationalities 
joined the people's communes.3
in China
However much the various accounts of ths communes 
differed with respect to the clroumstances of the movement's 
beginning* they agreed that the commune was as Important 
politically as it was economically. The People's Pally 
emphasized that the commune "la no longer a solely economic 
organization—iit combines eoonomio* cultural* political and 
military affairs into one entity.
Red Flag, was more blunt in pointing out the political ad* 
vantages of the communei
The establishment of people's communes also 
makes it easier to get rid of all the lndivid-
»4 Another publication*
^Hsueh* Su and Lin.op. clt 
2ma.. pp, 272-273,
3I-bld„ P. 272,
^"fiold nigh the Red Flag of People's Communes and
" in People's Communes. op. clt.-. p* 19*
P. 272.a*
March On*
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ualist, department all st, and other bourgeois 
Ideas and habits, heighten socialist and eoramu- 
nlst consciousness of the people, and foster a 
communist morality. This will oreate conditions 
for the steady transition to communist society.1
It should thus be noted that the commune movement 
was both the ultimate development of the Chinese total!tar- 
ian ideology and the greatest test of that ideology's valid- 
ity as a guide to economic development. By the end of 1959# 
there was mounting evidence to indicate that the commune 
scheme, for a number of reasons, had failed to sustain the 
"Great Leap Forward" as the Communists had elalmed it would. 
Although the regime was seriously handicapped by natural 
oolamitles whioh plagued agriculture from 1958-1960, there 
can be little doubt that a major portion of the disaster 
whioh the Communists suffered was self-imposed. Both from 
the political and economic standpoints, the results of this 
debacle are bound to have consequences of the most serious 
sort for Communist China, In order to assess the Chinese 
Ideology in notion it is necessary to review the communlza- 
tion of agrioulture, 1958-61, as it proceeded from the 
"Great Leap" to the great fell and, subsequently, to the 
great limp.2
At the outset, the communes were designed to be
^Wu Chih-pu, "From Agricultural Producers' Coop­
eratives to People's Communes," In ibid., p. 40,
sThe analysis whioh follows Is primarily concerned 
with the political and ideological aspects of the problem, 
and only secondarily with the economic. A detailed economic 
analysis of the communes up to I960 may be found in Chao 
Kuo-ohun, Agrarian Polloios of The Chinese Communist Tarty. 
op. oit.. pp. 1o4-230.
148
little more than enlarged collectives* Although there was 
official pleasure expressed at early oommunizatlon of all 
property and social life, these aspects of the communes, 
while they may have attracted attention outside of China, 
were not emphasized by the Communists* On the contrary, 
all the official orders ml propaganda put out by the Com­
munists at the start of the drive stressed that total 
abolition of private property should oome about very 
gradually over a number of years.* This was probably out 
of deference to the peasants who had balked at socialization 
of their property during each stage of the transformation of 
agriculture* The fact that the regime was less interested 
In obtaining stricter oontrol of property than it was In 
organizing greater numbers of peasant workers suggests that 
an important criterion for assessing the eoheme should be 
Its success in labor mobilization and productivity* Also, 
Inasmuch as the commune drive was undertaken as a means of 
bringing about much more thorough regimentation of the 
people and ideologloal uniformity, it is Imperative that 
the soheme be assessed in this respect as well* It should 
be obvious that more effective mobilization and greater 
productivity were fundamentally dependent on the techniques 
of regimentation*
On August 7, 1958 the Peking People* s Dally
*See People*s Communes In China, op, clt.* pp* 6- 
8, 12, 24, 35-37.
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published the oomplete text of regulations governing the 
establishment of the country's first commune, the Sputnik 
People's Commune in Sulping county, Honan prorinoe. This 
commune had been formed in April, 1958, by the merger of 
27 APCs, and was comprised of 9,300 households including 
43,000 people. That the Sputnik Commune was to be a model 
vas indicated by the editor's note accompanying the regu­
lations. "[The regulations ] are published in full," the
editor noted, "as reference material for all other parts 
of the country."*’ The regulations give strong indication 
that the regime had decided to base the entire political
and eoonomlo framework of the state on the oommunes. They 
vere not, then, simply a contrivance. They were to consti­
tute a bold, new way of life which would vault China to the 
very threshold of Communism. According to the regulations!
The people's commune is a basic unit of 
society in which the working people unite of 
their own free will under the leadership of the 
Communist Party and the People's Government.
Its task is to manage all industrial and agri­
cultural production, trade, cultural and educa­
tional work and political affairs within its
The intent and purpose of theown sphere. .
people*s commune is to consolidate the socialist 
system and energetically oreate the conditions 
for the gradual transition to the Communist 
system.2
. .
Economically, the oommunes were to be almost 
entirely self-sufficient, but integrated into the national 
economy. It should be noted that although the agrarian
^"Tentative Regulations (Draft) of the Weihslng 
(Sputnik) People's Commune," InjLbld., p. 61,
___gIDld.
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aspeots of the commune vere important* they were subordin­
ate to the higher priority of industry* The decision to 
take the "great leap forward" was predicated on the assuisp- 
tion that only such a leap eould enable the Chinese economy 
to "take-off," The decision was made during the period when 
industry bad top priority. The regulations specified that
the commune must develop industry as rapidly as 
possible. The first things to be done in this 
field are to set up mines* iron and steel plants 
and factories for manufacturing ball-bearings* 
farm tools* fertiliser and building materials 
and for processing farm produoe* repairing ma­
chinery, building hydro-eleotrio power projects* 
Installations for utilizing methane* and other 
enterprises.l
The principal feature of the commune so far as 
labor mobility and increased productivity were concerned 
was the "production brigade," This was to be the "basic 
unit for organizing labor,"2 These production contingents 
were designed to meet the need for constant productivity on 
the farms rather than the periodic activity which had pr 
vailed before* The responsibility of organizing and de­
ploying the production brigade was primarily in the hands 
of the commune leadership* although the regulations implied 
that the brigades were to some extent free to use their own 
discretion.3 Despite the fact that the regulations sat up 
alaborat# machinery for representation of "all the people" 
In the commune, the governing principle was "democratic
1Ibi£.* p. 64* 
2Ibia.. p* 69. 
3Ibld.
a
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centralism." In other words, decisions on major matters 
were made at the top, then cadres organised "popular discus* 
siona and consultations with the masses" who then endorsed 
the decisions enthusiastieaHjr in resolutions.^ Ones these 
popular resolutions vere made, all people vers hound to 
support them. And, significantly, "the superior organ 
retains the power of veto over the subordinate organs*"2
Operationally, the commune was divided into three 
levels. The highest level was the Commune Administrative 
Committee which was designed to be the "guiding body” on aU 
important matters. The second division was the production 
brigade, which was the intermediary between the Administra* 
tlve Committee and the basic units. These basio units 
constituted the third level, and vere in effect subdivisions 
or teams within the production brigade. The Administrative 
Committee, according to the regulations, was elected by 
the "commune congress," which in turn was comprised of 
representatives of the various production brigades who vere 
Sleeted by the people.** The apparently popular nature of 
the oommune government, however, must be viewed against the 
declaration in Article one of the regulations that the 
people operate on "their own free will under the leadership 
of ths Communist Party and the People's Government." In
*Chao Kuo-ehun, Agrarian Policies of the Chinese 
Communist Party, op* clt./p. 164.
2IM£,
^People'e Communes, oft* cit.. pp, 68*69.
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other words, Party members would be In a position to "guide" 
on ell important matters, and oodres would be deployed to 
oversee the ’’free elections" and "open discussions,"
That the oommunea were to provide a means of 
greater regimentation of the people was Indicated in the 
original regulations and even more emphatically in subse­
quent Party pronouncements, "a system of citizen soldiery 
shall operate throughout the commune,"^ said the regula- 
tlons. And it was further stipulated that all age groups 
of men over 16 "should be organized into militia unite that 
will undertake regular military training and fulfill tasks 
assigned by the state."2 A leading Indian economist,
Srlpati Ciiandra-sekhar, who traveled in China during the 
winter of 1958-1959, visiting a number of communes, noted 
that tills provision concerning the military "does not simply
mean that all able-bodied adults In the. commune get some
the slogan 'aot as if in battls' 
la to bs carried out along
military training 
implies that normal work 
military lines," Production brigades became agrarian end
• • •
• • •
industrial battalions serving the three-fold ala of greater 
productivity, greater economy and greater regimentation*
Chandra-selchar' a term for the basic nature of the 
communes was "shook labor" Which he described as virtually 
oeaseless toll with "neither time nor production limits**
». fi7.
| P* 43#
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Whether it Is production or construction, 
the battalion works Incessantly, night and day, 
perhaps days on end* without rest or relaxation*
Its simple aim is to obtain maximum results by 
massive, non-stop attack « * *1
The China Youth magazine of September 27, 1953 carried re­
ports of "peasants working day and night, forgetting to eat 
or sleep in their labor enthusiasm, [ and not] caring about 
■ 1 Party directives in November and December stressedpay*
that "peasants be permitted some rest,.that the labor day 
[ excluding meetings and lecturesj should not extend beyond 
twelve hours, that women should not be made to do heavy work
or stand in cold water while menstruating Or immediately 
before and after childbirth*,"-*'
From these reports it appears that commune leaders 
and cadres vent all-out In their zest to contribute to the 
Great Leap Forward* Whether this was on their own volition 
in an effort to satisfy the Party or whether .it came as a 
result of pressure from above is not entirely clear* But 
later events tended to Indicate that the Party, as before, 
had set the "correct line" and had relied on the "activists"
s O
to carry it out* Indeed, some comments In Party literature 
were critical of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of cadres*
"Only after the struggle against capitalist thinking [among
*
oadreqj is liquidated," said Red Flag, "can Communist
^Ibld., pp* 43-44*
^Quoted In Sherman.on. clt.. p, 32* 
3Ibld.
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thought extend Its Influence and only then can the people's 
commune be considered truly consolidated*Then, a Party 
resolution a month later criticized the cadres for "neg­
lecting the masses' livelihood" and over-emphasizing pro­
ductivity at the expense of morale* In short* command ism.2 
The cadres thuB felt the wrath of higher Party officials on 
the one hand for being Insufficiently enthusiastic* and on 
the other for being too zealous* however confused they may 
have been* the Party* it seems was at least giving the 
orders.
In the fall and early winter of 1953* the tempo 
of the Great Leap Forward suddenly quickened* Again* It is 
difficult to ascertain whether this acceleration was caused 
by apprehension or confidence on the part of the Central 
Committee* But in any case* the drive for oommunlzation 
was pressed with the full force of propaganda. Whereas the 
Party literature at the outset had emphasized that the com­
mune system would not be fully realized for several years* 
the new line emphasized that the millennium was at hand.'5 
Tills new line was presaged by an article In the people's 
Pally. October 1* 1958*
Since the nation-wide leap forward on all 
fronts* industrial and agricultural production
^From the November L* 1958 Issue* quoted in Ibid* * 
2Ibld.
**Seo Bernard Schwartz* "Totalitarianism and the 
Chinese Model*” pp. clt.. p. SO*
P. 33.
155
has Increased several times over • 
productivity has increased several times* hun­
dreds or even thousands of times over* This 
Vigorous expansion of productivity la the 
result of the liberation of the people's minds 
* * * With the great leap forward in production* 
communism has already begun to push forth 
sprouts of life * *
She press was full of "miracles'* that had been 
wrought by the communes* In Hopei province "people's 
oommunes • « • assigned 1*500 laborers to the job of iron
I
matting under the direction of some 70 functionaries
labor0 •
• • »
In A days 123 furnaces had been built and molten iron was 
tapped from 12 furnaces. In another part of the province* 
"the people immediately set out to oatch fish In the open
[and ] in a single night one eommune caught more
Another report declared 
that "when the masses of Lintung-hslen heard about the 
people's oommunes* they started to aot like a ferocious
sea «
than 10*000 oatties of fish * *
• #
tiger , , , In 8 days the peasants had started 8 agricul­
tural schools*"^ In the same miraculous way In a commune in 
Kiangsu province "all the blacksmith functionaries and 
school teachers and students worked together and introduced
^Quoted in Sherman, on. olt*. p* 34*
^Tensions in Comritmlot China* An Analysis Of 
Internal Pro 3 Soros bonora'tcd1 Since prepared atthe
request of'’’Senator Alexanuerwiley" by 'the Legislative Re­ference Service of the Library of Congress, 86th Congress, 
First Session (Washington* Government Printing Office, 
I960), p. 40* The quotation is from the Hew China Hews 
Agency,
5ibia>
AIbid. A catty equals 1*3 pounds.
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ball bearings In 7 days , , , In 3 days the commune eat up 
213 factories* nl There was seemingly no end to the fantes* 
tlo accomplishments made possible by the communes* The Hew
China Hews Agency reported on Deo ember 28 that "Industrial 
projects and housing are now being built in a few months* 
days or even hours* The speed of building has been doubled* 
trebled* and In some cases Increased more than tenfold*"2 
It Is difficult to believe that major Party 
figures actually subscribed to what would seem to be pure 
flights of fanoy by Party propagandists* But whether he 
believed them or not* Liu Shao-chl unmistakably put the 
Party's prestige at stake when* speaking for the highest 
authority In the Party In a statement on December 25* 1958* 
he endorsed the great achievements of the preceding three
■1
months* saying* "Everybody knows that people's communes are 
no longer simply organizers of production among the people* 
They are organizers of the life of the people. These and 
other demonstrations of high-level Party responsibility for 
the "great leap forward" and oommune schemes would seem to 
have ruled out any future backing down from the program*
Or* at least the unmistakable Identification of high-ranking 
Party officials with the schemes was certain to make any 
future recognition of failure very agonizing Indeed*
But* troubles with the communes and retrenchments
lIM4.
20uotod In Sherman* op. clt.i p. 40*
XTensions in Communist China, op. clt.. p« 40*
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by the Party were not long In coming, although they were 
Initially kept eeoret and couched In oblique language when 
eventually disclosed* The facets of the drive which ap- 
peared to evoke the moat Berloua resistance were the die* 
tributlon system, fixed wage system and the fragmentation 
of the family.
Under the rules which governed the cooperatives, 
members received shares of harvests depending on the amount 
of their Investment in the cooperative. Under the collect 
tlve system, members received extra benefit in bigger crop 
years by sharing the amounts over and above previously do* 
terrained state quotas. But with the introduction of the 
communes, the state ceased to share the extra production,^. 
Peasants also found that under the communes they were on a 
fixed wage system, which came as a result of a "spontaneous 
and popular" idea. The Daily Worker explained it this vayi
• members
worked together day and night , • • They all 
agreed that it was no longer possible to record 
work-points because there was simply no way of 
calculating who worked more and who worked less 
, , • The old method of recording work-points 
[wages based on kind and amount of labor] bor­
rowed from the cooperative was unsuitable .
Some members who had many mouths to feed In their 
family hut few breadwinners toiled year and year 
out and did not earn enough grain} they could not 
work properly because their minds were not at 
ease , • • The party oomraittee decided, there- 9 
fore, to enforce the half-supply half-wage system,2
This was a scheme whereby the peasants were paid one-half
During the big leap forward • •
• •
*Uew York Times. September 27, 1958,
2Quoted in Sherman, on* elt..pp. 36-57*.
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of their wages in money and the other half in the form of 
supplies which families normally used. This meant* of 
course, that Individuals who had earned higher than average
wages in the AFCs, and people who had smaller than average 
families suffered a perceptible out in wages. But* accord-
ing to the Bally Worker, "everybody" soon saw the value of
such a plant
• • • Belying on the poor peasants and lower 
middle peasants* the party committee used the 
method of free airing of views and free debate 
• Facts have now convinced everybody • * • 
capitalistic individualistic thinking Was eli­
minated and the communist thinking of "one for 
all, all for one" wae established • * » 
mune members enthusiastically supported the 
half-supply, half-wage system,*
• •
• all eom-
The government might wall have been enthusiastic also* for
it realised a considerable net gain from the change.
Similarly, the regime wae able to effect savings
by controlling food distribution through the communes whioh
had adopted the centralized plan of eating in mesa-halls.
By central food distribution the state oould lessen the
Pamount of grain wasted* hoarded or sold privately* 
by this practloe It could contribute to the goal of com­
munal living.
Also
It was this latter provielon of the commune soheme 
which may have been the most serious mistake made by the 
Communists in the transformation of agriculture. It la one
*IMd„ p. 37* 
2?bld.. p* 38*
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thing to collect!visa land, means of production, wages and 
other property. It la quite another thing to oommunlse 
families. From the very beginning of the commune drive, 
the "liberation of women" had been a major theme of Party 
propaganda* They were to be "liberated" from household 
chores in order to work in fields,*1 • The regulations spool* 
fled that oommunes should "sot up community canteens,
nurseries and sewing teams to free women from household 
labor,"2 The deployment of the men In production brigades 
to wherever they wore needed for construction projects over
a wide area meant that husbands and wives were often separ­
ated. It was not long, therefore, until it dawned on many 
peasants that the commune system meant the disintegration of
family lifet the husband was in one place, the wife In 
another, and the children eomewhore else. Furthermore, 
articles in ths Party press seemed to indicate that this 
effect was intended:
Emphasis should be laid on social, not home 
education , * • the Institution of ths family is 
to bo superseded by the collective life of com­
munism i , . Home education often breeds spoiled 
ohildren indisposed toward labor. If a child re­
ceives communist eduoatlon at school and non- 
eommunist education at home the result is unsat­
isfactory , , , In this respect flaws in home 
eduoatlon are beoomlng increasingly conspicuous,'
^Thls, In turn, would free large numbers of men 
to work in construction and Industry,
tentative fle/rulatlons. pn. ctt., p, 73,
^Editorial In Knanr-mlng Jlh-*>ao. October 24, 
1958, quoted in Sherman, &■>.. fTls.Tiu
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These "flaws* in the ideological unbringing of 
ohildren In their homes might possibly have been one of the
t.
factors which prompted the original decision to set up the 
communes* Such at least is the inference of an art 1 ole in
China Youth Palin
be do not want parents to imbue children 
with the narrow family oonoept « 
tlon of parents should not be oonfined exclu­
sively to their own children • 
ohildren as our own" should be the motto . • *
Society's concern for children will be deep and 
all-round • • • it ie the kind of love that 
maternal love can ever hope to compare with*
As the full effects of the accelerated communiza- 
tlon drive began to be felt, resistance began to solidify* 
The Party's reaction, however, was somewhat mixed. Indica­
tions are that the Central Committee felt the need to 
terminate the fanatioal propaganda drive whloh had started 
In the fall and which became increasingly incredible. But, 
at the same time, reports begem to come In pointing to a 
bumper crop from the 1958 harvest. As the reports were 
compiled It appeared that China had doubled food output over 
1957, raising production from 175 million tons to 375 mll- 
This was more than a "great leap forward)" it
The affeo-• *
"Treat other• *
s°
2lion tons.
was a mighty "take-off," and it must have convinced the
Party leadership that the orash program of the communes was 
basically sound. The fact was, however, that no such feat
lMThe Socialisation of Juvenile Education,"
China Youth Dally. October 25# 1958# quoted in ibid., p. 43.
2Reed J. Irvine, "Phantom Pood in Communist China," 
Asian Survey. I, Ho. 1 (iiarch, 19ol), 23.
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had taken place* The Communists vers the victims of their 
ovn propaganda* for the statistics which indicated the 
doubling of food production from 1957-1958 had been enorw 
mously Inflated at the lower levels* apparently by function* 
erles caught up in the spirit of miracles and desiring to 
please their superiors* By August of 1959 the error was 
publicly admitted by the Party, and the figure of 375 
million tons was scaled down to 250 million,1 although it
was probably substantially lees,2
% * 1
In any case* beginning in December, 1958* there 
was a gradual slow-down in the paoe of the commune movement* 
By the spring of 1959 the retrenchments were perceptible*
And by the end of 1959 the Chinese Communists were once 
again forced into "resolute contraction” from their eoheme 
to eoolallze agriculture* This time* however* the Party 
leadership had such direct responsibility for a policy whioh ’
• A
failed that elaborate measures had to be taken In order to 
disguise the extent of the disaster*'
She first indication of misgivings came In a 
resolution of the Party Central Committee passed in December* 
1958* By its cautious and conservative tone the resolution 
served to dampen the sealous spirit of previous weeks* She 
directive called for a consolidation and "tidying up” of 
existing communes* and by implication repudiated the lnsplsd
ltf. K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities” 
the CM-ifi Quarterly* Ho* 6 (April-June, 1961)* p* 67*
2Irvine, op. clt., pp* 23-24.
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claims that true Communism was just around the corner*
Said the resolution* pointedly*
• Without [ having accomplished much more over 
a period of years] it Is Impossible to talk about 
entering communism. We should not declare that 
people's communes will enter communism immediately 
this distorts and vulgarizes the great Ideal 
of communism* strengthens the petty-bourgeois 
trend towards equal!tarlanlsm. and adversely af­
fects socialist construction*1’
: I
What this appears to mean Is that if the people were given 
the Impression that what was happening on the commune8 was 
real Communism* they would lose hope in the future* So 
concerned about the matter was the central committee that 
it called for "extensive propaganda and education to clarify 
misunderstandings.
* •
• • •
The resolution made It dear that the communes 
should Indefinitely abide by the principle of "collective* 
rather than "publio" ownership* and criticized the attempts 
of some commune leaders to convert to the equivalent of 
atate farms* The central committee's reason for wanting to 
have ownership retained by oommune members collectively was 
practical rather than polltloali "Once the oommune It 
brought under publio ownership all losses will have to be 
borne by the state* end however large the losses the state
would have to maintain the members' consumption at ths same 
level*"3 Only those communes which were so well advanced
^Sherman* on. clt*. p* 49. 
gma.
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&a to be relatively free from loes were to make the transi­
tion to public ownership*
Popular resistance to the wage-supply eyetem also 
prompted the Party to adopt revisions* The resolution con­
demned attempts to "negate the principle of distribution
according to work in favor of distribution according to 
needs."1 It went on to say*
In order to promote labor enthusiasm • 
to meet the complex needs of the people • 
the communes must Strive to increase the wages 
of their members gradually* and* for a number 
of years to come* must lnoreass that part of 
their income which they receive as wages faster 
than that part of their income that they re­
ceive as free supply*2
Indicating the extent of the people's bitterness 
over the social effects of communlzation* the resolution 
called for eight hours of work and two hours of "study" per 
day during the slack season and a maximum of twelve hours 
of working during the busy season* Moreover* commune 
leaders were told to permit peasants to return to their 
homes if they desired* and to give back any personal prop­
erty* savings and vegetable gardens which may have been 
oommunlzed*^
♦ •
# •
The resolution also admitted that politically 
inspired "shook production" drives* such as the famous back­
yard blast furaaoe campaign of 1958* had Involved Irrational
11WI.. p. 50.
2mi-
’mi-
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use of labor with dislocating effects on the overall soon* 
omy.*1 In the future, communes were to
• • • transfer large labor contingents for shook 
campaigns only when absolutely necessary, and 
even then sufficient labor should remain in the 
oommune to guarantee normal production • • • 
communes should work out a reasonable manpower 
plan based on the need for an all-round devel­
opment.2
The December resolution also endeavored to place 
the blame for excesses and shortcomings of the oommunes onto 
oadres, who, as in the past* were accused of "commandlsm," 
"exaggeration" and flights from reality. Thus, the same 
oadres who had originally been pressured to drive the pea­
sants into the "greater, faster, better* communes, and who 
had earlier been criticized by the Party for lack of en­
thusiasm, were now being censured for possessing precisely 
the opposite traits.
But neither the Party's polioy of slowing down 
nor its attempt to plaoate the peasants succeeded in making 
the communes any more popular or productive. By the spring
^This headlong drive to increase greatly steel 
production was taken during the brief period when the Party 
had determined that industrialization was more important 
than agricultural development, and its frenzied nature was 
such as to reflect seriously on the sanity and sobriety of 
the Party leadership. The drive for "home made" steel not 
only turned out virtually worthless steel, but greatly 
Interfered with normal agricultural work. Although the 
drive was hailed as a "victory" (Ibid.), it was abruptly 
abandoned. This oostly failure apparently led to an even­
tual deoision to forego the Industrial aspects of the 
communes. See A. Doak Barnett, Corrmunlet China and Asia 
(New Yorki Vintage Books, I960), pp. bu-61," Also, tne 
New York TlmeB. Hay 17, 1959.
2Sherman, on. clt.. p. 51*
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of 1959 the regime was forced into still more "resolute 
contraction*" According to a report in the Hew York Times.^ 
quoting Reliable sources" who had "just toured the mainland" 
the Chinese Communists by Hay had consented to ease greatly 
the personal regimentation of the communes, to Increase 
food allotments substantially* and to permit communes to 
determine for t hens elves what percentage of food products 
would be kept and how muoh would be turned over to the 
government* But* while this eased the situation in the 
rural areas* it oreated food shortages in the cities and 
reduced the amount of food available for foreign trade and 
for Investment in industry* Thus* the original economic 
reason for adopting the communes—»to squeeze more capital 
out of agrioultun •waa defeated*
The Breakdown
In June the Party wae obliged to admit publicly 
that the muoh heralded greater productivity of the oommunes
"Thie year*" said one official* "some 
communes scored an increase in unit area yield* but total 
eowing areas were muoh less than last year* Thus there wae 
actually no Increase and in some oases there were even 
decreases reported."2
had not materialised*
It should be emphasized that the
1^5ay 17, 1959*
2Hew York Times. June 21* 1959*
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latter part of the statement referred to sowing, not 
reaping. Whereas It Is possible that natural disasters 
might have affected the harvest, it is likely that Ineffl* 
oienoy and maladministration were the major cause of a 
reduction In sowing. Ihe Peking People*g Pally, which 
earlier in the year had boasted that China's Communist 
Ideology had "seized the mandate of heaven, and man at last 
can defy nature and defeat it in its most vicious moods, 
began to take on a more somber tone. In a June editorial 
the Party paper admitted that "our country's agricultural 
production is still not high-yielding generally." Contra* 
dieting the earlier boast, the paper vent on to point out 
that agricultural production "is highly dependent on natural 
ehanges," and that "sometimes we oan have a bumper harvest 
one year and sometimes a poor harvest in another.
By mld*>summer the'Chinese Communists were faced 
with a triple problem involving agriculture, and it was a 
problem which grew increasingly worse in the months which 
followed. First, there was a nationwide food shortage which 
vae more acute in the cities mainly because the government 
was allowing more food to remain in rural areas, but also be­
cause of a general breakdown In the system of distribution.^
«s
1Ibld.
gIbld.
^New York Times. July 18, 1959. The dispatoh re­
ported that a lack of skilled reapers in some farm areas 
had resulted in late harvests and lost orops. "Both rail 
and highway transport slowed to a orawl in many sectors and
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Seeondly, there vas the reality of widespread dissatlsfao- 
tlon with the communes, along with the mounting evidence 
that they were not progressing at all according to plan* 
Thirdly, the mainland had been plagued by unusually severe 
natural disasters. Including droughts, hailstorms, looust 
plagues, and the worst floods In recent history** Although 
the regime had Increasingly tended to attribute the whole 
problem to natural calamities, the food shortages and mal- 
functioning oommunes were known to have been experienced 
several months before the heavy floods struok In the spring? 
Moreover, Party leaders were moved to call a meeting of the 
oentral committee for the purpose of formulating policy to 
oope with the situation* Had the problem been primarily 
oaused by pests and the weather, It la unlikely that suoh 
a policy meeting would have been neoessary* The conference 
was not officially announced at the time,^ nor were the 
results of It Immediately evident* But subsequent events 
tended to confirm that suoh a polloy review took plaoe, and 
later It was announced that the oentral oommittee had met* 
One of the major difficulties which the authori­
ties faoed was that the food shortages developed shortly
to a dead stop in others.” Aooordlng to one report, 
35,000,000 tons of produce were piled on sidings awaiting 
transport*
gHew York Times. August 2, 1959*
^Ibld. The meeting was held late in July and 
early In August, with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ohl, Ohou En- 
lal, and Ohu-teh reported to be in attendance among others*
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after the reoord gains In food produotlon had been announced 
in Peking* In an effort to praise and Justify the communes, 
the regime had widely propagandised the news that food pro*
duotion had been doubled in 1958, the year of the Great 
Leap Forward,* But as summer approached and shortages in* 
oreased, the Communists were in a difficult situation. 
Either they had grossly erred in calculating the production
figures, or they had permitted the distribution system to
break down, or they were selling food abroad for foreign
exchange while many Chinese were hungry* Whichever was the
case, it made the Communists look bad* Actually, all three
* 0explanations were partially correct* But the Party ohose 
to make the least painful admission, and on August 29 the 
Party central committee disclosed in a broadcast that the 
statistics for 1958 were erroneous,^ The eommittee blamed
"inexperience and wrong guesses by state statistical agen­
cies" for the enormous error.* The same report disclosed 
that the people's communes had been attaeked within the 
Party as examples of "petty bourgeois fanaticism. But
*This lends credenoe to the view that the Party 
initially believed the reports prepared by the statistical 
bureau. If the authorities had known the aotual situation 
they could have saved themselves muoh embarrassment by 
giving out accurate information. See the analysis by 
Tillman Burdin in the Kew York Times. August 30, 1959*
gHew York Times, August 2, 1959*
^Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo carried in 
the San Bernardino Sun. August 30, 1959*
*ma..
*CS14.
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the report made It dear that such criticism Mae mot to be 
tolerated, and that the orltioa would have to be "corrected."
• 9
Once again using the familiar scapegoat, the oommittee de­
clared that the principal danger now confronting the aehlevei 
ment of a continued leap forward this year is the arising 
of right opportunist ideas among some cadres.
The Peking People fs Pally was prompted to publish 
a front page editorial on August 27, attacking the oritios 
of the communes.® The communes, insisted the paper, were 
of "Incomparable superiority," The Popple's Pally found it 
necessary to deny that the communes were merely "the product 
of a few people's minds" and that they had been established 
too eoon, as the "right opportunist8N in the Party had 
oharged. Actually, the paper said, there were two main 
arguments which had been leveled at the people's communes. 
One was that it was not possible to oreats them without at 
the same time moving directly into Communism, and that China 
was not yet ready for this Ultimate step. The other argu­
ment was that the communes were so similar to collectives 
that there was no need for the oampaign. Both vlewe were 
entirely wrong, said the editorial, A great future for the 
communes was oertain, it insisted, and no changes should be 
mads simply because some people were Ignorant of the truth. 
Meanwhile, the Hew China Hews Agency announced on the first
1Ibld.
®Heuters dispatch from Peking in the flew York 
Times. August 30, 1959,
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anniversary of the communes that there were 24,000 people's 
communes, comprising 99 percent of the country’s peasant 
households.3.
But at the same time the Party was steadfastly 
defending the communes and insisting that no ohanges should 
be made, the oommunea were being quietly dismantled. The 
modifications consisted of breaking up the oven-centralised 
organization of the communes and dividing responsibility 
between the production brigades. Inasmuch as the production 
brigade within the commune was roughly the size of a former 
high*stage APC, and eince the "industrial and construction" 
duties of the brigades had previously been dropped, what
othe change amounted to was a return to the collective farma 
It is a comment on the considerable oonstemation which must 
have been felt by those in the Party responsible for the 
commune drive that official recognition of the eutbaok to' 
the basio unit of the oollectlves was not given until seven­
teen months later,^ and even then recognition was tacit, 
and oouohed in oblique terms.4
*Sow York Times. August 30, 1959.
2Ibld. The Reuters dlspatoh lnoluded this com­
ment t "Last winter 0.958-59 1 ownership of the oommunea 
was focused in a central commune organisation and adminis
howtratlon wae highly concentrated at the oommune level, 
ownership is concentrated in production brigades which 
correspond roughly to pre-commune collective farms."
*^See report and analysis by Harry Schwarts in the 
Hew York Times. January 29, 1961,
4In an artlole in Red nag* February, 1961, Minis* 
ter of Agriculture, Liao Lu-yen surrendered for the regime. He said, the T>princlpal means of produotlon belong to tne
-
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By the vlnter of 1959* China'e agricultural fall* 
ures were causing serious problems for the industrial seotor 
of the economy. Whereas the spring trade fair at Canton In 
1958 had been followed by a flooding of Southeast Asia with 
Chinese textiles, steel bars, cement and manufactured goods 
at prices veil belov the world market, the December trade 
fair saw the Chinese offering substantially fewer products, 
and these at market prloes. Moreover, foreign businessmen 
attending the fair indicated that the Chinese were relueant 
to sell. Exports from China to Singapore and Malaya fell 
off sharply, dropping from an average of #7,000,000 per 
month In 1958 to $3,500,000 per month in 1959,S A similar 
decline was reported in the China-Hong Kong trade,I
Thus, the Chinese Communist experiment In develop* 
ing vast, oentrally controlled agricultural communes for 
the purpose of greatly Increasing farm production while at 
the same time drastically outtlng costs had failed,** Simul­
taneously, the effort to aooelerate industrialisation before 
the full development of agriculture had proved equally
production brigade and the products of the brigade are at 
Its own disposal,H Alsoi '’The transition from the present 
system of commune ownership Is a matter for the future," 
Quoted by W, K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities" 
on. clt.. p. 72, The author expands at some length on the 
failure of the communes.
^•Hevr York Times, December 29, 1959* 
gIbld.
-*For an expert analysis of the failure see Wolf 
Jinsky, "More Than Mao Can Chew," The Renortcr (Ootober 
I960), pp, 37-40,
Lade
27,
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abortive. It may be concluded, then, that the totalitarian 
Ideology of the Chinese Communists during the decade, 1951*
1961, had not inspired sound, consistent economic develop* 
ment. Polities had been given the lead, as Liu Shao-chi put 
it, and the economy suffered. It ie true that the regime 
was able to make gains in certain respects, such as those 
revealed in food production Increases early In the decade, 
and in industrial development. During the First Five Tear 
Plan (1953*1957) it is estimated that food production rose
at a slightly higher rate than population which increased 
at approximately 2.2 percent.* Industrial growth was also 
significant during the same period! rolled steel increased 
from 1.1 million metrlo tons to 4.5 million, coal from 64.7 
million tons to 130 million, electric power from 7*3 billion 
kilowatt hours to 19.3 billion, and eement from 2.9 million 
tons to 6.9 million.2
If the Chinese Communists had been satisfied with 
the policies whloh had been responsible for these results, 
they might well have made consistent, respectable but un­
spectacular gains indefinitely. But the power Ideology ef 
Mao and the Party was incompatible with slow, persistent, 
manageable growth. It demanded that China be catapulted 
into the eounclle of the mighty, that 650 million people 
"leap forward" in glgantlo bounds, energised by massive
*0hoh-ming Li, "Eoonomio Development," China 
Quarterly. Bo. 1«, op. clt.. p. 40.
2Ibld.
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zeal, by selflessness, and by faith In a greater glory for 
China. With the most pervasive machinery for mass propa­
ganda and thought reform ever devised, the Chinese Communists 
sought to produce a miracle of economlo development before 
the eyes of a dazzled world. Instead they produced misery. 
They had Insisted that their efforts would stand as an 
Inspiration and model for underdeveloped countries every­
where. On October 21, 1955* when the hard drive to cooper­
ative agriculture was under way, the Peking Enlightenment 
Pally emphasized this point In an editoriali
For such a gigantic Socialist mass movement 
to be carried out In the rural villages of a 
country whioh has a large population, Insufficient 
cultivated acreage, frequent natural calamities 
and backward methods of tilling, is possessed of 
very great world significance. It will indicate 
to the billions of peasants all over the world 
who are still In a state of slavehood and poverty, 
as was true of China In the past, the direction 
for breaking away from oppression and hunger and. 
victoriously marching toward the happy life of 
socialism.1
The contrast between that beautiful vision of 
1955 and the ugly realities of 1960-1961 could hardly have 
been more severe. To a very great extent the burden of 
responsibility for the tragedy must be borne by the highest 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. For the ideology 
whioh the Communists applied to the economic development of 
China was greatly encumbered by something akin to dogmatic 
theology, an Insistence that reality be made to conform to 
theory and that faith In the Infallibility of the principal
1Current Background #373# P. 26.
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theorist rather than rational analysis of the situation be 
the guide* The creed of Mao Tse-tung may not have been 
"smooth and consistent," but it was absolute,* However
. ' V
necessary such dogmatism may be for the maintenance of 
religious orthodoxy, it is not applicable to the complexi­
ties of economic development* The example of China tends 
to prove that the doctrinaire approach to the challenge of 
social, political and eoonomlo transformations oreates as 
many problems as it solves*
Thus, the totalitarian Ideology of the Chinese 
Communists, as applied to the enormous problem of eoonomlo 
development of a huge, backward nation between 1951 and 19&, 
proved to be invalid* As China moved into the I960*a,® her 
population swelling, the national economy was in serious 
difficulty and the future was very unpromising indeed*
*See surra, p, 21,
2I?or a study of the condition of agriculture and 
the general economy of China in 1961 see ohap* vii*
CHAPTER FITE
The Ideology of Democratic Indies 
The Welfare Concept
Political Ideologies, like religions, tend to he 
the creations of Individuals of strong will and magnetlo 
appeal, and these charismatic^ personalities often have a 
profound Influence on the Ideology they foster* In 1955 
a group of specialists In comparative politics emphasised 
this point in a study of underdeveloped areas* They con­
cluded s
The process of breaking from a traditional past > 
creates attitudes that are strongly Inclined 
toward accepting oharlsmatio leaders * * • With­
ering of the deep emotional roots of respect 
for authority Is taking plaoe which leaves 
habits of obedience free-floating, In eearoh 
of new attachments* In ths meantime, the slow 
spreading of education of a rational oharaoter 
and scarcity of media of mass oommunloation 
retard the development of a new consensus based 
primarily on intellectual persuasion* Iu such 
periods of transition, oharlsmatio leaders are 
likely to fill the vacuum*2
In Communist China Mao Tse-tung has played this role to
*The tens "oharisma" was coined by Max Weber* It 
describes that mystique which develops between oertain 
leaders and followers In which the masses develop "devotion 
to the speclfio and exceptional sanotlty, heroism or exem­
plary character of an individual person fthe leader!, and 
of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him*" Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organi­
sation (hew York! "Oxford University treesjT 19^7), p*
^George Kahln, Guy Pmuker and Lucian Pye, "Com­
parative Politics of Eon-Western Countries." Am^oan Poli­
tical Science Review. XLIX (December, 1955)# 1025*
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some extent* With hie own Interpretation of Marxian Mao 
has created a revolutionary Ideology and won power* But, 
having achieved power, Mao quickly Inculcated new habits of 
obedience In the people, and relied less on a mystical bond 
between the people and himself than upon a unique fora of 
"persuasion." In India, both Gandhi and Nehru, close com­
rades but by no means Identical In their views, possessed 
the oharisna1 and have shared more or less equally the 
authorship of India's new Ideology* One of Hehru*s biogra­
phers, Frank Moraes,2 commented on this point!
With the sole exception of Gandhi, Nehru was the 
only Indian leader when independence came who had 
thought out and worked out a definite political, 
economic and soolal philosophy whioh power gave 
him a unique opportunity to implement*
It was Gandhi whose personality and philosophy 
dominated the independence movement, Nehru being his princi­
pal assistant* Whenever they disagreed—as they did funda­
mentally on economio matters^—It was Gandhi who prevailed* 
But Hehru gradually emerged as a co-equal in the leadership 
of the movement in the 1930's while Gandhi remained the 
father Image* However, beoause Gandhi's death cams just 
five months after Independence, it has been Hehru's politl-
^Myron Weiner, "Some Hypotheses on the Polltios of 
Modernisation in India," in Park and Ticker (eds.) Leader­
ship and Political Institutions In India (Princeton! Frinoe 
ton university tress, 1959), p* £7*
al H?hru! A Biography (Hew York! The 
l95b), p. W.
ocJawaharl
MacMillan Coupany,
^ HI chard J* Walsh (ed*)ft K^ru on Gandhi (Hew York! 
The John Day Company, 1948), pp, 84-97*
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Gal* social and economic philosophy and his personality 
vhieh have dominated the Ideology of republican India*
That Ideology is essentially comprised of four 
elements* all present primarily beoause of the influence 
of Gandhi and Nehru* even though to some extent they are 
the product of the entire independence movement* The 
elements are democracy* sooiallsm* "trusteeship,"* and 
satyagraha.2 Although Gandhi alone deserves credit for 
conceiving and disseminating the ideas of satyagraha and 
"trusteeship*" Nehru became the ehlef arohlteot and articu­
lator of India's socialist demooraoy* In view of this, It 
would be Instructive to review, briefly, the background out 
of which Nehru's views developed, particularly hie relation* 
ship with Gandhi*
Nehru* though quite intelligent* was not a par­
ticularly serious student* He cams by his political* social 
and economic views not so much by formal education as by
*l'his refers to Gandhi's idea that the wealthy 
should ease the lot of the underprivileged through voluntary 
distribution of part of their wealth* Cf • Phyllis J • 
Bolnick, "Charity, Trusteeship and Soolal Change in India!
A Study of Political Ideology*" World Politics. XIV* No* 3 
(April 19, 1962), 439-458. See pp» 193* 257- •
260, .
^Satyagraha means literally, "truth-forcer but as 
preaohed by Gandhi it came to mean the achievement of noble 
ends by noble means* e»g. the independence of India from 
Britain by non-violent efforts. In its wider application 
in India sinoe independence, satyagraha may be ooneidered 
as a synonym for persuasion in the true, not the Maoist* 
sense of the word* For elaboration of the concept see 
Homer A* Jack (ed*). The Gandhi Rnaderi A Sourcebook of His 
Life and Writings (Bloomington!Indiana University Press* 
195oT, chaps,' 'ill, v, vi, vli, xix.
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tha informal influences of hie home, his father, Gandhi* 
and his direct involvement in the independence movement*
The only son of a well-to-do Brahmin family, Nehru received 
early eduoation from British tutors in his home* Both from 
his tutors2 and from his father, a lawyer, Nehru was in­
structed in Western subjects and Western traditions* "A 
fervent admirer of the British eharaoter, Motilal [Nehru's 
father] was determined that his son should be brought up in 
Western ways* *3 Even though as a boy he had oome to resent 
the "presence and behavior of the alien rulers," Jawaharlal 
said, "In my heart Z rather admired the English* »4
It was thus fitting that at the age of sixteen 
Jawaharlal Nehru sailed for England to eomplete his educa­
tion at Harrow and Cambridge* It was significant for the 
political philosophy whioh he was ultimately to adopt that 
Nehru had such a long and Intimate association with British 
oulture. He was a student of only moderate suooess, and he 
was not especially conoemed with political and soolal 
questions at the time* But he was nevertheless steeped in 
the oustomB of the English* As a result, even though he 
resented the institutions by which the British ruled in
*For details of the early influences on his life
see Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal 
(New York* The John Day Co*, 1941), oiiaps* iii-vi herein- 
after cited Autobiography.
gIbld*. p. 16.
^Moraes, op. clt*. p* 19*
*Autobiography, p* 21*
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India, Nehru eame to aooept as baslo the demooratlo, par­
liamentary institutions by vhloh the British governed then- 
selves. Kis entire formal education was British} his first 
language was English,1 he spent seven of the most formative 
years of his life fully enjoying the liberties of England's 
open society. This was later to have a oruoial influence 
on the ideology of the New India and the approach India
would take to its own transformation.
'■ »
Although Nehru followed the news of Indian resist­
ance efforts early in the 1900's while he was in England,
he was still not deeply concerned with politics nor were*
his views on events in India well formulated. His father 
was a nationalist, but he was no revolutionary. Nehru de­
scribed him as a "moderate of Moderates" and noted that his 
father was bitterly opposed to the Indian extremists. In 
writing about the matter, Nehru desoribed both his father 
and the principal politioal influence on his early llfet
It was natural for him with his grounding 
in lav and constitutionalism to take a lawyer's 
and a constitutional view of politics. His clear 
thinking led him to see that hard and extreme 
words lead nowhere unless they are followed by 
action appropriate to the language. He saw no 
effective notion in prospect ... He looked to 
the West and felt greatly attracted by Western 
progress, and thought that this oould oome through 
an association with England.2
Nehru's views, however, eventually became mors extrem and
^He never mastered Sanskrit, although he even­
tually became fluent in Hindi.
^Autobiography. p. J6.
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so did those of hie father—ln spite of his Initially 
moderate position. But he never basically deviated from 
his early respect for constitutional, democratic institu­
tions.
When he graduated from Cambridge in 1910, Nehru 
etill had not decided upon a career. He finally eettled 
on lav, largely beoause hie parents Insisted upon It. Nor 
the next two years he studied for the bar examinations in 
London, did some general reading, and became "vaguely 
attracted to the Fabians and Boolallstlo Ideas, and inter­
ested In the political movements of the day."*
In 1919, seven years after hie return to India, 
Nehru vas swept up in Gandhi's first all-India agitation 
movement which had been prompted by the Rowlatt Bills, 
drastio measures adopted by the British to meet mounting 
India pressures for home rule. Tension exploded In Amritsar 
on April 13, vhen General Reginald Dyer ordered hie troops 
to maehine-gun a large crowd of Indians assembled in viola­
tion of martial lav. Some 400 people were killed, more than 
a thousand wounded.8 Among the many vell-to-do Indians who 
vers galvanized into antl-Brltlsh resistance behind Gandhi 
as a result of the Amritsar massaore vas Jawaharlal Nehru.
He vas one of the principal investigators of the incident
1Ibld., p, 38.
8T. Valter Wall bank, A Short History of India and 
(New York* New American!,! ovux/, Isyib), p. l^o.Pakistan
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for the Congress,1 and during the inquiry he worked closely 
with Gandhi. As a result, said Hehru, "Faith in his polit* 
leal Insight grew in me."2
The tragic events of the Punjab crisis in 1919
had two important consequences for Hehru and the ideology
he was later to apply in India. First, he became firmly
committed to the philosophy of satyagraha, not so muoh out
of moral or ethloal motivation, as from a realisation that
no other policy had any prospects for success* Speaking on
this point in 1931, when he made his Inaugural address as
president of the Indian National Congress, Hehru said*
Violence too often brings reaotion and demoralise*, 
tion in its train, and in our country especially 
it may lead to disruption. It is perfectly true 
that organised violence rules the world today and 
it may be that we oould profit by its use. But 
we have not the material or the training for or* 
ganlzed violence, and individual sporadio violence 
is a confession of despair. The great majority of 
us, I take it, judge the issue not on moral but 
on practical grounds and if we rejeot the way of 
violenoe, it is because it promises no substantial 
results. Any great movement for liberation must 
necessarily be a mass movement and a mass movement 
must essentially be peaoeful, except in times of 
revolt.3
Although the movement which Gandhi and Nehru led was to be
^The reference is to the Indian National Congress, 
whloh was the major organisation through whioh Indians worked 
for independence. Since independence it has become known as 
the All India Congress party, whloh has controlled parlia- 
sent from its inception. The Congress may be called either 
a movement or a party but it is not and never has been a 
branch or organ of the government.
2AutobloEraT)hy. p* 50*
^Moraes, or>. clt.» p. 149.
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a peaceful one. It vas nonethelese a revolution.! They 
vere committed to liberty for India and the Indian Individ* 
ual, which could only be brought about by a tremendous and 
protracted revolution. Nehru, like Gandhi, was a benign 
revolutionary.
The second significant result of Nehru's Involve* 
aent In the Gandhi movement of 1919 and 1920 vas that he 
was for the first time brought into direct personal contact 
with India's peasants and with the monumental poverty and 
misery of the agrarian masses. "Before becoming Involved 
with Gandhi," said Nehru, "I vas totally Ignorant of labor 
conditions in factories or fields, and my political outlook 
was entirely bourgeois."2 But In June, 1920, while on a 
mission for Gandhi in Allahbad on the plain of Hindustan,
I
Nehru encountered a peasant demonstration, vas begged to
visit the villages and examine conditions there. He did,
and what Nehru sav left him awe-struck,
I vas filled vlth shame and sorrow**shame at my 
own easygoing and comfortable life and our petty 
politics of the olty which ignored this vast 
multitude of semi-naked sons and daughters of 
India, sorrow at the degradation and overwhelming 
poverty of India, a new ploture of India seemed 
to rise before me, naked, starving, crushed and
^Of Gandhi, Nehru has saldi "By his own sacrifice 
ha shook India. Hs not only snook it, ha brought about 
great -changes. This is revolution." Hs described Gandhi 
as "the greatest revolutionary in our country, of the pre- - 
sent age, and of the previous ags." Quoted in Margaret V, 
Fisher, bNehrus The Kero As Responsible Leader," In Park 
and Tinker, on, clt.. p. 63«
^Autobiography. p« 54.
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1utterly miserable
Nehru returned from his mission a different man*
He realised for the first time the extent of India's social 
and economle problems. Moreover, from that time on he f At 
above all a deep obligation to improve the welfare of the 
Indian peasants. The experience, said Nehru, "filled me 
with a new responsibility that frightened me."2 But he was 
by no means paralysed with fear. On the contrary, he spent 
the next several months in the countryside of North India, 
talking with peasants, driving them to organise for their 
mutual benefit and succeeding in enlisting vast numbers of 
them in the swaraj^movement. Non-oooperatlon with the 
British was increasingly widespread in India, and Nehru 
was second only to Gandhi in responsibility for spreading 
the doctrine among the peasantry. An important result was 
that the misery of peasants and their determination to im* 
prove their lot became a major source of energy for the 
independence campaign, just as it had been the principal 
strength behind the Communist movement in China. Many years 
later when the victory was finally won, Nehru, like Mao, 
was both indebted to the peasants and handloapped by their 
problems. But in India the revolutionaries stressed non* 
vlolenoe, and this, more than any other single faotor,
* # •
hbid.. p. 57. 
2Ibld.
-'self-government.
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characterized the difference between the two, simultaneous 
revolutions in the Aslan countryside. With reference to 
the peaceful technique which the Congress emphasised, Nehru 
observed! "This may not have been fully appreciated or 
understood, but it did prevent the peasantry from taking 
to violence. «1
For the next several years Nehru was In and out of 
For a young revolutionary, many of whose polltioal, 
social and economic views had not been thoroughly formulated
t
when he became a revolutionary, the years in jail offered
jail.
Nehru opportunity to read and think. "Prison has made a man 
of me,"2 said Nehru years later. It also gave fibre and 
strength to the ideology which he was later to foster. In*
oreaslngly, Nehru began to think beyond independence and see 
that it was not an end in itself. Gandhi's views on the 
kind of political and economlo system which India should 
adopt upon winning its freedom were vague and visionary. **
It remained for Nehru to take the lead in formulating plane 
for the future.
One of tho faotors which strengthened hie demo* 
cratio principles and his socialist leanings was a trip to 
Europe in the spring of 1926. Said Nehru, "My mind was 
befogged, and no dear path was visible! and X thought that.
w ••
*Ibld.. p* 61#
nMorass, on. cit.« p. 91.
^ibld.. pp. 105, 107-1081 Walsh, on. cit..
PP. 95-96.
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perhaps. If I was far from India I could see things In
better perspective and lighten up the dark ooraers of my 
mind* Nehru spent nearly two years in Europe end it 
narked a major turning point in the formulation of his 
ideology* Most of his time in Europe was spent in Switzer*
land, In and around Geneva, and for the most part he read,
relaxed and thought* He commented*
I felt completely out off from India as well as 
the European world* India, and Indian happenings 
seemed especially far away* I was a distant on* 
looker, reading, watching, following events, 
gazing at the new Europe, its polltios, economlos 
and far freer human relationships, and trying to 
understand them.2
But he was not completely out off, for he attended 
oonferenoeB, met a number of people and traveled, among 
other places, to the Soviet Union* The visit to Russia In 
November, 1927, was brief, and as Nehru said, MIt did not 
teaoh us much about the new Russia,"-* but it did serve to 
stimulate his thinking about a plan for Independent India* 
Nehru at tills time could have been deeorlbed as more "anti* 
capitalist" than socialist or Marxist* He had soolallst
leanings from his association with the Fabians in England*
«•“
But he had not yet read Marxist literature carefully* He 
only knew that capitalism—and he had experienced the more 
unenlightened absentee aspects of It In India—was thoroughly
*Autobiography, p, 121* 
3IbU.. p. 127.
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distasteful*1 But during the 1930's hs read widely in 
socialism and Marxism* and by the end of the decade he was
convinced that socialism should form the basis of India's 
future eoonomio system* He never subscribed passionately 
to Marxism* and he was later to moderate his views greatly*
but the writings of Marx Influenced him profoundly just the 
same*
Russia apart* the theory and philosophy of 
Marxism lightened up many a dark corner of my 
mind* History cane to have a new meaning for 
me* The Marxist interpretation threw a new flood 
of light on it* and it became an unfolding drama 
with some order and purpose • • « It was the es* 
sentlal freedom from dogma and the scientific 
outlook of Marxism that appealed to me* It was 
true tiiat there was plenty of dogma in offieial 
Communism in Russia and elsewhere* and frequent 
heresy bunts were organised* That seemed to be 
deplorable * * «2
It is slgnlfleant that Hehru read the works of
Marx in the midst of the Great Depression* and he commented 
that "the great world oriels and slump seemed to justify 
the Marxist analysis." He noted that "while all other 
systems and theories were groping about in the dark, Marxism 
alone explained it mors or less satisfactorily and offered 
a real solution* It happened* moreover* that Nehru come 
under the influenoe of Marxism during a long siege in prison 
from 1931-1933 at one of ths most depressing ebbs in the 
swaraj movement* Nehru experienced an emptiness in tits
1Ses Autobiography, pp, 47, 231-232, for comments* 
gXbld*. p. 230*
3ihia.
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movement and In himself, and the possibilities of soelalism 
filled him "with a new excitement*"^ At the same time, 
however, the Soviet version of Marxism repelled him in many
ways.
* Much in Soviet Russia I dislike—the ruth­
less suppression of all contrary opinion, the 
wholesale regimentation, the unnecessary 
in carrying out various policies » * *2
Nehru was aware, nevertheless, that the conditions whioh 
had prevailed in Russia before 1917 had made the violence 
of the Soviet regime possible* He was aware also, that the 
economic and social ills of India were worse by far than 
those of pre-Communist Russia* This was naturally disturb* 
lng to Nehru, who cherished visions of a liberal democracy 
for India* For he saw in Russia during the 1920's and 
1930's, as he and others were again to see in China during 
the 1950's, that enormous problems invited radical notion* 
What was happening in the Soviet Union had direct implica­
tions for India, and for that matter, for the entire under­
developed world* Behru realised the dilemma in his prison 
cell long before he was to confront it as ruler* He wrote t
Perhaps the Bolsheviks had tried to go tro fast 
• * * A slower tempo might avoid much of the 
[violenoe and ] misery in the rural areas* But 
then the question arose if really radical re­
sults could be obtained by slowing down the rate 
of change* Reformism (Instead of radioal mea­
sures] was an impossible eolution of any vital 
problem at a critical moment when the basic 
structure had to be changed, and, however slow
• •
violenoe
1ibi4.
gIbid., p* 229.
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the progress might he later on, the initial step 
must be a complete break with the existing order, 
which • . . was now only a drag on future progress.1
But Nehru worried over how one could break 
completely with the existing order by non-violent and demo- 
oratio means—a problem which still plagues India. He 
believed that only a revolutionary scheme offered any real 
hope of success. But he was also aware of the fact that 
democratic and non-violent ways were gradual ways, "In 
India," he noted, "only a revolutionary plan oould solve the 
two related questions of land and industry as well as almost 
every other major problem before the country.But at the 
same time he quoted Lloyd George, approvingly, saying, "There 
is no graver mistake than to leap the abyss in two jumps."
Just before World War II Nehru realised that it
would be only a matter of time before India aohleved inde­
pendence, But up to that time, nationalism and the swaraj 
effort had almost completely preoccupied the leaders of the
"Were wemovement, obscuring eoonomlo and social questions, 
to jump to economic freedom at the same time Cas political
freedom]," Nehru wondered, "or take them in turn, however 
short the interval might be?"-* He ooncluded that these 
faotors were interrelated, but he observed that "a clear 
and definite Ideology was lacking."* Whatever that ideology
1Ibld.. pp. 229-230. 
2Ibld., p. 230. 
3Ibld.. p. 231.
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night become, however, Nehru was convinced that It would
have to be moderate by Communist standards, even If radical
by existing norms, While In prison again in 1936, he wrotei
• « * I am very far from being a Communist, My 
roots are still perhaps partly in the nineteenth 
century, and I have been too much influenced by 
the humanist liberal tradition to get out of it 
completely, , , » I dislike dogmatism, and the 
treatment of Karl Marx's writings or any other 
books as revealed scripture which cannot be 
challenged, and the regimentation and heresy 
hunts which 
munism,
in Russia, and especially the exoeseive 
violence in normal times * , ,1
Thus, the die for the ideology of independent 
India was cast ten years before independence, although many 
of ite features remained to be vo-rked out, India, Nehru 
had concluded, should follow the political path of demoo- 
racy, the social path of equality, and the economic path 
of undognatlo socialism. Although Gandhi had initially 
oharted the course, it was an uncertain one, and it fell 
to Nehru to lead the way. This was clear as early as 1929 
when Nehru had been named President of the Indian National
eeem to be a feature of modem com* 
I dislike alBO much that has happened
use of
Congress on the reoommendation of Gandhi, who had declined 
the post, Gandhi eald of Nehru at the timet
He is undoubtedly an extremist, thinking 
far ahead of hie surroundings. But he is humble 
and praotioal enough not to foroe the pace to 
breaking point. He la pure as orystal. He 
is truthful beyond suspioion. He le a knight 
sans neur. sans renroche. The nation Is in his * aT2
the
THTTi
pp. 348-349#
2iioraes, op, pit., p, 142,
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Nehru made It clear la his presidential address 
"I must frankly confess," he said, "that 
I am a socialist and a republican*"
where he stood*
He vent on to note 
that when India's leaders eventually von their objective, 
great eoonomle and sooial changes would have to be wrought* 
"To maintain the status quo," declared Nehru, "la to main*
tain Injustice and exploitation* The only way to do right 
Is to do away with the domination of any one class over 
another*n3,
briefly, commentsi
In other words, the balance, tilted against the 
have-nots, would be righted by removing the 
harsher inequalities between the classes and 
the masses and by adjusting the returns for 
labor and capital on a more equitable basis*
Social justice was the ideal, not social regi* 
mentation* This envisaged a classless society, 
but more on the socialist than on the Marxist 
model, with the utilitarian motif predominating*2
Adhering closely to the views of Its young leader, 
the Congress on January 2, 1930, passed a resolution pledg­
ing the goal of Independence* The pledge contained the 
kernel of the philosophy whloh guided the swaraj movement 
from that time forward, and it formed the foundation of 
Independent India's ideology* The opening lines of the 
pledge read*
Koraes, analysing Nehru's emerging Ideology
We believe that it Is the Inalienable right 
of the Indian people, ae of any other people, to 
have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their 
toll and have the necessities of life, so that
. ■ p. 1*8. .
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they may have full opportunities of growth. We 
believe also that If any government deprives a 
people of these rights and oppresses them, the 
people have,a further right to alter it or 
abolish It.1
The resolution, however, was lacking in any d 
tailed reference to the sooial and economio system whioh the 
Congress desired for independent India. The reason was that 
it had nothing concrete to present. Nehru's socialism at 
the time was indistinct and Gandhi's was ehlmerloal, but
they were in substantial disagreement on what they did 
believe.2 Moreover, some of the most important and influ­
ential members of the Indian National Congress were wealthy
businessmen, industrialists, and landlords who did not take 
readily to Nehru's socialism. An inoldent the following 
year bears out this lack of agreement on eoonomio questions. 
At a conference of the Congress in Karachi in 1931» Nehru 
authored a Resolution on Fundamental Rights, whioh contained 
this provisions "The State shall own or oontrol key indus­
tries and 8ervloes, mineral resources, railways, waterways,
•xshipping and other means of public transport. The resolu­
tion passed, but it was later revised on the demand of 
conservatives and rewritten in such a way as to reassure 
landlords and other property-holders that wholesale expro­
priation was not Intended.
1Ibld«. p. 151.
2See Mlohael Breoher, Nehrui A Political Biog­
raphy (Londont Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 193-195.
?Ibid., p. 176.
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Thus* Nehru*• aoolal and eoonomlo Ideas were
considerably more extreme by 1931 than were those of Gandhi
and most other Congress leaders* Moreover, in the years
immediately following*—as Nehru absorbed Marxism in prison—*
the gap widened* When Nehru resumed an active role in the
independence movement after his ' release, he labored to win
backing for his philosophy, and in 1936 and 1937 gained eon*
eiderable support* In preparation for provincial elections
to be held In 1937, in which the Congress had decided to
participate to demonstrate its strength, Nehru wrote an
eleotlon manifesto with several left*of*»eenter passages*
One was especially striking in that it promised peasants
substantial agrarian reforms, including
• * * immediate relief to the pocro*’ peasants 
by a reduction of rent and land taxes* exemption 
of uneconomic holdings from all rent and taxes* 
a moratorium on debts; the scaling down of rural 
indebtedness; and the provision of cheap credit 
facilities* There was something for all groups 
[in the manifesto } but its primary emphasis was 
on Improved conditions for the rural masses**
On the strength of his mass appeal, Nehru was 
reeleoted President of the Congress, and on the basis of 
his Leftist, agrarian-orlented manifesto the Congress von 
an Impressive victory in the provincial elections* Still, 
he did not win over the strong, influential conservative 
faction of the Congress*2 Furthermore, his differences with 
Gandhi on economic matters were as great ms ever* While
1Ibl£., p. 226* 
2Ibid., P* 227.
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Hehru stressed the need for nationalization, the right-wing 
clung to private enterprise. While Nehru emphasized sweeping 
land reform and redistribution, Gandhi stressed that bene- 
volenoe of the landlords toward the peasants would solve 
the problems. As Gandhi ones told a delegation of landlords!
My object is to reach your hearts and con­
vert you so that you may hold all your private 
property in trust for your tenants and use it 
primarily for their welfare, • * • But supposing 
that there is an attempt unjustly to deprive you 
of your property, you will find me fighting at 
your side • « ,1
From 1937 until Independence in 1947* the opposing factions 
in the movement held their ground, Gandhi contended that 
whatever reforms Indian society needed eould best be brought 
about by implementing his concept of trusteeship. The 
rich, he believed, should limit their possessions voluntar­
ily, thus contributing to a wider distribution of wealth and 
greater social equality. Not believing in either the possi­
bility of a classless soolety, nor in the desirability of 
economic egalitarianism, Gandhi strongly opposed the Marxist 
and Communist doctrines of olass warfare, "They frankly 
believe in violence and all that is in its bosom," said 
Gandhi, "1 believe in non-violence through and through.
Nehru and the other socialists countered that 
Gandhi's doctrine accepted wealth and poverty, simply
^■Quoted in Rolnick, on, clt.. p, 447*
2The analysis vhioh follows is based on ibid,,
^The Gandhi Reader, op, clt.. p, 326,
pp, 447-450.
1*4
relying on the wealthy to ease voluntarily the lot of the 
poor* This wag unacceptable, Nehru was the most outspoken 
orltio of Gandhi's economic and social Ideas* pointing out 
that Gandhi's promise to protect the rights of both prinoo 
and pauper was an assurance that pauperism would remain,* 
The socialists Insisted that poverty should be abolished*
If the chasm which divided the eoonomlo philoso*
*
phies of Gandhi and Nehru had not been bridged* there would
likely have been extreme factionalism and prolonged civil
strife upon the winning of Independence* But the opposing
views were ultimately reconciled* and that compromise has
become the principal feature of the Ideology of Independent
India* As Rolnick observes!
The Independence movement appeared to need an 
ideology that could meet at least two important 
conditions! it had to cater to the views of 
those who held a stake In Indian society as It 
was then constructed and who publicly 
traditional values; and at the same time It had 
to reconcile Itself in some way to those demands 
for "equality" and "change" and "sooial revolu­
tion" that were permeating the fabric of Indian 
society*2
The Boolallet Ideology of Nehru was thus tempered by the 
mors traditional Indian concept of trusteeship espoused by 
Gandhi* The result was that when the Government of India 
undertook the planned eoonomlo development of the nation 
after independence, under the leadership of Nehru* the goal
endorsed
*Rolnlck* op. clt*. p* 450. 
2lbld.. P. *4<5.
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irhioh it sought was a "socialist pattern of society.This 
phrase has beoome the commonly accepted description for the 
economic and social aims of India's policies* It Is not a 
euphemism for Marxism, but is rather a term for the modified 
socialism which the compromise between Gandhi's and Hehru's 
views brought about* While there may be more of Hehru's 
philosophy than Gandhi's in this "pattern" it is neverthe­
less a synthesis of the socialist and trusteeship oonoepts* 
The latter has profoundly influenced the form of action 
which Hehru's ideology has taken*
Indian socialism, then, is Marxism modified by 
Gandhism* Hehru's ideology subscribes baeioally to the
1Thls phrase was first used in a resolution of 
the Oongress Party during its 60th annual session held in 
January, 1955, at Avadi. The resolution oalled for "plan­
ning * * * with a view to the establishment of a Socialist 
pattern of society where the principal means of production 
are under sooial ownership or control, production is pro­
gressively speeded up and there is an equitable distribution 
of the national wealth." The resolution followed closely 
the language whioh Nehru had used in speeches during the 
preceding year and whioh were incorporated into a book, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Towards a Socialistic Order (New Delhlt 
Indian National Oongress, 1955/* ihe Avadi resolution 
caused a mild stir in the oountry, some oritios of Nehru, 
including a number of newspapers, charging that it marked a 
sharp veering to the Left* Other commentators held that It 
was simply the same Congress plan dressed up in new language* 
Nehru, himself, held this view, referring to the resolution 
and the term "socialist pattern" as "nothing speolal*" Al­
though there is some reason to believe that the resolution 
did indicate a certain restiveness on Hehru's part, the evi­
dence supports the view that Nehru and Congress leaders had 
more or less been describing a "socialist pattern" since 
independence* For a thorough aooount of the controversy see 
Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V, Bondurant, Indian Approaches 
to a Socialist Society (Berkeleys University of California 
Press, 1956), pp." 1-34 and appendix II* See alBO Brecher, 
PP» clt*. PP. 527-531*
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socialist philosophy of distribution of ths wealth, cham­
pioning the interests of the worker-peasant masses and the 
creation of a welfare state* But Nehru has rejected the 
most doctrinaire Marxist elements such as class struggle to 
which he subscribed in the 1930's* Indicating the extent 
of Nehru's reversal of his earlier views in favor of Man 
and against Gandhi, is his remark to an Interviewer in I960 
to the effect that although olass struggle is prevalent, It 
can be obviated eventually by the Gandhi an approach*^
The reason that Nehru came to aooept a major 
feature of Gandhi's philosophy and incorporate it into his 
Ideology for the development of India was that he found it 
practical to do so* Just as Mao and other revolutionaries 
found, Nehru discovered, upon winning the long resistance 
movement, that it was one thing to write traots about the 
need for vast social and economic transformations and 
another thing to implement them* Nehru's government earns to 
reoognlze early, as Mao's did not, that it eould "cope with 
only so many problems at one time*"2 And so, in contrast to 
the "great leap" ooneept into which the Chinese Communists 
rushed, India's "socialist pattern" called for gradualism* 
Nehru's earlier radical fervor was sobered by the immensity 
of the problems he faced as a responsible ruler* He decided 
to conduct a muted revolution, particularly in the agrarian
*H* K* Karan 
George Allen & Unwin,
jla, The Hind of Mr. Nehru (London! 
I960)',’ p7 76. "T
SRolnick, on. clt.* p* 458*
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eeotor. Because, as Rolnlok points out, for India's loaders
• • • to encourage class struggle within the 
country, to raise the expectations of the most 
depressed classes before those expectations
can be met, is an invitation to anarchy* • • • 
Although the government gives token recognition 
to the plight of the "rural masses" through com*
munlty development programs, in fact little ef­
fort is exerted to bring about any revolutionary 
ohange in rural structure*!
The government and the ruling Congress party reasoned that 
the peasant masses were still largely unoonsoious, politi­
cally, and that by delaying agitation for revolutionary 
ohange they could stave off a social upheaval which would 
prove unmanageable,2
Moreover, Nehru came to recognize that the trus­
teeship concept provided an invaluable means of reoonolling 
the traditional cultural values of India with those of the 
modern world* India has remained exceedingly custom-bound, 
as Vera Anstey has emphasized,'* greatly diminishing the 
possibility of rapid ohange* If politicians flaunt these
Avalues too openly, they do not win elections* 
do not attempt to overcome traditional praotioes, develop­
ment is not possible* Gandhi's philosophy offered a means 
of coping with this dilemma*
But if they
1Ibid.
2Ibld.
^supra. p* 41.
^Rolnlok, op* clt., p* 459#
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The Constitutional Bass
When the people of India drew up their constitu­
tion between 1947 and 1949, that document reflected the 
synthesis which had taken place between the views of Nehru 
and Sandhi, The constitution thus embodied the Ideology 
which was to guide India's development within the framework 
of democracy, socialism, trusteeship and satyagraha. The 
philosophy behind that scheme Is expressed olearly in the 
preamble to the constitution. It declares that the people 
of India, "having solemnly resolved to constitute India into 
a sovereign Democratic Republic," hold that all citizens 
should enjoyi
Justice, social, economic and politicalt
Liberty of thought, expression, belief, 
faith and worshipf
Equality of status and of opportunity! 
end to promote among them all
Fraternity assuring the dignity of the « 
individual and the unity of the nation •
In part four of the constitution there is a some­
what more expllolt statement of the type of socialism which 
the leaders envisaged for India, Preceding the statement, 
there is a notation explaining that although what follows 
Is not enforceable in court as law, the prinoiples "laid 
down are nevertheless fundamental in the govemanoe of the 
oountry and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these
* •
^The Constitution of Inlia (New Delhi* Government 
of India Press, 1949;, p. I*
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principles In making lava." Then oome these declarations*
The state shall strive to promote the welfare 
of the people by securing and protecting as effec­
tively as It may a soolal order In whioh justice* 
social, economic and political, shall inform ell 
the institutions of the national life*
The State shall. In particular, direot its 
policy towards securing—
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, 
have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood;
(b) that the ownership and eontrol of the 
material resources of the community 
are so distributed as best to subserve 
the common good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system 
does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the com­
mon detriment * * •*
It will be noted that the Constitution of India 
sets forth the "socialist pattern" and the welfare oonoept 
in moderate toneB, without dogmatism* Another Important 
provision further illustrates this characteristict
The State shall endeavor to secure, by 
suitable legislation or economic organization 
or in any other way, to all workers, agricul­
tural, Industrial or otherwise, work, a living 
wage, conditions of work insuring a deoent 
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure 
and social and cultural opportunities * •
Reserved language prevails throughout the section of the
constitution whloh presents the welfare oonoept* It re­
peatedly uses suoh phrases as, "the State shall promote,"
shall endeavor to secure," or "shall"shall take steps, 
within the limits of its economic capacity and development,
m t»
1IMd., p* 19.
gIbld*. p* 20* Emphasis added*
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It makes no Iron cladmalca effective provision 
guarantees, no imprudent promisee* It sets forth the broad, 
general guide lines of moderate socialism, the aim being to
# # •
promote the peopled welfare* It establishes no deadlines, 
but makes every allowance for the gradualism which Gandhi 
insisted was imperative and whloh Nehru eventually came to 
adopt*
This moderation was quite in keeping with the 
democratic institutions of separated powers, ohecks and 
balances, the right of opposition and dissent, and the 
basie freedoms guaranteed elsewhere in the document* Note* 
worthy are the provisions stipulated under the title* "Sight 
to Freedom*"
All citizens have the right-*
a) to freedom of speeoh and expression;
b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory 
of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the 
territory of India;
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(g) to practice any profession, or to carxy on 
any oooupation, trade or business*
It is illuminating to observe at this point that although 
the Constitution of the People's Republic of Ohina specif­
ically provides for the same freedoms as stipulated in a, b.
gIbld*. p. 9.
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d* e, and f above,1 it negates all of them In effeot by 
setting down the Inviolable prlnolple of "democratic cen-
A
tralism"* by which the people must abide and through which 
the state Is given the means to take whatever notion the 
"control organ" of the Communist Party deems necessary.3
An especially significant manifestation of the 
tempered socialism outlined in the Indian constitution
specifies that "no person shall be deprived of his property 
save by authority of law," and then elaborates at consider­
able length the process through whioh those laws must go, 
and the compensations vhioh they must provide** India's 
"socialist pattern," then, was one whioh made allowance for 
private property, private enterprise and private wealth, 
even though these features were to be subordinate to the 
primary aim of a welfare state under government guidance 
and planning* Hornes comments that Nehru has held from the 
beginning that the socialist pattern of soolety should be 
achieved with genuinely popular oonsent, "by a process of 
free dlscussion^ln short that it be planning by persuasion.
1For counterparts to these freedoms see The Con­
stitution of the People's Republic of China, op* cTt»* 
articles ^7,96, ""ft. lo and I2,1 respectively* tor the 
negation of them via "democratic centralism," see articles 
2 and 100*
gSut>ra. pp* 47-48.
3Ibld.
*The Constitution of India, op* clt*. Part III,
•eo. 31.
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for the people and by the people."*
In explaining the purpose and polloy behind the 
first Five Tear Flan In 1951* Nehru stated the philosophy 
of the "socialist pattern" In these words* "We must ala at
a classless society* based on cooperative effort* with op­
portunities for all. To realise this ire have to pursue 
peaceful methods in a democratic way*"2 Therein lay the
Gandhi-Nehru synthesis*
But however worthy and well-intentioned this 
synthesis may be* at least one observer holds that India's 
"socialist pattern" is essentially a compromise between 
inoompatibles* On the one hand there is the desire and need 
for radloal changes in order to promote rapid eoonomlo 
growth* On the other hand there is the desire not to pro­
ceed too qulokly in upsetting traditional institutions* and 
to leave some of them intact* While Western observers may 
take comfort in India's refusal to conduct sweeping and 
violent transformations and its refusal to employ regimenta­
tion and dictatorship to gain its ends* they must take less 
oomfort in ths country's rate of growth*** As Rolnlok has 
pointedly observed*
• * * those who feel disturbed about the depths 
of poverty still so visible in India* and about 
the slow pace of ohange* might legitimately 
pose the questions If for whatever reasons* 
trusteeship has become an inherent part of the
P< 422*
2Quoted in JJbid.* pp. 422-423. 
^see infra, pp. 306-307* . 310-315.
203
Indian Socialist Ideology 
will come the impetus for the more radioal 
socio-economic change needed in India?1
The inferences in this question have apparently 
troubled Nehru and others in India from time to time, but 
Nehru, at least, has not been convinced that any other 
Ideology offers more hope for India, Nehru paid a visit to 
China in October, 1954, during the period of transition from 
the individual peasant economy to cooperative agriculture. 
Observers agree that he was Impressed by what appeared to be
• from whenoe, •
progress in China, although they are not agreed on how 
strongly Nehru's impressions Influenced his ideas on Indian 
development. Breoher wrote that
there oan be no doubt that Nehru was deeply moved 
by what he saw in China* He was impressed by the 
energy and discipline of Chinese workers, in con­
trast to Indians, particularly under the direction 
of an efficient centralized government which gave 
China "terrifying strength,"2
Breoher further notes that although Nehru was comforted by 
indications that India's economy was generally mors advanced 
than China's at ths time, he was disturbed by the evidence 
that China's rate of growth was faster, Breoher believes 
that Nehru acquired from the visit "added insight Into ths 
reality of the Indo-Chinese rivalry," and noted that he may 
well have moved to the Left upon his return, consciously or 
subconsciously, "by ths oonoem that China was winning this 
crucial contest.
^Rolnlck, op. clt,. p. 460. 
gQp. clt«. pp, 529-530. 
3Ibid.. p. 530.
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But Nehru'e faith In demooraoy was not shaken,
however disturbed he may have been to find the Chinese making
what appeared to be more rapid economio gains* Baok in
India, he criticised the absence of basic freedoms in China
and pointedly reiterated his great respect for democratic
institutions*^ Moraea2 is of the opinion that Nehru's faith
in India's approaoh to development was actually strengthened
by his visit to China* "He did not disguise his conviction
that India, given a socialist objective and planned guidanoet
could and would move faster," said Moraes* Moreover, Nehru
• • • was careful to emphasize that India had 
chosen the democratic way and that the Avadl 
resolution was a shining beacon of that demo« 
oratio resolve and faith* His visit to China, 
as hie later visit to Russia roused in him a 
competitive spirit* India could go one better 
along the democratic path*'
Other Indian visitors to China, however, were not 
so convinced that India had taken the right path* Indeed, 
many of than who toured China between 1951 and 1955 returned 
to India with a highly favorable attitude toward the Chinese 
Communist system* One influential Indian visitor remarked 
that "the idea of government and people working together 
appeals to me much more than the praotiee of the people 
continuously judging, criticizing and opposing their govern-
^Por a detailed aoeount of Nehru's remarks upon 
his return from China, and for Indian press comment on the 
tour see Fisher and Bondurant, Indian Views of Slno-Indlnn 
Relatione (Berkeley! University oi: California Press, 195o), 
PP. loy-119.
^O^^jcit* , p* 440, 
3Ibld.
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ment. Another visitor commented that the whole Chinese 
system "Is based upon the enthronement of a conception of
social virtue over the deoadent western ideal of individual 
right."2 Other Indians also compared the Chinese and Indian 
systems at this time and found the Indian approaoh looking, 
H. c. Gupta, head of the department of economics at Vaish 
College, Punjab University, was especially definite In his
conclusions on the matter. In a book Gupta olted numerous 
statistics comparing the agricultural production of China 
and India during the years 1949*1956 which indicated China's 
greater productivity. Then he drew these conclusions, whloh 
are particularly interesting in view of the events in China, 
1958-61*
• . .[China's] progress has not only been steady 
but speotacular too ... China's achievements 
do not lie in astounding progress made towards 
raising agricultural production, and creating a 
solid base for future economic development or 
bringing land reforms or developing cooperatives 
[so much as] in their remarkable achievement in 
fruitfully employing millions of Chinese people 
on constructive work in a manner which is really 
oommendable. They have shown the path along 
which the under-developed countries of Asia 
shall have to travel • It le amply demon-p •strated by the Chinese that ... in planning 
the economy one should be systematic and orderly 
• • . . China in the long run is bound to leave 
us behind in the economio race, for her planning 
and the execution of planning both are more sol- entlflo.3
^Fisher and Bondurant, "The Impact of Communist 
China on Visitors Prom India,” Far Eastern Quarterly. XV 
(February, 1956), 261.
2Ibld., P. 263.
^Problems and Processea of Scononlo Plannlng in 
PndordevelQT:c.J ]jconGalC3n"\Allaau.t/Juim' Axt.ua ^jui,' 1 sJJT* 
P.' 225.
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Nehru, however, arrived at no euoh ooncluelons 
about the superiority of the Chinese system, even though 
he may have endeavored to aoeelerate India's paoe somewhat 
after his tour of China* He reiterated his views quite 
forcefully In a speech before the National Development
Council on November 4( 1954, shortly after his return from 
China* Among other remarks, he saldt
Speaking of conditions In India and the way we 
have been working, we have In the polltloal 
sphere and more so in the same way In the eco­
nomic sphere, brought about changes democratic­
ally and peacefully, even though that change 
might appear to take a little more time than the 
other* * * * I think that In the long run the 
democratic and peaceful method Is more successful 
even from the point of view of time and much more , 
so from the point of view, I think, of final results* >
That India's leaders were interested in developments in
China was Indicated when the Ministry of Food and Agricul­
ture dispatohed a delegation of specialists to China in the 
summer of 1956 to examine Chinese progress in agriculture* 
The Indians were generally Impressed with the tight organi­
sation of Chinese rural cooperatives, with the "harder 
efforts" of Chinese peasants, and the apparently better 
Chinese yields* Upon its return, the delegation recommended 
that a number of steps'* be taken in India, emulating certain 
methods and techniques of the Chinese*. But the Indian
^Quoted in Fisher and Bondurant, Indian Annroaches 
to a Socialist Society* on. clt.* appendix X, pp*"iii-iv,
p
For recommendations see the Report of the Indian 
Delegation to China on Agricultural Planning and Taol^lcmos*
imib' 555
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visitors vers aware that China's development was taking 
plaoe In an altogether different political atmosphere from 
that In India* Although the delegation doubted "If the 
effort and hard vork vhloh are now being put In by peasants 
oould be attributed to any appreciable extent, to force, 
compulsion and the like,”*’ nevertheless the team eonoludeds
We must emphasise * * * that any measures that 
va may adopt for eoonomlo development or teob- 
nloal progress [In response to Chinese methods] 
should be fully In accord with our demooratle 
institutions.2^
The Eclectio Approach
Not only did Nehru insist upon retaining a demo­
oratle political system, he continued to invoke the validity 
of a pragmatic and eoleotle approaoh to eoonomlo development*
Socialism* Commu­
nism, Capitalism, and Gandhism—"have taken a shape which is 
normally associated with a rigid, dogmatlo, semi-religious 
outlook, l«s *, holding fast to a set idea, some slogan, and 
trying to fit in your thought to that slogan rather than
He observed that all the various scheme
fitting yourself and understanding [to] the changing condi­
tions. Having thus, by implication, indloted Ideology 
as a hindrance to eoonomlo development, Nehru proceeded to
1Ibld*. p. 192. 
gIbld*. p. 199.
■^Fisher and Bondurant, Indian Approaches, op* clt*«
P. 3*
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expound In Ideological terms his own doctrines, which, how*
ever respeotful of flexibility, were nevertheless dootrlnes,
The following passage from his speech on November 4, 1954,
is typical of Nehru and Illustrative of his ambivalence on
the matter of Ideology!
The picture I have in mind is definitely 
and absolutely a socialistic picture of soolety.
I am not using the word in a dogmatic sense at 
all, but in the sense of meaning largely that the 
means of production should be socially-owned and 
controlled for the benefit of society as a whole.
There is plenty of room for private enterprise 
there, provided the main aim is kept dear,3'
On the paradox of Nehru's making a strict dogma out of anti- 
dogmatism, Koraes offers some insight, "Less doctrinaire 
than the Gandhism which influenced their shape and direction," 
he wrote, "Nehru's beliefs are equally inflexible and pur­
poseful, They might bend but they will not break,"2 If 
Nehru has not been dogmatic in espousing and defending his 
"socialist pattern of soolety," he oertainly has been per­
sistent, So persistent has he been that one commentator 
observed, "Not a day passes when the phrase 'Socialist 
Pattern of Soolety* is not referred to by leaders of Indian 
If repeated invocation of a oonoept is ons of 
the identifying marks of an ideology, then Nehru's "socialist 
pattern" may be so identified.
But there is more to an ideology than the repetl-
..3opinion.
1mi.
20n, clt., pp, 437-438,
-*J, P, Chandra, India's Socialist Pattern of 
Society (Delhi! Metropolitan Book Company,' 1956), p,ix.
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tion of slogans, however Important they may be* A viable 
ideology must be constituted of principles vhioh have broad 
Appeal* particularly if they are to be Implemented by demo* 
cratle means* The indications are that Nehru's "socialist 
pattern" has such appeal* The primary reason for its appeal 
seems to be the welfare concept which is inherent in the 
"socialist pattern*" The idea that India's development is 
being undertaken for the fundamental purpose of elevating 
the living standards of the people seems to be entirely 
genuine* Moreover, it appears to have been effectively com* 
munioated to the masses* References to the building of a 
strong and mighty India, powerful on the world scene* are 
exceedingly rare in the speeches, statements and writings 
of Congress leaders* But their concerns for improving the 
people's welfare are reiterated constantly* The theme is 
repeated annually in the resolutions of the Congress partyi1 
it is the heart of the Congress party's platform in parlia­
mentary elections)2 and it is the central topio in govern­
ment literature** and programs associated with rural develop­
ment sohemes*
^See Fisher and Bondurant, Indian Approaches* on* 
Pit*, appendioea II and III*
2See Fisher and Bondurant* The Indian Experience 
with Democratic Elections (Berkeleys university of c'alil- orHalrel3s,ri95jnT*,,,^*‘^
^For a typical example see Road to the Welfare 
State, issued by The Community Projeots Aauanisixation* 
Government of India, Hay, 1955* 87 pp* For an acoount of 
Government's rural program as an example of India's Ideology in notion see Infra, chap. vi.
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U. N, Dhebar, President of the Indian National
Congress, and, according to liiehru, the prlnolpal author of
the Avadl resolution,^* holds that human welfare is the most
distinctive feature of the "socialist pattern."
... In my opinion the vital difference between 
the pattern of society India wants to evolve and 
that that may be obtainable at other places Is 
that India does not forget "the man" ... The 
development of the man Is the primary objective 
that we aim at ... We are convinced that such 
development cannot be secured under a totalitarian 
State or a managerial revolution through State 
bureaucracy. This is the very vital difference .
This same theme has been struck by another de- 
fender and propagator of the "socialist pattern" in India, 
J. P. Chandra.-* Be maintains that there Is a substantial 
difference between state socialism and a socialist soolety. 
Ths former, he says, la preoeoupled with an "soonomlo man," 
whereas the latter Is devoted to both soonomlo and non-
2• •
soonomlo oonoerns, and alms at the "true fulfillment of the 
individual." The Ideology of the new India, says Chandra, 
recognizes that "to asplrs for soonomlo development, at ths
cost of human values, is to barrioade the process of human 
evolution. i.4
A crucial aspect of the Indian Ideology Is, thsn,
1Brecher, op. clt
2In a foreword to Chandra, op. clt.. p. vii.
*For a well-written discourse on and defense of 
the philosophy behind India's political-economic Ideology, 
see Ibid., chap. 11, from which most of Chandra's statements 
have been drawn.
p. 529*
4Ibld.. p. 17*
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that It aubsorlbas to tha view that the state and its pro* 
grama exist primarily aa a means of helping to provide an 
environment in which individuals may enjoy material seourlty
and political freedom—a "humanitarian-democratic social 
order."1 Because it subscribes to the basic tenets of 
democracy, India's Ideology is open, in contrast to the 
closed ldea-syeteo of Communist China. It is aa ideology 
which is subject to the multiplicity of views whioh natur­
ally derive from a spirit of free inquiry. The Indian
ldea*syatem, thus, is eneumbered by a minimum of dogmatism,
not only because of the multiple influences on it, but
because it has been constructed within the framework of
democracy, whioh, by its very nature, is characterised by
compromise. Nehru's observations on this point are quite
pertinent. In a speech in 1956 he noted!
The leader has to adapt the truth as he sees it 
to olroumstanoes in order to make it acceptable) 
because a leader, more especially in a demo* 
cratio country, will only be a leader in so far 
as the people are with him. ... I hope that 
the leader wante to adhere to principle and 
truth aa he sees it. But, inevitably, he tends 
to compromise • • .«
A major advantage of compromise, as Kehru has ob­
served, is that it may prevent a ruling group from taking a 
headlong rush into programs which may be ill oonoeived, and 
prevent the forcing of polloies against strong opposition, 
from Nehru's many remarks on this matter, it may be con*
1Ibid., p. xii.
2Quoted in Fisher. "Nehrui The Hero as Responsl* 
bis Leader," op... o!t.» P. 64.
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oluded that ha subscribes to the view that although demo­
cratic methods may be slower than despotic methods, "never­
theless, the ultimate failures of dictatorship cost humanity 
far more than any temporary failures of democracy* B** 
other advantage of the allowance for compromise Is that It 
permits India to draw upon whatever elements of different 
Ideologies may be benefleally adapted to the Indian situation. 
Heeding the passage In The Mahabharata which says, "Good 
words, good deeds, and beautiful expressions a wise man 
culls from every quarter,"® Nehru has statedi
An-
"If anything
communist is good, I am going to take lt| if anything anti­
communist is good, I am going to take it also,"^ Moreover,
the allowance for compromise In the Indian ideology permits
a certain accommodation to be achieved between the tradi­
tional and the new. Emphasizing the importance of this 
methodology Rajendra Prasad, while President of India, 
stated that "it is absolutely neoessary for us to build 
[our] eoonomlo system on the foundation of the historio 
ethical consciousness of our country," 
synthesis was a conscious attempt to embody not only desir­
able features from modern, foreign systems in the Indian 
soheme, but to incorporate compatible native institutions 
as well.
The Gandhi-Nehru
^Chandra, op. clt«, p, 16, 
®Quoted in ibid., p, 19, 
3Ibld.
AIbid.
....
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In short, the polltloal-sooial-oeonomlo ideology 
of Independent India ie an ambitious endeavor to eolve the
problem raised by John Stuart Mill of "how to unite the 
greatest individual liberty of action with a common owner­
ship, and an equal participation in the benefits of oomblned 
labor. nl Rising to this challenge in 1948, Nehru declaredt
Our aim should be to evolve a political system, 
which will combine efficiency of administration 
with individual liberty and an economic etruoture 
which will yield maximum production without the 
operation of private monopolies and concentration 
of wealth, and which will create a proper balance 
between urban and rural eoonomies. Such a social 
structure can provide an alternative to the ac« 
quisltive economy of private capitalism, and the 
regimentation of a totalitarian state,2
Sounding this same theme, Barbara Ward recently described 
the goal of India in this ways
Modernisation can oover many almst national 
prestige, military power, ability to throw one's 
weight about the world, to become "top nation," 
to carry through an ideological blueprint. In 
India, no doubt, modernization has a number of 
different meanings to different groups and in­
terests, yet here, too, there is a consensus— 
the belief that the master aim of modernisation 
must be to raise living standards and give people 
some hope of a better life, a genuinely demooratlo 
community oan hardly have any other main purpose.3
Such a venture ae the one embarked upon by inde­
pendent India may very well be the most difficult and 
significant undertaking In the history of demooraoy. It Is
^Prom Mills' Autobiography, quoted in Ibid,, p. 16, 
SIbi£., pp, 6-7,
^Barbara Ward, India and the West (Hew lorki 
W, W. Horton and Company, Ino„ 19£>1), p, 140,
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b bold experiment* and It la yet to be demonstrated whether 
It can succeed*
.
CHAPTER SIX
Ideology and Economic Development In Indlai 
Democracy, Gradualism, and Rural Change
Struck by the overwhelming poverty of the Indian 
peasants while he was an agent for Gandhi in the countryside 
In 1920, Nehru came to believe that only revolutionary 
ohanges could meet the desperate needs of the "naked, starv­
ing, crushed and utterly miserable" masses of peasants. In 
1931 he called for a complete break with the existing order 
whioh had given rise to the endemlo destitution of rural 
India, But the vastness and complexity of the eoonomio and 
sooial problems whioh Nehru confronted as Prime Minister 
induoed him to settle for an agricultural program, whioh, 
although it had revolutionary implications, was considerably 
less than a rapid and complete transformation of the rural 
eoonomy. Nevertheless, Nehru and India's other leaders were 
aware that their hopes for the eoonomio development of the 
nation would turn on agriculture. The Planning Commission, 
of which Nehru is Chairman, put it in plain wordss
Despite India's great olties, its industries, 
its proposals to intensify industry, India is now 
and will remain in the forseeable future a pre­
dominantly agricultural nation. For India, as 
for most of Asia, the test of development is the 
advance of agrioulture and of rural people,2
India, like China, has been for centuries a nation
*The New India, op, pit., p, 159,
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of small villages mads up of s cluster of small houses or 
huts. Sohools are virtually non-existent* roads are Inade­
quate* and communication with the outside world is fragmen­
tary and spasmodlo at best, there vers some 556*089 of 
these villages in India In 1951 when the government.embarked 
upon Its development program* 70 percent of them with a 
population of 500 or less,'*' In all* village India oomprises 
some 325 million people, approximately four-fifths of the 
total population. For 250 million people agriculture is 
the means of livelihood,8 But farming techniques are primi­
tive and although these millions of peasants produos half 
of the nation's total income*^ they are at "the bottom of 
the scale in health* sanitation* llteraoy, lnoome and
Aopportunity,"
Thus, when India's planners promulgated the first
in a projected series of Five Tear Plans in 1951* the prob-
But the Plan was "modestlems they faoed were gargantuan, 
in scops and cautious in approach, and really was not the
full-fledged, elaborate soheme which later plans came to be. 
It was, rather, a somewhat general outline of high-priority 
problems and an integrated approach to meeting them. As 
Nehru later described It* this plan was "designed to be the
XIbld„ p, 160, 
gIbtd.. p. 159*
4Ibld, p, 160,
^Breoher, opa clt.. p, 524,
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foundation of a bigger and better plan of progress in the 
future*
The foundation of the First Five Tear Flan was 
agricultural reform, and the means for the advancement of 
the rural economy was to be a nation-wide Community Develop* 
ment program. Community Development was conceived as a 
means by which the people of village India could cooperate 
with the government In an Integrated program of developing 
and Improving agricultural production, rural construction 
' and the economic and social standards of the village people, 
Zt was a comprehensive undertaking designed to bring to­
gether private, voluntary rural improvement schemes, govern­
ment development programs, and Individual efforts. Moreover,
, , • It was recognized that any suoh scheme, to 
he effective, should take cognizance of the "cul­
tural preparedness” of the village for changes 
begin with the "felt” needs of the villages, 
at direct and fairly quick results to demonstrate 
usefulness of the programs and make sure of the 
availability of supplies and technical services.
The logic of the movement had to be such as would 
bring the people, [and] the people's representa­
tives , , , together,2
The Community Development program called for the 
ultimate transformation of rural Ufa and the agrarian 
economy, Just as did China's plan for the socialization of 
agriculture. But In India both the end and the means were 
markedly different. The aim in India was to advanos
dim
^Morass, op. clt., n, 426,
2Sunil Guha, Welfare Economics In India (Calcutta! 
Flrma K, K. Mukhopadhyay, 19oQ]'9 pp, 75-76, Gulia Is a 
member of the editorial hoax’d of the Congress Party publi­
cation, Sconoalo Review,
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simultaneously the standard of living of the rural masses 
and the productive strength of the national aoonomy( so as 
to make possible the establishment of a welfare state* The
means were to be* largely* "guided self-help and Improved 
organization* .<1 Although the government had provided the 
impetus for the program and had outlined its major features* 
Community Development was to be a transformation carried
out from the bottom up rather than imposed and forced from 
above* It was based on the belief that if the peasants and 
others in the villages were given the opportunity of self- 
help for the purpose of their own advancement "they would 
respond with their skills* enthusiasm and energies*"^ It 
was in accord with democratic ideology adopted by India that 
the rural masses oould only be persuaded and encouraged to 
participate in organized development* They could not bo
I
coerced* But the planners believed that this approach was 
not only right* but practical* They concluded that "no 
program for the advance of India's villages oould succeed 
unless it had the wholehearted cooperation of the rural 
people themselves* ..3
The program in effect colled for a prooees of 
government stimulus and popular response to be applied to 
the whole range of rural problemsi food production* land 
reclamation* Irrigation, eduoatlon, health, housing* com-
XIbld., p* 76.
^The Hew India, on. cit*. p. 169* 
3Ibld*
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munications, supplementary employment, and eoolal welfare* 
Hot limited to physical problems alone, the aim was also to 
generate a national spirit for development and change, and 
personal committment to the alms of the new India* Without 
this ssnse of urgeney and Involvement on the part of indi­
viduals, the planners reasoned, eoonomlo development would 
be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to carry out* 
Speaking to this point, shortly after the inauguration of 
the Community Development program, Nehru said)
• * * The community projects are of vital import 
tanoe not only for the material achievements they 
will bring about, but much more so because they 
seek to build up the community and the individual, 
and to make the latter a builder not only of his 
own village center but in a larger sense of 
India* * * * The primary matter is the human 
being involved, the man who is going to work, 
the man who ie going to feel it and translate 
that feeling into action*^
Community Development and National Extension
Following the First Five Tear Flan which declared 
that "Community Development is ths method and Rural Exten­
sion the Agency through which the Five-year Plan seeks to 
initiate a process of transformation of the social and 
eoonomlo life of the villages,"2 the government launched the
^From a speech before the First Development Com­
missioners Conference, Hay 7, 1952, quoted in ibid*
20uoted in Organization of Rational Extension 
.Service and Expansion of' Ooririualty -^cvcioT^~7:£ lro.:.x'.la*
Community Projeote Administration. Planning Commission, 
Government of India (New Delhi! The President's Press, 
1953), p. 1.
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Community Development program on Ootober 2, 1952* Although 
the organization and implementation of the eoheae have been 
modified several times since 1952 the plan basically called 
for a program which would accomplish two things* First it 
vas expeotad, through education and demonstration, to 
"create an urge among the rural people for a better way of
life and show [them ] the way of satisfying this urge pre­
dominantly by means of self-help,"* Having aohieved this, 
the rural development program should then provide the frame­
work for continuing improvement in agricultural production 
and village standards in cooperation with the government. 
The institutions designed to accomplish these aims were, 
respectively, the Community Development Program and the 
National Extension Servioe,2
Although the CDP was the first to be introduced,^ 
preceding the HES by one year, the two schemes operate 
simultaneously and are aotually two aspects of the same 
program for rural development. The difference between them
*"The Community Development Program in India,"
An Evaluation of the Development and Planning Division by 
the Reserve Bank of India in Kurukshetra. IX, Ho, 9 (April, 
1961), 14, Kurukshetra is a monthly publication of the 
Ministry of Community' Development and Cooperation,
^Hereinafter cited CDP and KS3,
^Because India Is a federal government, with 
states in the union playing an important part in eoonoraie 
development, the CDP was organized in a hierarchical fashion. 
Four levels were established! the Central, State, District, 
and Project (later called Block), For details of the organ­
ization see Community Projects. A Draft Outline, Community 
Projeots Administration, Planning Couuiiaaiou, Government of 
India (1953), PP. 45-47,
221
la that the CDP was organised for store intone lye and compre­
hensive development, operating with more funde and including 
health, education, sanitation, communications and other 
matters as Kell as agriculture and its allied aotivltles.
The NES was adopted by the government on the advice of 
American technical assistance consultants and vae patterned 
after extension programs in the United States.^ The HES 
was conceived primarily as a means of oarxylng out agricul­
tural Improvement programs and vas designed as a permanent 
feature of the cooperative endeavor between the government 
and the people to advanoe production and living standards. 
The stages of development, with respect to the two aspects 
of the program, were originally to bet (1) extensive devel­
opment under the NES program* (2) intensive development 
under the community blocks} and, (3) resumption of the NES 
program as a permanent feature of rural development.2
But after several years of trial during which time 
the program began to suffer from the lack of experienced 
personnel, the planning commission decided to revise the 
sequence. At present, the program le divided in two five- 
year stages, preceded by a one-year preparatory stage. When 
rural development is undertaken in a region now, the first 
year is given over to a "pre-extension" program with the 
baslo emphasis on agriculture. This is followed by a five- 
year period of development under the NES. Then comes the
^auha, 22* dt.. p. 77. 
sibld.. p. 78.
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five-year period of the Intensive Community Development 
Program,* By the end of 1959. 70 percent of the rural 
population vas oovered by some phase of the program, and
100 percent coverage is scheduled to be in effect by October 
1963.2
The Community Development Program began operations 
in 1952 in 250 regions designated as "Development Blocks. 
These are units comprised of approximately 100 villages and 
60,000 to 70,000 people and designated for intensive efforts 
to advance all aspects of rural life. Pilot projects ear­
lier had made it dear that the various problems of villages 
—agricultural techniques, irrigation, sanitation and educa­
tion, for example—were so olosely interrelated that it vas
4not feasible to undertake improvement of them separately.
Behind the idea of intensive and comprehensive 
development of villages through the joint efforts of the 
rural populace and the government were three major premises^ 
vhioh effectively demonstrate India's Ideology applied to
*"Community Development Program in India," Eval­
uation, op. pit., p* 14.
OGuha, op. clt.. p. 79.
^The New India, op. clt.. pp, 169-170.
4See directive from the Planning Commission 
Secretary to all State governments. January 12, 1952. In 
Important Letters Issued by Community Projects Administra­
tion. Government of India, p. 1.
^Prom Carl C. Taylor, "Community Devdopment Pro­
grams and Methods," Kurukshetra. Annual Humber (Ootober, 
1954), pp. 16-19. Dr. Taylor, an Amerloan specialist in 
rural sociology, vas for a number of years Regional Advisor 
on Community Devdopment to the Government of India.
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eoonomio development* First, it was held that the manpower. 
Ingenuity and enthusiastic participation of millions of 
villagers was imperative to national development* Secondly, 
it was felt that even Isolated and illiterate peasants 
eould be mobilized in the effort of individual end national 
advancement if they were permitted to be at least partially 
responsible for their own improvement* Thirdly, it was 
recognized that even the most depressed villagers have self* 
recognized needs and desires to satisfy those needs; and 
if, through the guidance of trained workers, these people 
could be encouraged and assisted in undertaking cooperative, 
self-improvement schemes they oould effectively contribute 
to their own advancement while at the same time enhancing 
national development* Furthermore, it was recognized that 
because villagers are so physically and psychologically 
Isolated from state and national events their concerns are 
almost totally looal* Therefore, it was logioal to enlist 
their support in the improvement and advancement of matters 
of immediate and tangible Importance to them*
The CDP plans were sometimes explained in the 
somewhat deceptive, visionary language of the sort which so 
often accompanies the promulgation of agrarian schemes in 
Communist China* The four prlnolpal steps1 whloh were out* 
lined as the primary "methods of Community Development" 
illustrate the point* The first step in undertaking a CD 
project "is systematic discussion" of "common felt needs by
1Ibid** pp. 18-19.
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members of the community** The eeoond step "is systematic 
planning to carry out the first self-help undertaking 
selected by the community." The third step in carrying out 
m project "is almost complete mobilisation of the physieal 
economic and social potentialities of local groups*” Fi­
nally ^ there Is the "creation of aspiration and determination*
in the people "to undertake additional community improvement 
projeota." That the program In praotioe did not quite de­
velop along these lines vas less a discredit to the program 
than it vas an indication of the dlfferenoe between theory 
and reality in economic development*
The principal faotor accounting for the frequent 
disparity between plans and aotlons in the CDP vas the con­
dition of village India when the program was begun in 1952*
As outlined by Douglas Ensminger,1 American specialist in 
community organization, and a Ford Foundation representative 
in India, those conditions included a number of elements 
inimical to the aims and methods of the CDF* There was, 
for one thing, because of the long period of stagnation, 
the belief on the part of villagers that the future would 
bring no improvement, and that their present lot vss both 
inevitable and unchangeable* With respect to those things 
vhloh were most unbearable, the villagers traditionally 
looked to the government for relief* let, beoause of in­
numerable disappointments and frustrations in the past.
*"What Future for O.D*," Kurulcshetra* Annual 
Eumber (October, I960), p* 13*
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peasants had developed serious suspicions and misgivings 
about the government* In addition, villagers of different 
oastes lacked experience in working together; despite oommon 
problems, they did not share oommon attitudes about their 
solution. Over the years, the rural masses bad oome to 
accept tradition, handed down through generations, as their 
guide to conduot and enterprise, Ensminger concluded that 
the villager's mental orientation was to survival, and the 
peasant's orientation to land was simply to produce, if 
possible, enough to survive.
In order to overoome these conditions and success-* 
fully oonduot change, Ensminger suggested that five prelim­
inary stops were essential; (1) oreats dissatisfaction with 
present conditions among villagers; (2) eduoats the people 
to want better conditions whloh are both desirable and 
obtainable; (3) motivate the people to want Improvement 
badly enough to exert Individual and group effort to achieve 
it; (4) make clear to the people the alternatives open to 
them for actually achieving their newly expressed wants; 
and (5) help villagers to have an initially successful 
experience with new methods so that they are enoouraged to 
accept new techniques as an integral part of village culture, 
Ensminger concluded that as of I960, eight years 
after the C9P had begun, the villagers of India had pro* 
greased through stage two. They had become dissatisfied 
with the status quo, they were expressing new wants, and 
they were in a receptive mood for stage three. In other
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words, India's endeavor to apply the demooratio philosophy 
of voluntarism* Individual initlativet persuasion* eduoatlon 
and gradualism to rural development had not produced venders* 
But the government of India oould at least take some eomfort 
in the fact that its approaoh had not produoed vldespread 
resentment* dislocation and turmoil in the oountryslde*
The Agents of Change
Perhaps the most important factor in the Community 
Development and BBS programs* both from the standpoint of 
their operation and their manifestation of Ideology* is the 
Village Level Worker. Known to India's rural masses as the 
"Gram Sevak,"1 the Village Level Worker is the primary agent 
of the government at the village level* there for the pur­
pose of lnduoing the villagers to eooperate in programs for 
their own improvement* In describing the role of the VLW 
as an agent of ohange* the CP administration artioulated 
India's Ideology dearlyt
Only as village people become productive 
and fully part ideating citizens in free* in­
dependent India will they find freedom from the 
pressure of satisfying basic needs* Village 
people can and will take part more intelligently 
in the Government and the community development 
only when they are encouraged and given guidance 
in planning that directly affeeta their own lives*
- Anyone Interested in helping the villagers must 
go and live in the villages | show the villager
^Literally, "village servant." The terms Gram 
Sevak, Village Level Worker* and VLW will be used inter­
changeably herein*
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that he vasts to be their friend and companion 
and then through living examples, help them see 
how they can improve their lives* Today, the 
villagers, though politically free, are still 
in bondage of ill health, Ignorance and Btarva- 
tlon* Whosoever helps them in this struggle 
will be helping the country* What village people 
need most today is a village worker who will come 
to them as a friend* The village worker does not 
work as a specialist in any one aspect of agricul- 
ture or rural development* He is to be a friend 
and guide who helps the villagers weave a new 
pattern of life*! •
Of this comprehensive effort to transform India's 
rural society, the government planners saidt "It would be 
a mistake to view it as a mere economio program* It is 
much more than thatt It is an expression of Democracy*"2 
Thus, the counterpart of Communist China's cadre, India's 
Gram Sevak, was enlisted to help India and its rural masses 
move forward In a joint endeavor, "each complementing the 
other's effort for the promotion of the common objective— 
'The greatest well-being of ths greatest number*' That 
the government placed strong emphasis on the role of the 
VLW was indicated olearly in the outline of ths CDPi "The 
success of the Community Development Program will rest 
primarily upon ths ability of these village level workers 
to mobilise enthusiasm and cooperation of ths people*
The prospects for both the immediate and long range success
„4
n*Manual for Village Level Workers* Community Pro- 
sets Administration,'TTanHingComisaTon, Government of 
ndla (undated), p, 3*
2Ibld*. p* 4*
^Community Projects. A Draft Outline, op* cit^n. 3* 
Ibid** p* 42,
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of India's rural development program may be assessed by 
summarizing, briefly, the role of the Gram Sevak, his 
responsibilities and problems.*
Essentially, the Village Level Worker serves as 
the link between the various specialists, who vork at the 
Block or Project level, and the villagers. He is not the 
equivalent of the agricultural extension offioer in the 
United States who is a professional specialist in agrloul* 
ture, engineering, health or home eoonomios. The counter* 
parts of these officers in India work at the higher, Project 
level. Bather, the VLW is the generalist who has soms 
training in all the facets of rural development and who is 
the communicator between the specialist and the people. 
Generally, the Gram Sevak is a high sohool graduate with, 
perhaps, one or two years of college training. VLW'n are
f
often former exployees of the agriculture department, some* 
times with experience as field men. "At beet the skills 
they possess are ability to interpret the needs of the 
farmers in an agricultural situation and ability to convey 
sdvloe and assistance to the farmers from the Community 
development programs."2 Upon employment the VLW is given 
fairly extensive training in the areas of his responsibility.
The Gram Sevak lives in one of a "circle" of eight
*The analysis which follows is based partly upon 
K. T. Varughose. 'ftn Evaluation of The Training Program for 
Ths Gram Sevak,” (unpublished Ph.D, dissertation, Claremont 
Graduate Sohool, 1957), PP. 77*196,
gIbid.. p, 87.
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to ten villages under his care. He goes from one village 
to the next, from farmer to farmer as he Is able, talking, 
encouraging, giving demonstrations, giving help vhen asked, 
and endeavoring to awaken Interest in villagers in the need 
for ohange. In addition the VLtf works olosely with the 
team of experts at the blook level, continuously extending 
his own technical knowledge. Because of his multiple 
responsibilities the VLW is occupied throughout the year.
• , • When he is not busy with agriculture, he ie 
busy with animal husbandry. When he is not busy 
with either of these, he works with the villagers 
in the sphere of publio health, sanitation, social 
education, improvement of roads, and housing or 
other similar problems.*
Living with the villagers, the Gram Sevak ia able to acquire 
intimate knowledge of local conditions and is able to gain 
e certain amount of trust from the people he serves. This ^ 
is essential, for without the friendship and truet of the 
villagers the VLW is simply an outsider, an agent of offi­
cialdom. The first Program Evaluation of the CDP, conducted 
in the summer of 1953, emphasised the importance of dose 
rapport between Gram Sevaks and villagers, concluding*
• , • The most important ein^Le factor whioh in­
fluences the villagers' knowledge and reactions 
toward the program is the Village Level Worker»
For getting favorable response and cooperation 
towards the program, the VLW'e personality and 
methods of work count more than any other thing.
Hie training ie important* but probably more im­
portant still is his capacity t> understand the 
local situation and his willingness to adapt hi8 
methods and activities to the needs of the dif­
ferent groups la the village.2
1Ibid__ _ p« 02#
— ^Quoted In Ibid## pp# 79-80#
• •
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But the VLW in India, like the cadre in Communist 
China, is in a difficult position, placed as he is between 
those endeavoring to introduce ohangs and those who tend 
to resist change. Even though the VLW is not subject to 
oaprioious shifts in official policy and is not mads the 
constant soapegoat for the failings of his superiors, as
the cadre is, he nevertheless has a somewhat thankless 
assignment.*’ On one side he is confronted by government 
planners, projeot officers and agricultural experts who are 
often impatient to see the results of their ideas in changed
8ooial and eoonomlo practices. On the other side he faoes 
the illiterate, impoverished peasant who is often either 
unwilling or unable to follow different practices.
The Obstacles to Change
Inasmuch as it is a matter of utmost importance to
the problem of improving agriculture and rural conditions
in India, it would be well to clarify the nature of what is
oommonly called "peasant resistance." One of India's fore-
omost rural sociologists, M, N. Srinivas, has succeeded in
*Tor a most illuminating ploture of the dally life, 
the trials, troubles and rewards of the VLW, see S. 0. Dube, 
India's Changing: Vlllanes (Ithlcat Cornell University 
Press,"1958J, appendix 'll. It oontains excerpt9 from the 
diary of a Gram Sevak. The book also oontains several in- 
delve analyses by the author of the Inherent difficulties 
of the VLW's position.
^"Village Studies and Their Significance" in D. K. 
Kajumdar (ed.), Rural Profiles (Lucknowt The Ethnographic 
and Polk Culture Society, lio5), PP. 92-95*
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Illuminating the matter effectively*
Srlnlvas maintains that the Image of the Indian 
peasant as "extremely conservative, pig-headed, Ignorant 
&ad superstitious" and opposed to teohnologloal change just 
out of etubhomess Is unfair and misleading* The problem 
is much more complicated than this conventional portrayal 
suggests* The fact is, says Srlnlvas, that change is a 
very serious matter in any small, highly structural, inter­
dependent social situation such as prevails In India* Thus 
the peasant's hesitancy to ohange is not without reason*
His poverty does not permit any experimentation with methods 
which might fall. And because he is at least familiar with 
his traditional techniques, whereas the proposed ones are 
unknown quantities, his fear of experimentation is quits 
understandable* Srlnlvas points out that the peasant's 
eoolal and cultural institutions give him a sense of se­
curity and permanence, and it is natural that he hesitates 
to Jeopardize these things* It must be borne in mind that 
changing a particular agricultural praotice le not merely 
a teohnologloal matter, but one whloh affects sooial rela­
tions between father and son, elders and youths, superiors 
and subordinates* VLV's have found that there are always 
a few young men in a village willing to alter their tradi­
tional ways, but the older men tend to resist innovation 
and resent "outside intruders*” Because respsot for elders 
Is strong in rural India, and because of the authoritarian
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influence of the joint family and panchayat,* VLV/’e find it 
difficult to lnduoe the younger men to praotloe new tech­
niques.
Moreover, according to Srinlvas, peasants are very 
quick to peroeive subtle, social ramifioations of technical 
innovation. Gram Sevaks have frequently found, he asserts, 
that during lectures or demonstrations of new methods, 
villagers are a jump ahead of them, having calculated the 
impact of a new tool or technique on the village power 
structure before the VLW has finished his sales talk. Thus, 
while the technician Is explaining the superior qualities 
of a new process, the peasant may be pondering the advan-
I
tapes It may place in the hands of the village headman or 
dominant caste. If he then opposes the technique on techni­
cal grounds, It is not because he is stupid, says Srinlvas, 
but because he is intelligent* A major factor in the 
peasants resistance to change is his perception of the 
eooial Implications of Innovation*
One example of this problem bears out the point*
In Rampura, one of the villages studied olosely by Srinlvas, 
the VLW was In the prooess of conducting village meetings 
for the purpose of arriving at some consensus on the “felt
d
needs" of the community* The majority of the villagers 
seemed to feel that a school should be established^' But 
the headman of the village, who was a member of the dominant
^Literally, "council of five*" The Panchayat is, 
in effect, the oounoil of village elders* See Infra* p*245*
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e&Bte and the wealthiest man In the village, wanted a bull* 
dozer for clearing land, and electricity for irrigation 
pump8. A school would eventually disturb the village social 
structure, whereas a bulldozer and eleotricity would benefit 
him Immediately, Because of the delicacy of the matter, a 
compromise project was finally agreed to which did not leave 
either faction enthusiastic. It is not difficult, then 
fore, to see why the VLW was unable to instill "aspiration
and determination in the people to undertake additional
» 1
community improvement proJsets, "
Srlnivas goes so far ae to conclude!
• • • Anyone with experience in village sociology 
knows that there are within every village a few 
keymen whose position in the structure and whose 
intelligence will enable them to exploit every 
ohange to their benefit. And even the lowest 
peasant is quite able to pereelve this exploi­tation,!
The picture which Srlnivas describes is one of an 
lntrioata social system in rural India, complicated by the 
hierarchlsn and authoritarianism of caste. However archaic 
and anachronistic the traditional techniques of Indian 
agriculture may be, they are not simple. On the contrary, 
they are part of a complex, interrelated matrix of economio, 
social, political and religious institutions, and change in 
any part of thle matrix produces repercussions In the entire 
ey8tem. It la little wonder, then, that peasants offer re­
sistance to the government'a inducements to change. Vil­
lagers, Srlnivas emphasizes, cannot be held responsible for
^srlnivaa, op, clt,. p, 95*
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customs which havs gripped India for centuries* Hor con 
they he denounced* Justifiably, for their imprisonment by 
these traditions* They must be understood , then educated* 
persuaded and convinced in the most carefully calculated 
ways, and this will require a very long time*
It should not be surprising, then, that the Com* 
munity Development Program and National Extension Service, 
and the Village Level Worker who carries the major burden 
of implementing them have not produoed a transformation in 
rural India. Village surveys oonducted by 3* c« Dube, 
similar to those of Srinivae, indicated that as of 1937, the 
Community Development projects in villages were still viewed
by the local people largely as some sort of government drive,
%
and not as a vital, democratic movement of the people them* 
selves.1 He noted that although the people expected the 
government to do much for them, they still had a deep-seated
• • t
scepticism regarding its methods and motives*
As the Reserve Bank of India's Evaluation Report 
on the Community Development Program pointed out in 19(31, 
statistical data on the progress of the CDP are unsatisfao* 
tory,2 Before and after data are almost entirely lacking. 
Therefore, any evaluation of the program "has to be quali­
tative rather than quantitative
subjective analysis* nevertheless, even vhlls considering
»3 with all ths risks of
^Dube, on. oit.. p# 84*
2"The 0, D* Program in India,* on* cit.* p* 15*
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the physical Improvements node In schools, roads, veils and 
health eenters, there le little evldenoe to Indicate that 
the CDP and K33 programs have succeeded In substantially 
altering this bleak assessment of conditions in rural India 
made by one of the country's foremost agricultural econo* 
mists In 1954i
* • • • Production [in agriculture] la not com* 
mensurata with the minimum requirements of the 
population* The latter are in a permanent 
state of hunger and mal-nutrltion. The various 
epidemic and endemlo diseases have their work 
simplified by starvation. There has been no 
balance in orop production. The yields of crops 
have fallen and soil fertility has been stabl*
Used at a low level. The ancillary facilities 
for cultivation such as water, manure and equip* 
ment are inadequate even for maintaining the 
current production oanaolty. The methods of 
cultivation are primitive. There has been no 
significant advanoe in the application of tech­
nology to agriculture in spite of advances made 
in the solenoe of agriculture within the country.
The resource pattern of the agricultural popula* 
tlon inhibits any tendency for improvement. The 
incomes of the majority are unstable and below the 
margin necessary for their subsistence. There are 
no alternative or supplementary avenues of gainful 
employment. Therefore, they have been subjected 
to on appallingly low standard of living * , ,*
In some areas of the country, the Community Devel­
opment Program has contributed to significant progress in
improving the conditions deploted by Thirumalal. The Ford... *-•
Foundation, in an evaluation of the program mads in 1951, 
commended the eonospt, reported favorably on the program's 
potential, but conoluded that the CDP's "achievements, while
^S. Thirumalal, Post-Iter Anri cultural Problems 
andLPollcleo in India (Bombay* The Indian Society of Agri­
cultural Economics, 1954), pp. 255-256. The study was 
undertaken with the sponsorship of The Institute of Paoifio 
Relations.
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Impressive, are unevenly distributed, with relatively few 
villages and villagers aeeounting for disproportionate 
shares of the benefits# »1 "nationally," reported the Ford 
Foundation, "the program has fallen short of [the] mark*"
Ironically, the aspect of Community Development 
which has shown the most disappointing results is agricul­
tural production. On the democratic premise that the people
should set their own priorities, and in order to popularise
«the program, the government enoouraged villagers to deter*
#
mine themselves the nature of projects they would undertake# 
The result was that most villagers chose some kind of wel­
fare measure# These were more popular and considerably 
easier to Implement than baslo eoonomio reforms# So little 
voluntary action on agricultural enterprises had been taken 
by 1955 that India was faoed with food shortages and rapidly 
inflating food prices#2 "For an effective solution of the 
food problem," said a special Enquiry Committee, "all out 
efforts to step up production have to be made#?**. In re­
sponse, the government ordered that every effort be taken, 
within the limitations imposed by the democratic approaoh, 
to swltoh the emphasis of Community Development projects 
to agriculture end allied enterprises# It recommended that
^Roots of Chnnrei The Fo^i Foundation in India 
(Kew Tories iue Ford Foundation, p# 15#
2See Ronort of the Foodgralns Enquiry Conmlttee# 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government bx'lnuiu, 
1957, P# 7#
3Ibid.# p. 133.
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VLW'b bp and 70-80 percent of their tine on agricultural 
matters,* But two years later, another evaluation teaa 
found little oause for satisfaction over results of the 
effort to stimulate agricultural output. Said the reporti
Material progress in ths agricultural seotor 
can be judged only by the total increase in pro­
duction, • • , Computations on the basis of thess 
data [ supplied by the Ministry of Community De­
velopment] indicate that the all-India average 
of additional food production in the Community 
Development and National Extension Service Blooks 
comes to only 10,8 per cent, varying in individual 
States from 2,7 per cent to 19 per oent, • , , 
These figures make unhappy reading and merely 
emphasize the need for greater attention to ths 
agricultural sector in our schemes of community 
development,2
That the program does have the potentia^ to bring 
about greater agricultural production is indicated by the 
results of the program in the stats of Andhra Pradesh, It
is estimated that food production there rose 41,4 percent 
between 1951 and 1957,3 The reason, it appears, was that 
this stats led all others in demonstrations of improved
seeds, with a total of 4,748 demonstrations per year per
a
block as against a national average of 847,
*"The C, D, Program in India," op. clt.. p. 15*
2Reoort of the Team for the Study of Community 
Projects anSTliatlonai jixten3lon Service, I, Committee on 
Plan Projects, Government of India, 1957* 71,
_ It should be emphasized that this is at 
best a fair approximation. No information was given in ths 
Evaluation Report to lndloate how the figure was arrived at. 
But the same report admitted that statistical data for ths 
CDP were "unsatisfactory," Nevertheless, ths svidenos 
seemed to be convincing that Andhra Pradesh very substan­
tially increased food production under CDP guidance.
3
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But Andhra Pradesh was the exoeption which proved 
the rule that India's Expression of democracy" in rural 
development had not succeeded in meeting its objectives of 
making India self-sufficient in food, substantially lnoreai 
lng the level of living in villages, or inspiring rural 
people to assume an Important role in their own advancement. 
To achieve self-sufficiency in food is India's most baslo 
need, economically. Yet beoause of population growth, the 
objective of self-sufficiency in food turns out to be a 
moving target. There is the additional faotor that in India 
the bulk of the population is underfed, meaning that small 
lnoreases in food production are quickly absorbed in in­
creased consumption.
Thus, at the end of the Seoond Five Year Plan in 
1961, India was running a deficit in food production of 
approximately two million tons per year, despite increases 
in production.1 At the present rate of growth in population 
and food production, the gap between supply and demand would 
be 28 million tons by 1966.2 The group making this estimate 
warned that unless sharp Increases in production—a minimum
can be realised, India's food crisis 
might well become insurmountable, With respect to the pro­
jected 28 million ton gap, the report commented that "no
of a 5,7 peroent rie
^uha, op. clt.. p» 104,
^Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet 
It. by The Agricultural Production Team (sponsored 
Ford Foundation), Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Min­
istry of Oommunlty Development and Cooperation, Government 
of India, 1959,
by tua
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oonoelvabla program of imports or rationing oan moot a 
crisis of this magnitude. Until or unless tbs Community 
Development Program is able to olose the gap, it will have 
to be Judged as less than satisfactory*
The failure of the government's plan for the too- 
nomlo advancement of rural India by means of eduoatlon and 
persuasion has prompted frequent criticisms of the Indian 
Parliament, as the following excerpts from floor debate2 
illustrate*
A* C* Guhat
While the Ministry (of Community Develop* 
sent Cooperation] has in a way succeeded in 
rousing the consciousness of the rural populace, 
it has failed in ameliorating their economic 
condition. * *
M. D* Upadhyayi
I have walked myself along the 25 mile long 
boundary between a block and a non-block area, 
but I oould not find any appreciable difference 
between the fields on the two sides* * * * In 
the matter of food produotion our plana have 
failed to deliver the goods •
Kanhlyalal Balmlklt
The progress that was expected as a result 
of the Community Development program is not 
visible in our villages* So far as the sched­
uled (lowest] castes, landless laborers and 
others are eonoemed, their condition is not 
improved*
• •
An important factor in evaluating the progress of 
the CDP is the extent of the people's participation in the 
program* Financially, the people's contribution to the
1Ibld.
2Prom "Lok Sabha Debate on Community Development 
and Cooperation Ministry,* Kurakohetra. IX, ho* 8 (May, 
1961), 11-14,
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total expenditure on CD? was 34*9 percent during the Flret 
Plan (1951-1956); It Increased to 40*8 percent between 1956
and 1957; then It declined to 28*4 peroent during the first 
six months of I960.1 "It seems the program has lost Its 
original attraction," said the Evaluation Report* A related 
factor is that of whloh elements in the Tillage participate
most in the construction of Community Projects* The large 
oultiTators, who could most afford to participate both in 
terms of time and money, contributed least*8 Having sur­
veyed the development and achievement of the ODP, the 
Reserve Bank Evaluation Report concluded!
The pace of progress is slow * * * Conditions 
in villages are such and ohanges to be brought 
about are so many that the personnel and the funds 
available are insufficient to speed up the pace 
of progress very muoh* * * » One gathers the im- ■ 
pression of an Inadequately coordinated endeavor, 
government rather than popular in character, and 
sustained more by hope than by achievement.'
The Planning Commission's own evaluation team was 
equally eandld in admitting the failures of Community Devel­
opment to live up to expeotations.
Admittedly, one of the least successful 
aspeots of the CD and NES work is its attempt to 
evoke popular initiative* We have found that 
few of the local bodies at a higher level than 
the village panchayat have shown any enthusiasm 
or interest in this work; and even the panohayats 
have not come into the field to any appreciable 
extent* An attempt has been made to harness 
looal initiative through the formation of hop
lnThe C* D. Program in India," on* clt*. p* 17*
gRePort of the Team for the Study of Community 
Pro.lectB and Rational ^tension op. clt*. pp*43-44.
3Ibld., pp. 17-27.
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bodies mostly with nominated personnel and In­
variably advisory In character. These bodies 
have so far given no indication of durable 
strength nor the leadership neoessary to provide 
the motive force for continuing the Improvement 
of economic and sooial conditions in rural 
areas , , ,x
The team vent on to observe that if the needs and desires of 
a locality were to govern basio decisions on the development 
of rural areas, then some agency or group within the commu­
nity would have to be responsible, 
discover or create a representative and democratic institu­
tion" which will speak for the people and help load them, 
the report concluded, "we will never be able to evoke local 
interest and excite looal initiative in the field of devel­
opment."2 • • •
"So long as we do not
India's leaders, while still talking hopefully,^ 
recognised the shortcomings of the program. The Minister of
Community Development and Cooperation, S, K. Dey, remarkedi
Perhaps our basic mistake is that too muoh 
was expeoted of Community Development in too 
short a time. At first we anticipated a great 
rural awakening. Now we know that we cannot 
make over an entire way of life in a few years.
Thus, those who expeoted speotaoular or even 
impressive results from India's bold experiment in rural 
development through democracy have been disappointed. Talk
4
^ftenort of the Team for the Study of Community 
Projects an3rric.tio;:air Ii.xtc^sloa Scrvi~ca. &■:«' ilt.J p.
gIbld.
^See Excerpts from Nehru's speech on the Draft 
Third Plan in Kurukshotrsu Annual Humber (October 2$ I960)* 
P# 6# A. Quoted in Hoots of Chanro» or), clt»» p* 15«
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of mlraoles, as the Chines* Communists discovered, does not 
produoe miracles* But if the Community Development Program 
Is looked upon modestly as an effort to create a spirit of 
oommon enterprise, and an endeavor to prepare the ground 
for gradual transformation, then its accomplishments deserve 
respect* It has helped to develop wider appreciation in 
rural India, of the need for innovation, as Ensminger has 
pointed out* Onos this spirit of a vast movement is 
achieved. It will be easier for India to overcome the back­
wardness which presently retards her growth* But the culti­
vation of suoh a national awareness requires time, skill 
and broad understanding by those who would accomplish it*
As one observer put it, "What is needed is a widespread 
combination of love, servloe, and oommon sense, but this is 
a rare combination in or out of government* nl
Democratic Decentralization
The response of India's leaders to the failure of 
the Community Development Program to meet expectations pro­
vides some insight into the nature of the Indian ideology* 
The leaders' faith in the validity of the demooratlo approach 
was not shaken. Indeed, their response was that mors democ­
racy was needed. After analysing the shortcomings of the 
program, it was deolded in 1959 that the CDP would be
^Jayaprakash Narayan, "Sarvodaya and 0. D.— 
Identity of Approach," Kurukchetra, Annual Number (October 
2, I960), p* 11* ... ........
243
rejuvenated by Increasing the responsibility of villagers 
for implementing the program's alms* The new polloy was 
oalled "democratic decentralization*" Nehru, reflecting on 
the new policy in a speech in I960** noted that it came as 
a result of the "slow down in the oreatlve energy and 
creative impulse" of the CDP in the late 1950'a* "Then," 
said Hehru, "came the stress on demooratlo decentralization." 
He oontlnuedi
I have no doubt in my mind that this 
perienoe is a revolutionary change in India*
It has changed* it is changing* and it will 
change the whole texture of our sooiety* of 
our thinking and of our actions* * * It is 
the biggest revolution one can Imagine* a 
peaceful revolution* though * * *2
Whether Nehru's high hopes for ths revitalizing 
effeots of democratio decentralization wars justified is 
open to serious question* For however worthy the idea* and 
however valid the concept in terms of long range returns* 
the indications are that "turning responsibility over to 
the people" for Community Development and agricultural 
advancement will not solve ths immediate and urgent needs 
of India for greater food produotion* Ths reason is that 
ths people to whom responsibility is being turned over have 
had virtually no experience in providing leadership for in­
novation* The assumption behind ths government's decision 
to adopt demooratlo decentralization was that village
*Jawaharlal Nehru. "The Biggest Revolution*" 
Kurukshetra. Annual Number (Ootober 2* I960)* p* 6*
gIMd.
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leaders and representatives would support programs for 
ohaage If they were given the dlreot and major responsibil­
ity of implementing them. She Panehayatl Raj* concept, then 
provides a baslo test of whether or not the ldeologloal 
premises behind the Indian approaoh to eoonomlo development 
are viable. If the villagers respond favorably to the chal­
lenge of responsibility* India will have met its greatest 
ohallenge. If not, the whole approaoh may have to be 
radically changed.
By 1961* the great bulk of villages in India had 
been brought into the eoheme of Panehayatl Raj, 
eonslets of three, interlocking Panehayats whioh represent 
the people at the three development level
The system
village* block* 
and dletrlot>—and whioh work in cooperation with Community 
Development officials at the respective levels. The new 
plan gives Village Panehayats greater freedom and responsi­
bility in planning development pro jsots. In addition it 
entrusts to the village oounoil power to determine budget
allocations whioh include village* stats and eentral govern-
*Panchayatl Raj is used interchangeably with 
demooratio decentralisation,
^It is interesting to note that, although the Nehru 
government has taken pride in "development from the bottom 
up" rather than imposing plans from the top* there is no 
evidence of any pressures on the central government or the 
states from the people for greater responsibility in plan­
ning, The decision for democratic decentralization was made 
at the top, on the reoomrnendation of the Team for the Study 
of Community Projects, on. oit., pp, 5-23, Thus* adoption 
of the decentralization policy was, in a sense, a violation 
of the baslo rule that development plans oould be made to 
work only If they were a genuinely "felt need" of the people.
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meat funds, subject to approval of the block level Panohayat, 
The Village Panohayat is elected by the people in the vil­
lage, but thus far no studies have been published to indi­
cate whether the rejuvenated "popular” eounoil is eomprlsed 
of other than the influential elders who have traditionally 
made up the group. It should be borne in mind that the 
undemocratic social structure, the power of the dominant 
caste in the village, and the factionalism of whioh Srinivasa 
Dube and others have written, constitute strong deterrents 
to truly popular representation.
The second tier in the deoentralised framework is 
the Panohayat Samitl, or blook level council. This is "an 
eleoted self-governing body which [has] the entire oharge 
of all development works within its jurisdiction co-extensive 
with the development block. The Panohayat Samitl is com­
prised of representatives eleoted to It from eaeh of the 
village Panohayats, and is thereby responsible to the baslo 
unit. In oonjunotion with blook officers the Panohayat 
Samities have responsibility for coordinating block-wide 
development projects, allocating priorities, and generally 
supervising development at the lower level. This body also 
has the power of approval over village panohayat budgets.
It is thus "a statutorily powerful Instrument of the local 
people's will, whioh should insure that the expenditure of 
resources upon local works conforms to the wishes and needs
^Guhan, on. clt.. p, 81,
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of the looality,"*
At tho dlotrlot level, the people's Interests and 
desires are represented, indirectly, through the Zlla Pari* 
shad. This group is made up of the presidents of blocks' 
Panchayat Samlti, plus the members of parliament in the 
district, and the health, education and development offioers 
of the ODP in the district. The Zlla Parishad has no exec­
utive functions, but exists for the purpose of coordinating 
welfare and development projects throughout the block.
The soheme of democratic decentralisation was not 
conceived as a replacement for the coordinated state and 
union governments' programs of Community Development and 
National Extension, but rather as a supplement. The addi­
tion of Panohayatl Raj was designed to take some of the 
administrative burden off the Community Development officers, 
while at the same time serving as a means of generating 
greater popular support for rural transformation. The 
program, however, has had a mixed reoeptlon, with very vooal 
supporters and orltlos. Although it is too early for any 
final Judgment the plan will not be in full operation 
until the end of 1962—the program has yet to demonstrate 
that it is "changing the whole texture of Indian eooiety, 
thinking and notion" as Prime Minister Nehru expected it
would.
Speaking for the ruling Congress party, the editor 
of the Economic Review, described the rationale behind
1Ibid.
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democratic decentralization In the eonfldent words of one 
who la ideologically committedt
Democracy not only influences the amount 
of initiative exercized by permitting a larger 
number of eouroes to operate) it also influences 
the number of people willing and capable of ex* 
erolzlng Initiative* A large number of peopl 
self-reliant, willing to make decisions—is thus 
both a necessazy oondltion for the maintenanoe 
of democracy as well as a consequence of it • « •
That the Indian villager has to be guided and 
trained to undertake the responsibilities of 
administration is accepted by everybody. Re* 
eponsiblllties create confidence • , .1
In a metaphorloal way, the Minister of Community 
Development and Cooperation, S. K. Dey, explained the aotl* 
vation behind democratic decentralization similarly. Said 
Dey, "A child learns to walk by walking. Ha may bruise 
himself in the process, but there's no other way."^
The oritlos of democratic decentralization have 
been equally artioulete. In a forceful argument against the 
scheme, S. P. Aiyar took to task the baaio premise behind 
it. He asserted that Panohayatl Raj Is the product of a 
specious equation between localism and democracy.^ There 
is no neoessary relationship between the two, Aiyar Insists. 
Where local emphasis Is natural and compatible with democ­
racy, suoh as in England, he agrees that it is useful.
"But this does not mean that looal institutions should be 
created if they do not exist, or used when they are
1Ibld.. p. 84.
^Root3 of Chantre. op. clt.. p. 16.
*
^"Demooratlo Decentralisation In India*" theJBooh* 
PQPilo Keenly lot India)* XIII* Ko* 2 (January 14* 19ol)» 57•
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Incompatible just because they are local*"x Aiyar suggests 
that the whole idea of democratic decentralization is mis­
conceived and based on the erroneous assumption "that since 
the denial of responsibility makes people irresponsible, the 
best vay to make them responsible is to saddle them with 
responsibility*" Whereas this may be valid in societies 
with long experience in democracy, with a great reservoir of 
eduoated people, and a social heritage of equality, says 
Aiyar, it is not valid where these oondltlons do not exist, 
suoh as in India* This is the orux of the argument against 
democratic decentralization*
Moreover, one of India's leading experts in Commu­
nity Development conjured up an equally ploturesque metaphor, 
countering that of S. K* Day, included it ini an artlole
highly orltieal of democratlo decentralization, and published
Said K* S* U* Raman,it in the journal of Day's Ministry*
f
"No doubt you cannot learn to swim without getting into 
water but thanLneither do] you normally throw a weak and 
hungry infant into deep, shark Infested water hoping that 
it will swim and not sink*"2
Thus, while the government strives to invigorate 
rural development through decentralization, argument over 
the policy continues*
XIbld.(HMMSi '
Panohayat Raj No Substitute for Community Devel­
opment," Kurukohetra, IX, No* 5 (January 26, lftol), 27*
2.,
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Gradualism and Gandhism In Land Reform
From the disappointments of Community Development 
and the difficulties of democratic decentralization, it can 
be seen that India has found no easy solutions to the prob­
lem of alleviating the enormous poverty In the countryside* 
Fully realizing that democratic methods are slow, hut cog­
nizant of the value of moving at no faster paoe than the 
people will accept, the leaders of India have operated on 
the premise that gradualism Is sounder than boldness as a 
political approach to economic development* But for all 
its virtues, gradualism has Its drawbacks, and nowhere are 
the problems of India's moderation more apparent than on 
the question of land ownership and land reform* That the 
matter Is basic Is emphasized In this statement from the 
planning commissions
However great the achievements ef the rural 
development program, without doubt the greatest 
challenge for India, as for other Asian countries.
Is how ita land, so scaroe, so precious, B 
to the lives and livelihood of the people, 
most fairly shared and most efficiently used
liehru, who had become an ardent supporter of basic land r
form as early as 1920, was equally pointed In his renarks
on the matter in a speech before the United States Congress,
October 13, 1949s
so vital 
may be 
• *
One of the main causes of social instability 
In many parts of the world, more especially In 
Asia, is agrarian discontent due to the contin­
uance of systems of land tenure which are
*The Mew India, op* clt.. p. 180*
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completely out of plaea In tho modern world* In 
a country of which agriculture Is atlll the prin­
cipal industry* land reform Is essential not only 
for the well-being and contentment of the Individ­
ual* but also for the stability of society.1
But despite this note of urgency sounded by the 
planning commission and the Prime Minister, the government 
of India* In stark contrast to that of Communist China, has 
followed a moderate policy of basic land reform and has 
moved to meet the problem with measures "not as far-reaohlng
p
or as rapid as was hoped and as Is necessary*' This hesi­
tancy to move swiftly on the question of land has led some 
observers In India to call Impatiently for a bolder polioy* 
In a book otherwise expressing loyalty to the Congress 
party which sanctioned It* J* P* Chandra** was orltioal of 
the moderation on land reform* Noting that "the urgency to 
bring about radical and fundamental changes in the land 
tenure system has increased manifold* * Chandra regretted 
that "far-reaching steps have yet to be taken to give the 
farmer social status and economic security* that he so 
rightfully deserved."*
The government of India* however* is confronted 
by what may well be the most complicated and dlfflcult-to- 
reform land system in the world* This factor* plus the
^Quoted in ibid*, p* 182* 
gIbld*. p. 187.
^Indla*s Socialistic Pattern of Society (DelhiI 
Metropolitan Jook' Company Private, Ltd,, lioojV' p* 147*
*Ibld,
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determination of the government to bring about change 
democratically, means that reforms are bound to be slow In 
coming. Although there are dear dangers In moving too 
gradually—particularly the dangers of mounting poverty and 
Insufficient production inoreases—the risks of making evift 
and radical changes are also great, as ths Chinese Commit* 
nlsts discovered. In any oase, the complexity of the land 
problem in India, together with the demooratlo Ideology 
governing reform, has resulted In slow and uneven progress 
In the endeavor to meet "the greatest challenge for India."
The right to own land has been a fundamental one 
for oenturles In India, and this right was firmly Imbedded 
In the Constitution of India In 1949. The problem, so far 
as land reform Is concerned, then. Is not a question of 
whether or not private ownership should be permitted. That 
matter Is settled. The problem Is who should own the land, 
under what conditions, and In what amounts? Before con­
sidering government attempts to deal with these questions 
It would be well to review, briefly, the oomplex pattern 
of land tenure whloh the government Inherited.
Until the end of the eighteenth oentury, the 
major part of India's land was owned by Individual farmers. 
Whether they were large holders or small, the owners en­
joyed "relatively seoure rights to transfer, Inherit, rent 
out or even mortgage land."1 All, however, were obliged to 
pay a land tax, whldh, until various British policies were
1The Sow India, op. clt.. p, 184.
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applied In the eighteenth century, were usually moderate*
An important feature of the pre-British land system In 
India was that a large portion of the land was farmed by 
tenants who* despite their tenant status* also had rela­
tively secure rights of tenure*
In an effort to establish convenient and stable 
means of collecting land tax* however* the British adopted 
various policies in different parts of the country all of 
which had in common the purpose of assuring revenue* but 
which differed greatly in fora and sooio-economie effects* 
What the British created in rural India was a variety of 
''intermediate owners*" a new element between the tillers 
and state* empowered to oolleot what,was called "rent" but 
whloh was* in effect* a tax. In some oases the British 
bestowed upon princes and maharajas the responsibility to 
collect rents from large tracts of villages* giving these 
minor rulers the opportunity of adding to their wealth by 
exacting from farmers higher rents than the state had set*
In many oases* small tillers lost their holdings to larger 
owners as a result* A number of variations of this praotioe 
were adopted in different parts of the oountry.1
But by far the most extensively used version of 
the new landlordism lntroduoed by the British* and the most 
ruinous to the oustoa of small-peasant-proprietorship* was
*See Alak Ghosh* Indlen Economy. Its Nature end 
Problems (Calcutta! The World PressTrlvaie, Ltu** i’&uT* 
pp. lisO-185*
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tha Zamlndarl system.1 "Zamlndar" means "permanent settler"
or simply landlord, and the system vhleh It Imposed on a
major portion of India2 led to most of the depressing and
debilitating effeots generally associated with extensive
absentee landlordism* Under the Zamlndarl system
• • • landlords in most oases were rent receivers 
and did almost nothing for increasing the pro­
ductivity of the land held by their tenants* She 
pressure of population led to gradual extension 
of cultivation and a greater demand for cultivable 
land* As a result of this rent reoelpts of the 
Zamindars progressively increased which gave an 
incentive to the growth of sub-infeudation and 
intermediary interests between the cultivator- 
tenant and the Zamlndar* All this meant that the 
gross rental paid by the cultivator-tenants was 
shared by the state, the Zamindars and a large 
number of middlemen* The landlords grew richer, 
the intermediaries continued to flourish * 
and the cultivator-tenants lived a "hand-to- 
mouth" existence* 3
Moreover, the Zamindars by virtue of their speolal privi­
leges were in a position to break down the rights to tenure 
and inheritance customarily enjoyed by tenants* The effeot 
of this was to reduce scores of millions of Indian farmers 
to rent-oppressed or landless peasants whose poverty in­
creased in direot proportion to population growth and rent 
increases*
• •
These were precisely the eonditlons which prompted 
a minor peasant uprising in Uttar Pradesh in 1920 while 
Jawaharlal Nehru was in the area on a mission for Gandhi*
1£bl£., p. 181.
23y 1947 the system had spread to cover nearly 
half of tho country# yhe New India# op a clt.« p# 184#
^Ghoshi P» 181#
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Having thus been confronted for the first time with the 
oppression suffered by the peasants, Nehru described their 
plight In a moving comment t
1 listened to their innumerable tales of 
sorrow, their crushing and 8ver-growing burden 
of rent* illegal exactions* ejectments from 
land and mud hut, beatings; surrounded on all 
sides by vultures who preyed on them—aamindar' s 
agents, money-lenders, police; toiling all day 
to find what they produoed was not theirs and 
their reward was kicks and curses and a hungry 
stomach* * • * The land was rich, but the burden 
on it was very heavy, the holdings were small, 
and there were too many people after than*
Taking advantage of this land hunger, the land­
lords * * * charged illegal premiums* The ten­
ant, knowing of no other alternative, borrowed 
money from the moneylender and paid the premium, 
and then, unable to pay his debt or even the 
rent, was ejected and lost all he had*^
Kith such conditions as these prevailing in muoh 
of India, the Nehru government oould not have remained pas­
sive, despite its commitment to employ responsible, demo- 
oratlo methods and to respeot the rights of all, rioh and 
poor alike* The government, therefore, recommended both an 
Immediate and a long-range policy to deal with the land 
problem, both of vhloh were incorporated into the First 
and Second Five Year Flans* The Immediate policy consisted 
of a three-pronged approaoh to land reform; (1) abolition 
of intermediaries; (2) tenancy reformf and (3) oeiling on 
land holdings* The long range endeavor was to enoourage the 
praotloe of cooperative farming by individual owners with 
the technical assistance of the CDP and MBS*
The program of land reform has proceeded gradually
* Autobiography* op* clt*. p,. 57*
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not only because the leaders of India are committed to suoh 
a policy, but also because under the Constitution of India 
the power to adopt land legislation rests with the states 
rather than with the Union government* Therefore, although 
the central government has developed a recommended program, 
the burden of conduotlng land reform falls on the states.
In whloh varying conditions determine the pace of progress* 
Moreover, the abolition of the Zamlndarl system Is costly 
to state governments, because the Indian Constitution guar* 
antees just remuneration for confiscated property** Likewise, 
tenancy reform, inasmuch as It involves rent reductions, 
plaoes a financial burden on the states* nevertheless, by 
the end of the Second Five Tear Plan in April, 1951, "most 
of the work relating to the enaotment of laws for the acqul-
t
sltion of intermediary tenures Lhad ] been undertaken and 
intermediaries [had] almost entirely been abolished***2
The major objeotives of tenanoy reform are, first, 
to reduce rents, seoond, to reestablish security of tenure,
*For example, in West Bengal State, the scale of 
compensation is as follows! the Zamindar reoelves 20 times 
the first Re* 500 value} 18 times the next Rs* 500) 17 times 
the next Rs* 1000; 12 times the next Rs* 2000) 10 times the 
next Ks* 10,000; 6 times ths next Rs* 15,000; and 3 times 
the next Rs* 80,000 or part (8s* 100»US$21,00)* The oompen* 
sation is paid partly in cash and partly in bonds* In 
addition, the Zamindar is permitted to retain up to 25 acres 
of agricultural land and 20 acres of non-agrioultural land* 
See Ghosh, op* clt*. p* 182*
2Indla. A Reference Annual* 1951* on.
Included inTlie seoi'lon'"onTaa2 roxora Is a tab!
the progress of the respective states*
clt*, p* 261* 
e shoving
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and third, to help tenants become owners,1 While some 
progress has been made in rent reduction, legislation in the 
various states is uneven, and some have made very little 
progress. More advancement has been made on security of 
tenure, but in this, also, progress is uneven, Zn the 
matter of extending tenant ownership, improvement has been 
especially slow, with few tenants who have been given the 
option to buy land aotually exercising it. The main reason, 
says the planning commission, "is sheer inability to pay,"2 
The recommendation by the central government that 
the states impose oeillngs on landholdings, la order that 
excess holdings could be redistributed to landless farmers, 
has had the least satisfactory results of the three major 
land reform proposals. Actually, there are two recommends* 
tlons on oeillngs, one on limiting future holdings, and 
another on limiting existing ownership. In general, the 
principle of setting a limit on future acquisition of land 
is widely accepted, and by 1961 the majority of states had 
enacted legislation setting these limitations.-* But the 
imposition of maximums on existing amounts of land holdings 
has encountered stiff opposition, mainly, of course, from 
large owners. As a consequence, and also beoause of the 
cost involved, only five states had acted on this reeoaraen-
^For a state-by-state review of progress In 
aohlevlng tenancy reform see ibid., pp, 263-266,
2The New India, op. olt.. p, 183,
^Indla. A Reference Annual. 1961. op. olt..
PP, 266-267,
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dation ten years after it had been made,*
One of the more unusual aspeote of India's post- 
war agrarian reform program is a movement known ae bhoodan, 
Bhoodan means "land gift," and it is an all-India effort to
achieve land redistribution, voluntarily. Founded and led 
by the sage, Vinoba Bhave, one of Gandhi's most devoted 
disciples, bhoodan began in 1951 in the Telangana area of 
Andhra Pradesh, vhere the oppressive Zamlndari system had
Bhave*s2resulted in the severe Impoverishment of peasants, 
approach is to confront landlords with a direct appeal that 
they give land to him for redistribution among the landless, 
Bhave and his followers walk from village to village, and 
from estate to estate in the tradition of Gandhi's satya- 
graha, leading "a movement in keeping with the spiritual 
heritage of India,Bhave asks that the landlords treat 
the landless laborers who work for them as a "sixth son" and 
deed one-sixth of their land for redistribution. The oen- I 
tral government has officially acknowledged the bhoodan 
movement by recommending to the states that they enact laws 
legalizing land ownership changes brought about by Bhavet
*Ibid», p. 267.
pThe Kew India, on, olt.« p, 192,
^Donald Groom, "Vinoba Bhave and Non-violent 
Reform in India," a lecture in Riverside, California,
April 16, 1962, under the auspices of the American Friends 
Service Committee, Groom, a British Quaker, has worked with 
Bhave for a number of years, representing the Quaker inter- , 
est in the movement. He has undertaken a lecture tour in 
the United States and United Kingdom, at Bhave's request, 
to explain and generate interest in bhoodan.
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the majority have complied,1 Moreover, the Planning Com­
mission has recognized the psychological assistance which 
Bhave*s voluntary, non-offielal movement has given to the 
overall effort of land reforms
The movement, by high-lighting anew the Gandhian 
approach of Bocial justice, of the responsibility 
of the privileged to the underprivileged on whloh 
India'8 land reform is based, has unquestionably 
helped to produce a climate of acceptance of peace­
ful and orderly reforms, in keeping with India's 
traditions and its highest hopes,2
Describing the aims of his movement, Bhave saysi
In a just and equitable order of society, 
land must belong to all. That is why we do not 
beg for gifts but demand a share to which the 
poor are rightly entitled. The main objective 
is to propagate the right thought by whloh social 
and economic maladjustments can be corrected 
without serious conflicts,3
Bhave has set a target of 50 million acres of land 
to be donated "so that it may be possible to provide some 
land for cultivation to every rural family."A But after 11
years of sffort, Bhave has managed to acquire only five 
million acres.^ However, the movement has widened its soope 
from the initial aim of winning land for the landless, and
has been expanded to seek donations of entire villages, the 
objective being to establish common ownership of land be­
longing to village residents. This phase of ths movement,
1Ibia.
gTha Hew India, op, olt.. p, 193*
**Indla. A Reference Annual. 1961. on. git., p. 270, 
AIbld.
^Groom, op. elt.....-____ ______ ____ ______ _—
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known as gramdan, has bssn welcomed by the government as a 
significant contribution to ths development of cooperatives 
in rural areas* In an effort to faollltate Bhave's program 
of gram dan, the Ministry of Community Development deoided in 
1958 to give preference to gramdan villages for the intro* 
ductlon of development projects. In addition ths central 
government appropriated some Ha. 2,879*000 in financial 
assistance to bhoodan between 1955 and 1961.* An even 
greater sum has been donated by the states*
Aside from whatever moral and psychological bene* 
fits it may have had on land reform and agricultural devel* 
opment thus far, the bhoodan movement has had negligible 
effects, physically. Few villages have converted to ths 
gramdanc scheme, and so far as the land gift aspect is 
concerned, at ths present rats it will be 90 years before 
the target is reached* Moreover, oritloe point out that 
landlords have a strong tendenoy to donate to Bhave the 
least desirable sixth of their land.** Another problem is 
that the landless who have received land do not have the 
tools and wherewithal to cultivate such land as is arable* 
Recognising this, Bhave has expanded his movement to the 
oltles, seeking donations of money for the purchase of farm 
implements* For a number of reasons, then, bhoodan doee 
not appear to be in itself an immediately practical oontri-
*Indla. A Reference Annual, 1951. on. dt.. 
gIbld*. p. 272.
^Dean, op, clt*. p* 109*
P. 271.
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bution to India's agrarian problem, although It oould con­
ceivably make a significant contribution in the long run. 
Because it so plainly wears Gandhi's mantle and therefore 
enjoys such widespread sympathy, the government has respected 
Shave's movement and even taken it into aocount in eoonomie 
planning. The movement, however, has aotually "made little 
dent in the traditional soolo-eeonomlo structure,"1
It may be ooncluded, then, that immediate progress 
in the implementation of land reforms in India has been 
modest. As the Planning Commission put it, land reform has 
not gone fast enough to meet the nation's needs. One of the 
principal reasons for the laok of success of the program may 
be, as one expert suggests, that the major premise on whioh 
the government's land polloy is based is contradictory,
Vhat the Nehru administration hopes to achieve by agrarian 
reform la "economic effloienoy and soolal equity*"2 By 
economic effloienoy is meant greater inoreases in agricul­
tural production. In sooial equity the aim is to "give land 
to the tiller," reduoe disparities In wealth, provide secure 
ity for tenants, and eliminats exploitation, among other 
things. Although Thirumalal does not assert that economlo 
effloienoy and soolal equity are incompatible, he dose hold 
that oertaln means by whioh the government would achieve 
soolal equity work at cross purposes with economlo effi- 
olenoy. For example!
^■Rolnlck, op. clt.. p. 451. 
2Thlrumalai, op, clt*. p, 260,
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There la a real eonfliot between the current 
measures of land reform whloh propose a celling 
on the land holdings and the objective of effi­
ciency in agriculture which cannot be attained 
without an enlargement in the size of operating 
units* A clear deolsion must be taken on whether 
eoonomlo efficiency should be the dominant objec­
tive or sooial equity?1
In raising this question, Thirumalai has touohed a 
sensitive nerve, for the whole Ideology of independent India 
is based on the belief that this enormously underdeveloped, 
impoverished nation can achieve eoonomlo growth and sooial 
equity, simultaneously, within the framework of political 
freedom* This, in essence, is Sehru's "socialist pattern of 
society." For the leaders of India to make or even propose 
a choice between economic efficiency or growth, and social 
justioe would be an admission of the invalidity of their 
entire philosophy* let, Thirumalai has raised a pertinent 
question* For as he points out, "The land reforms at pres­
ent initiated are more in the nature of measures for sooial 
amelioration* They laok the eoonomlo perspective of effi­
ciency in agriculture*"S In the greater part of India, two- 
thirds of the farms are less than five acres in size, and 
of these the average holding seldom exoeeds two acres.^ The 
amount of Increased output that these small holdings oould 
achieve by Improved techniques is probably considerably less 
than the amounts needed, short of quaBi-meehaniz&tion such
XIbld*. p. 261*
•*The Raw India, op*. cit*. p* 182*
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as that aohleved In Japan. The means for this are nowhere 
In sight In India. It Is therefore quite valid to question 
whether the land reforms thus far recommended and applied In 
India oan succeed In achieving both social equity and eco­
nomic efficiency. The government, while reiterating Its 
belief that the approach Is a sound one, has admitted that 
progress on both objectives has been disappointing.
One indication that India's leaders basloally 
agree with Thlrumalai that Initial land reform programs lead 
to a proliferation of uneconomic holdings Is to be found in 
the nature of the government's recommendation for the long 
range objectives cooperative agriculture. The First and 
Second Five Tear Plans both called for legislation from the 
states to facilitate the establishment of voluntary rural 
cooperatives. Two years before the end of the Second Plan 
the central government created a committee to formulate a 
program nto insure the availability of flnanolal and other 
facilities, technical knowledge and guidance to those who
voluntarily deolde to establish joint farming societies in
Incorporating the recommendations of this„1the country.
committee, the Third Plan urged that 320 carefully planned 
pilot projects of farm cooperatives be established at the
rate of one per distriot. "These proj sots would serve as 
catalytic agents for further expansion and it la expected 
that about 4,000 societies would come into being outside the
^Indla. A Reference Annual. 1961. op. clt.. p. 269.
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pilot areas."1 If this target is to bs met during the 
Third Plan period (1961-1966) it will require a great deal 
more energy on the part of the government and enthusiasm on 
the part of the peasants than have yet been exhibited* For 
during the sixteen year period between 1945 and 1961 a total
of only 3,475 bona fide cooperatives (in which cultivation
»
was conducted jointly) came into being*
The government, in recommending acceleration of 
agrarian cooperatives, emphasised that they should be 
entirely voluntary, and expressed the hope that the bulk of 
cultivators would be those With small holdings* The assump­
tion seens to be that the cooperatlvisatlon of the marginal 
farms would result in the most perceptible rise in output* 
Various inducements were offered by the government to stim­
ulate the cooperative movement, suoh as low cost loans, 
subsidies, and additional technical asslstanoe from the CD? 
and K5S* Also, a National Cooperative Farming Advisory 
Board has been set up for the purpose of promoting the 
cooperation scheme*
But despite redoubling of efforts by the govern­
ment to stimulate the development of agricultural coopera­
tives, the effort has thus far shown little indioation of 
substantial expansion* The Ministry of Community Develop­
ment and Cooperation devoted the entire issue of its monthly
xIbU*
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publication to the problem in July, 1961,* assessing the 
performance of the pilot program begun earlier in the year, 
and projecting on the future outlook for cooperatives. The
consensus was that the future is doubtful, and the primary 
reason was the same as that behind the difficulties which 
cooperativlzation encountered in China* the peasants are 
not enthusiastic. But the important difference is that in 
China, practloally speaking, the peasants had no choice. In 
India they have a choice, and for the most part they choose 
to remain Individual cultivators. Landless farm laborers 
appear to be receptive to the idea, particularly when they 
see that cooperatives may provide more work. But they have 
no land to pool. Even though ownership of land is retained 
by the individual under the India cooperative scheme, the 
government has great difficulty in convincing peasants to 
farm Jointly. With respect to the disappointing progress 
in establishing cooperatives, Daniel Thomer, a foremost 
authority on rural development, has commented*
The suooesa of rural cooperatives presupposes a 
modicum of social equality, political demooraoy, 
and eoonomlc viability among the villagers.
These preconditions have not been present in 
[village ] India and still are not present to­
day. ... What le happening in India today is 
that the cooperatives are being asked to oreate 
their own pre-conditions, to reconstruct vil­
lage society so that the ordinary peasants can 
make effective use of the cooperative method. 
This ie too muoh to expect. To rush ahead 
prematurely with cooperatives is to invite
*See Kurnkahetra. IX, No, 10 (July, 1961), 
also X, No. 3 (Uece^oer, 1961), 3-15.
See
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failure and give cooperation a bad name.^
Thus, neither the Immediate program of land reform 
nor the long range program of cooperatives at present offer 
India's leaders much cause for satisfaction* Considering 
the monumental nature of the problem and the limitations 
upon it, the government has probably done as mueh as it 
could reasonably have been ezpeoted to do in this vital 
matter of land. But despite the effort and the aooompllsb»
and they are significant—the 
government of India and its leaders have not found a solu­
tion to the multiple problems of agricultures low yield, 
insufficient production. Inadequate techniques, poverty 
breeding poverty, wide disparities in land holdings, and 
uneconomic farms.
mants which have been mad
It is not because they are lmperoeptive to the 
problem and its many ramifications that India's leaders have 
failed to find an Integrated program promising an ultimate 
solution for agriculture. The Planning Commission has seen 
it very clearly, as this sober oomment bears outs
The future of land ownership and cultivation 
constitutes perhaps the most fundamental issue in 
national development. To a large extent, the 
pattern of economio and social organisation will 
depend on the manner in which the land problem is 
resolved. Sooner or later, the principles and 
objectives of the polloy for the land, oannot
^"Context of Cooperatives in Rural India." The 
Economic Keehlr (Mew Delhi), XIV, Nos. A, 5 and 6 (FeTTruary, 
19027, 259-2O0. Thomer is Director of Studios, Eoole 
Pratique dee Hautes Etudes. VIerne Section, Soienoes Econo- 
miques et Sociales, The Sarbonne.
2 66
but influence policies In other sectors as well.*
The difficulty is baeloally in the magnitude of the problem. 
Were it not for the immensity of the poverty and population 
with whloh it has to oope, Indians progress in bringing about 
rural development through democracy might well have been 
impressive. The accomplishments of the Community Develop* 
ment Program, the National Extension Service, the abolition 
of the Zamindari system, and reforms on tenanoy are not mea* 
ger in themselves. They are simply slight when considered 
against the enormity of what remains to be done. Putting it 
in a more positive tone, a veteran Community Development 
officer saidi
We have olimbed the first few steps of a 
long and steep stairway. For oountries at the 
top. it may eeem little enough. But for us at 
the bottom, it's momentous progross.2
Equally aware of the immensity of the challenge, 
but equally positive. Shrlman Narayan, General Seoretary of 
the Congress party, gave notice that India's ldeologloal 
seal has not been appreciably diminished when he declaredi
march ahead with full faith.We must .• •
in our Ideals and objectives. Destiny has en* 
flowed us with a heavy but sublime responsibility. 
India has to show the world that [in development] 
the path of peace, non-violence and democracy is 
quicker and nobler than the path of confliot. 
violence and authoritarianism.'?
. .
Narayan Included these words in a party traot written in
1Quoted In Chandra, op. clt.. p. 146.
9Roots of Change, op. clt.. p. 52.
^India and China (New Delhit All India Congress 
Committee, Ti&Oj,' p.~£o. __ ____ ___
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1954 in an effort to ebore up India's eelf-oonfidenoe at 
a time when China's apparently rapid strides were gaining 
the world'8 and India's attention* The burden which India 
carries in an effort to demonstrate that a tremendously 
backward country can develop its economy and erect a welfare 
state within the framework of an open, demooratio political 
system is very heavy, indeed* Sarayan did not promise that 
development would be rapid, only that it would be "quioker 
and nobler" than the totalitarian approach. Few people in 
India or in the democracies would doubt that India's system 
ia nobler than China's* But in 1954 not very many were 
saying that it would be quicker* By 1961 it appeared that 
harayan was right on that soore also*
CHAP2KH GEVEH
Comparative Achievement* Gliina und India 
After a Decade of Development
Because of the unavailability of much official 
data and the unreliability of what data was available at 
the end of t3io Gro ;t leap Forward, it i3 not possible to 
make an exact comparison of specific indices) of the Chi­
nese .'ind Indian econoraion after a decade of development*
It ia possible0 howeverf to evaluate a number of reliable 
OGoond-ry aouroea on th3 ut te of the Chinese economy, and 
to oopii.ilo a reasonably accurate record of its condition, 
1959-1961* This, in turn, can bo examined alongside data 
reflecting the ciroumat neon in India at a comparable 
point of development, thus permitting ©one oonoluoiono con­
cernin': the rsl .tivo aceonpliahmonta of the two syotono* 
After core thm a dcoade of Communist rule the 
n ti until economy of China wna in critical oendition by 
1959* She principal f»otor contributing to this state wae 
that the Con uniat© h ,d failed in their program© for the 
development of agriculture* In the ease of China, ideolo­
gy had superseded reason, and Mao Toc-tung, whose earlier 
realisation cf tho fundamental need to solve the problem 
of agriculture had formed the basic of the successful Com­
munist movement, waa confronted with on agrarian crisis as
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gror.it as the ono which had existed twelve ye o*a before.* 
The indict tore of this crisis v.ero ei&ply too 
obvious to be ignored or hidden* targot;a for agricultural
Oproduction in I960 had not boon not;*" the government could 
not m.iko the annual payment on its debt to the Soviet 
Union in 1959* whloh was normally paid in agricultural 
commodities^ in the oighteon months preceding May, 1062* 
the regime was forced to spend some 8600 raillicn to buy 
food from <broadi^ Hong Kong Chinese shipped food to rela­
tives on the muinl nd during 1961 at a rato of two million 
pound.; per month* compared v:ith a total of loos than four 
million i-oundo for all of I960* and only 870,000 pounds 
for 1959iJ malnutrition among coal miners resulted in 
shortages which caused a decline in stool production ecti- 
m .tod at 3*000*000 tono during 1961;** 
during the winter of 1561 wore sufficient only for patch­
ing old cloth* the customary padded clothing having almost
cotton doth rations
York Tines* October 1* 1961*
*Tfo.v Yorh Times, January 15, 1961*
3Peggy DurUn, "Peiping*a Agriculture* A Ho- 
sounding Pilure," Porel.-n Policy Bulletin* XL, Ho* 17* 
(Hew XorX* May 13* I^uJJYu*
^Albert R -venholt* Tho Human Price of China*a 
Disr-.ntroue Pood ghort ■:a, American Universities pie id 
vJt.u.i’ Reports, k-y, "iy&-* p* 2*
^ITov Yorl: Timoa* Do comber 13* 1961*
g
How York Times, December 4* 1961,
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disappeared from the a irketu;* reduction.? in food rations? 
brought tho rice allotment in Shanghai down to 13 pounds 
i>or person per month irt Dcoembor, 1361, tho lowest level 
oinco 7/Ox-ld War IX, while moat virtually disappeared from 
tho diet.2
So serious v/rto tho economic condition of Commu­
nist China in 1961 that tho regime oould neither ignore it 
nor explain it a-.r?y* But nlneo an admission of error would 
reflect adversely on tho highest loader??, it had to be pre­
sented in mild tanas* Liu Shao-chi in a speech on June 30, 
1961, celebrating the fortieth annivers ary of tho Commu­
nist P arty, made the admission, but characteristically 
cleared tho responsible figures, and sounded the call for 
gi’c tor iloolngioal solidarity I
During tho 3ig leap Por.v rd of tho last three 
yo =.ra we h vo h d tremendous achievements, and 
the gonor >.l line raid v rioun specific policies 
and xaeaouroy have all been adopted* 
o-oao time, there also have been .>uite a few 
shortcomings in our work -which, together with 
the serious natural calamities of tho two nuo- 
cewaive years h ive given rice to tein,or'ry dif­
ficulties • • • [Out ] we are fully confident 
th :t under the leadership of tho oontral oom- 
mitteo of the Party headed by Comrade Hao 
Ssc-tung iind luiaoi* the guidance of tho throe 
rod b nncra [the general line, the Dig Loup 
Forward, find the people*a communes], the whole 
Party and the v/hoio people will surely unite 
an one, cveroorae tom., .or ary difficulties 
continue our triumphant march forward*•*
At the
and
" York Times* Dvoombor 13, 1961*
2Ibid.
5Eoprinted in "Qu rtorly Chronicle and Documen­
tary, » China Qu-rtorly* Bo* 7 (July-Septombor, 1961)* P* 164
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Natural disasters had caused damage, but the Chi­
nese Communists had only themselves to blame for a major 
share of the food oriels which gripped the nation at the 
end of the Great Leap Forward. The basis of the problem 
seemed to lie in the ideology of power* This demanded that 
China industrialize rapidly and that it demonstrate in a 
relatively brief time that it could match the heavy in­
dustrial might of 3ome of the major world powers.* 
who had perceived in the 1020'a that China*a basically 
agrarian economy made solution of agrarian problems funda­
mental, had somehow determined by the mid 195G*a that 
heavy industry was more important and that this should re­
ceive first priority. This meant that agriculture would 
h.ivo to subserve the interest of heavy industry. In 1958, 
during the first year of the Second Five Tear Plan, the 
slogan became, "Heavy industry la the fundamental goal and 
the basis of the national economy." But, actually, the 
primacy of heavy industry had boon established in 1953 
with the inauguration of tho First Five Year Plan, al­
though it was not until later in the deoado that a deci­
sion to make a "big push” for industrialization prompted 
the Great Leap Forward. When the Communists published a
Liao,
*Supra, pp. 140-141.
2Burdin, on. cit p. 9* This contrasts sharply 
with Liao’s declaration in ah article, "Our Economic Poli­
cy" published in 1934, that "agricultural produotion ranks 
first in our economic oonstruotion." Translations from 
Bod Flag;. JPRS Document #6700, February 3, 1961.
•»
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summary of the First Plan in August, 1955 in book form and 
circulated It for public consumption agriculture was not 
even mentioned in the list of five major priorities.* 
ing Mao Tee-tung. the statement said. "Without industry, 
there can be no solid national defense, no people's welfare, 
no national prosperity and no power.
If we are to raise China's national eooxw 
omy from a state of backwardness to that of 
the best modern technique, if we are to put 
Chinese industry, agriculture and transport 
on a technical basis, we have to build new 
industrial equipment ... That is why the 
First Five Year Plan mainly oonoentrates on 
industrial capital construction, with heavy 
industry as its oore • • .3
But the Communist leaders were still aware that
Quot-
It continued!
agricultural production was the key to industrialization, 
however much heavy industry may have been favored. For. 
as Li Fu-chun, chairman of the State Planning Commission.
• -a :
noted in his "Report On the First Five Year Plan." in 1955.
1American Consulate General. Hong Kong, 
of First Five Year Plan." Current Background #358
"Summary
_________________ . Septem­
ber 19. 1955. p. 2. There are several curious aspects of 
the First Plan that should be noted. For one thing, the 
Plan was not actually submitted to the National People's 
Congress for formal approval and adoption until July. 1955. 
some two years after it was supposedly in operation. (See 
Current Background #346). Then, even though it had been 
adopted, the Plan was not presented in detail, nor was it 
published in detail, only as a "summary." (See Current 
Back ground #358J From this it may be concluded that 
china's First Five Year Plan was not so much an exaot or 
oarefully formulated program with specific figures and 
targets as it was a set of principles and priorities, som 
what loosely presented.
9 'cFlrst Five Year Plan For Development of the Ra­
tional Econo ay of the People*a Republic of China la 1 
f [Peking: iorelan Languages i'resa. lstfab). pT ll.
’iiia. .............
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"The development of agriculture ia the basic condition for 
ensuring the development of industry and the fulfillment 
of the entire national economic plans,"* 
thiB( no a commentator on Li*a report observed, wore ^uite 
simple:
She reasons for
• • • Agriculture will not only have to supply 
the whole nation with grain but will have to 
am ply diverse kinds of Industrial raw mater­
ials. ikJiufaotured goods made of farm products 
account for over 50 percent of the total output 
Value of industry for China* • • • If, simul­
taneous with our development of heavy industry 
and the building of the foundation for socialist 
industrialisation, agriculture ia not oorroe- 
pondingly developed in ouch a way as to meet 
the needs of industrial construction and the 
living standards of the people, it ia impossible 
to realise industrialization of the country,2
She analyst went on to point out that until such time as 
China*a industry was o pablo of producing lta own indus­
trial neede, it would be necessary to purchuso eaoential 
products from abroad. Chore was no other major source 
them agriculture from which to obtain the purchasing power 
needed!
If, for instance, we export 2,000 catties of 
dried eggs we on obtain 20,000 oattieo of gaso­
line} we can exchange 2,000 catties of raw silk 
for rails for two kilometers of railway} we o m 
exchange 10.000 tons of fiue-oured tobaooo for a 
complete set of machines of the same scale as
*Chnng Tjin-ohih, "The Role of Agriculture in 
Socialist Construction," Politicvil Study. No. 9, Septeffl- 
ber 15, 1955» in Extracts iFro/s China Mainland Ha,"azinc.
No. 10, American fconsul -W General (Hong Long, huVtt.su or 28, 
1955), p. 39*
L?Ibld.
■■ ll I I MU
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the machines of the Anohan Seamless Tubing Mill**
In view cf this eminently reasonable understand­
ing of agx*ioulture’s primacy in the Chinese eoonomy in 1955. 
why did the Communist leaders refuse to state plainly in 
the First Five Year Plan that agricultural development 
should receive firot priority* and why did they determine 
in 1953 to make on all-out drive for a Great leap Forward 
into industrialization? If the answers to these two ques­
tions could be found they would throw considerable light 
on the oauses behind China’s tremendous economic failures* 
Actually* the absence of any mention of agriculture 
in the top five priorities of the First Plan is somewhat 
deoeptive because, even though it was not given emphasis in 
public pronouncements* the increase of agricultural produc­
tion was a major premise of the Plan* Nevertheless, budget 
figures releaood by the government covering the years 1953- 
1954 make it quite apparent that the regime was ideologi­
cally committed to the primacy of heavy industry from the 
beginning cf planned development* In the 1933 budget* ex­
penditure on light and hoavy industry oombined amounted to
approximately 20 poroont of the total, whereas that on agri-
2culture amountod to only about ten poroont. In the 1954
^Ibld.
2Percentages computed by the writer on the basis 
of figures of monetary totala given in Teng Hsiao-plng, 
Minister of Finunoe, "Report on the 1954 State Budget at 
the Thirty-first Meeting of the Central People’s Govern­
ment Council," June 16, 17* 1954* released as Supplement 
No. 204 (Hong Kong, June 24, 1954) of the New China News 
Agency* It should be noted that the outegory "agriculture* 
also included forestry and water conservancy.
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budget tho outlay for Industry ro30 to approximately 22
percent of tho total, whereas that for agriculture dropped 
to approximately five percent.^ From this it muy be con- 
oludod that even though the Gomciuniuta rnoognisod the de­
pendency of Industry on agriculture, ao Li Fu-ohun noted, 
they refuood to see the necoaoity of firot developing
agriculture. Father they docidod on a policy of circuital 
noouo development, but with agriculture subserving the 
interests* of industrialisation. However, inasmuch no in­
dustry was being alloc .tod r.oro than four timeo aa much ae 
agriculture in the national budget of 1954, it could hard­
ly bn claimed that induatry and agriculture were being 
"correspondingly developed" ao Li Fu-chun had inpliod they 
ohould have been.
The moot plausible explanation for tho Conaau- 
uictu* inuijtcnoo in the First Plan upon the primacy of in­
dustry, whoa their own experts made plain the dependency 
of industry on .agriculture, would ocom to lie in tho power 
idoology of liao and its siniloxity to that of Stalin. It 
probably is not mere coincidence that oven after revela­
tions made by Krushchev in hie August 1953 speech dealing
with the serious shortcomings of Stalin*a strategy on the
2relationship between agriculture and industry, tho lead
^v7. Rostov", F.ioh-„rd 17. Batch, Frank A. Kicr-
mon, Jr., and Alex :nder Eoknteln, T\o Procrhccta for Commu­
nist China (Cambridgei Technology Prose oi' 
i-P . ig'9 .
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editorial in the Polling pcolo*c; Dally of Hovombor 25# 
1955# woe a p;iraphraso of Stalin* a policy of the late 
I920*oi
Socialism cannot be established on t ;o entire­
ly different and contradictory foundations# one 
of which ia a great# progreouive Socialist in­
dustry, the other being a backward economy of 
nnjcll peasants that frequently promotes capi­
talism • • #1
Shia declaration provides considerable inaight into the 
early Chinooe decision concerning the primacy of Industry 
find the subordination of agriculture and the subsequent 
decisions to undertake the socialization of agriculture 
and the Great leap Forward• All of thorn follow logically
from Uno*o ideology of power# which bears a "distinct fami- 
ly resemblance" to that of Stalin. The close parallel 
between tho ideology of Liao and Stalin was strongly empha­
sized in a booklet written in 1955 by Chen Fo-ta#^ one of 
tho loading Chinooe Communist theorists and editor of tho
Party*a ideological Journal# Pad Flag. Chon wrote*
... Blare ia only one path for Ciiina to take# 
that is# the • • • path pointed out by Comrade 
Stalin in 1927 • » • Basing himself on and de­
veloping Comrade Stalin*a revolutionary line# 
Conr alo Mao Iso-tung has guided our oountry on­
to tliie correct path. It in a path which has 
enabled our people to give scope to their inex­
haustible vitality and which will lead our 
oountry to prosperity and boundless power#
Quoted in ibid.# p# 129*
^Stalin and gho Chinooe Revolution (Peking* For­
eign Languages proas# 1954)# pp# •
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Shun ( Uao had determined f ua Stalin had before, 
that if power v?aa to bo achieved it would have to bo in 
term a of heavy industry* 2ho First Five Year Plan* there­
fore, reflected the priority of induotry, no did tho bud­
gets of 1933 and 1934* But ao Uao admitted in 1957, nVh 
etill lack experience Lin eoononio development] and neod 
to get noro."^ But ho made it clear that ho wusj seeking 
to find chert cute*
To had no experience to ot u*t with in revolu­
tionary work either, and it w.*.a only after wo 
h id t-ken a number of tunbloo and learned our 
le con that wo won nation-wide vlotory. T/hat 
-'O muat do now ic to cut tho tine we take to 
C in experience in' economic construction to 
Ioju than it tock ua to get expui’ionoo in re­
volutionary work and not pay such u high j.rioe 
for it. u'3'11 have to pay come aort of price, 
but we hope that it will not be ao high ac 
that paid during the revolutionary period*2
By 1957 when Kao wrote tho ubove, it was all too 
apparent that tho Comnunlotu lacked experience in cconosrdo 
planning, for 1957 eaw a sharp doolino in tho rate cf 
growth in tho national economy. Moreover, it was soon to 
buoomo ole r that the Cocrxwlsto v;ould suffor "a number of 
tumbles" in eoononio matters junt uo they had o rlior cn- 
ccuntored difficulties ns revolutionaries, Finally, with 
tho failure of tho Grout Leap Forward tho Chinese Comr.u- 
nieto took the biggest tumble of all and found that the 
price for their ideologioully-oauaed economic miatakeo was
*0n tho Correct n-.adlin/g of Ccntr dictions Among
tho Poo, lo. o | £* # WO#
p, 64.
> •
2lbi\ • ,
I
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▼ery high indeed.
A Japanese economist specialising in Chinese de­
velop. B*ent, IJobaru Isuohii, has conducted cone reaoarch 
which reveals ceriouo wcoknesoes in the Chinooe economy 
find which hoi pa to oxplaln some of the roue one behind the 
decision to try a great leap* Noting that Ban economy io 
not normal Lor healthy] to the extent that it has economic 
fluctuationo,"^ Noboru indicates Conmunist China*o economy 
hao a strong tendency to oovore fluctuations, ao the fol­
lowing figuroa indicate*
Fluctuations in the Eoonony of Communist China 
(Comparison of rates of growth of the various 
sectors of the national economy)2
1953 1954 1055 1956 1957 1953 1959
14.0 5.7 6.5 14.0 4.2 54.0 21.6
Agricultural Production 3.1 3.3 7.7 4.9 3.5 25.0 16.7
30.2 16.3 5.6 20.2 11.4 66*2 39.3
23.9 20.5 3.7 5.7 7.9 34.3 7
04.0 13.0 3.0 59.0 7.0 93.0 24.5
22.0 19.6 0.5 26*0 14.4 39.0 42.0
25.2 4.7 29.0 -1.1 -3.0 23.2 7
25.3 3.6 1.1 33.2 4.4 134.1 ?
Other Workers & Clerks 15.3 3.0 1.4 27.0 1.1 04.9 ?
Average Wage
Personal Income
Induetrial Production
National Income
Investment
B.It. Proiglit Loading
Trade
Induotrial Workero
11.2 4.6 2.9 14.2 4.4 3.0 7
The two moot import .nt observations that may be 
made from the no data arc, first, that the Chinese eoonony
^■"An Analysis of the Economic Growth* Background 
to the *£o&p Forward Movement,•» Ekafue Taushin, No. 229 
Tokyo, May 21, I960, translated in tocumon’t #6751,
February 14, 1961, p, 53*
2Soken from ibid., p. 54. Noboru*a figures are 
hie own adjustments from 'data released by the Statistical 
Bureau of Communist China* There la, of necessity, a cer­
tain am. unt c£ educated guessing which goes into the use 
of statistics dolling with the Chinese economy. The data 
In the table, therefore, should not be accepted us hard 
figurea.
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under Communist planning hac been narked by abrupt rlseo 
iini declines In growth rates, and, second, that the eco­
nomy suffered a serious set-back in 1957, the year before 
the introduction of the "great leap" policy* Sharply con­
tradicting the Indian economist, H* C* Gupta, who hud mar*- 
v-eled in 1953 at trie “steady and spectacular* growth. of 
the Chinese economy and the "systematic and orderly plan­
ning* of the Chinese,* Hoboru concluded:
In view of the fact that tha socialist 
economy is bacod on the principle of plan­
ning, we con infer from the fluctuations in 
the economy ci Communist China that the level 
of planning ia low, that the lowness of the 
degree of planning indicates that there are 
many elcnonta which cannot be encompassed by 
the n .tionul eeoncRio plans, nni that those 
elemntn ,ira impeding b il '-need and normal 
growth of the economy of Communist China* 
though it ia oont ended that such el omenta are 
oapit iliotio and liber 1 in nature, we suspect
low level of
Al—
that they are duo also to the 
auction in Communist China*2
pro-
One might add that politically-motivated, abrupt 
oh ngos in eoonomio policies such as tho cooparativiza- 
tion, collectivisation and oommunlnation of agriculture, 
•with their attendant social find p3yohologioal dislocations, 
also would constitute "elements which impede bal'vncod and
At any rate, Hoboru*anornil growth of the economy** 
findings, approximate though they may be, tend to discre­
dit tho view that the firmly controlled, oontrally gov- 
eraod regime has the advantage of being able to conduct
*Soo supra* p. 205* 
2JJoborut Op* cit*» p* 55*
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scientific , oystematio and orderly economic planning. Al­
though this theory nay bo oorroct, the Chinese h ive yet to 
provo it. It may well be tlv.it the cumbersomet dogmatic 
ideology of liao, based on the power concept, is such as to 
&o?Q than offset the advent ■•.go a for planning which are sup­
posed to accrue to a highly contrail sod et to.
With respect to tho reasons behind the big push 
introduced in 1953, Noboru concluded that "the main eco­
nomic reason for launching tho Croat Leap Forwurd Movement 
in 1958 i*nd 1950 ueems to bo the crisis brought about as a 
result of the recession in 1957The political implica­
tions cf tho recession of 1957 were as serious ar, the eco­
nomic, because 1957 w .s the last year of tho First Five 
Year Flan, and for it to end on a charp decline in tho 
economy w »a a serious reflection on the Party and it3 poll— 
oioc. A spectacular demonstration of. growth w.-io needed 
both for economic and political reasons* Tho Communist 
leaders determined that the Second Five Year Flan should 
achieve on immediate and suet .ined increase in growth, 
honcc the communes and the policy of tho Grout Leap For­
ward. One of the major objectives of tho new speed-up was 
to accelerate greatly China's industrial output* The slo­
gan booamo "overt..bo find nurpass Britain in Steel produc­
tion" which the Communists vowed to do "possibly in ten
^IMd P. 57.•I
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and certainly in fifteen yoara."^ Thic io very likely the 
reason behind the ill-fated backyard blast furnace drive 
of 1958, ao veil as the explanation for the eonaunization 
of agriculture* As Sillnun Burdin conraonted in a dispatch 
fron Hong Kong to the Hcv? York Tlr.oat
The gruolling totalitarian performance 
of 1958, with its regimented, aimo.;t around- 
the-clock toil for tho 650,000,000 mainland 
Chinese, is paying off in what will surely be 
the biggest one-year achievement record the 
Cofamuuist rogireo has been able to register 
winoe it was established in 1949*2
Although he quoted foreign obosrvers an believ­
ing "that in contrast with tho relatively Tollable final 
statistics of previous yore, [the 1953 estimated] are in­
flated to tho point of absurdity,* Durdin nevertheless in­
die -tod th >.t most observers expeotod Communist China*a
• this year will bo impree- 
cive and if continued through the present Piv3 Year Plan 
eventually will put tho country among important industrial 
powers*"^ If they are reasonably accurate, Hoboru’s data 
for 1953 show that China’s production and rate of growth 
wero indeed impressive in the first year of the Great Leap* 
But it la significant that on all indioes other than rail 
freight loadings, tho figures for 1959, v;hero they are 
given, show a severe decline from 1953* In othor words.
production "in all fields • •
^Tow York glnos* Soptombor 23, 1953* 
::I;.).1.3*
3isa.
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the Great Leap Forward had already resulted In a "tumble" 
In lto eeoond year, although the Tull magnitude of the 
f:\ll was not to become evident until many months later.
In contrast to the economic realities of 1959* 
the Chineoo Connunicta put out a opocir.il publication in 
that year, hailing the acoc-apliahmontc of the Groat Leap 
Forward and exclaiming that the Second Five Year Plan 
(1953-196 :) had boon achieved in t'-’O yearn* 
munis Osx
Said the Con-
In 1959* China*o 650 million people un­
der the brilliant leadership of the Chinese 
Con umist Party and Chairman Jiao Ssc-tung, 
high in spirit and firm in determination, 
achieved a better, more all-round big leap 
forward in the national economy on the basis 
of the big lo ip forward in 1953* Duo to the 
continuous big leapa made in 1953 and 1959*
Your Plan (1953-1962) for thethe Second, Five 
dovelo.-ncnt of the national ooonoiay has been 
triumchant ly fulfilled throe years ahead of 
time.1
"Shis great victory," it was pointed out* "is due to the 
Chinese Communist Party*3 general lino for the building of 
socialism, the big lo p forward* the people* 3 commune a and
Othe to.aching of Mao Too-tung."4" 
wno otill the major objective of tho "greater, faster* 
hotter" drive* tho publication noted that "on tho basis of 
tho continuous leap forward*" China w.ia "striving to oatoh 
up or eurpaso Britain within ten year3 in tho output of
Indio .ting that induotry
*Thc See end Fi vc-Yo nr PI an Fulfilled in T-Q 
Yenrr'g Facts on tho’ i)ov-6~lo,.-z.isnli"’oJ the ITatlon.: 1 Economy
'i:i l'JU'J I'pjkln. A ’ Foreign TSifauafijtt ’fcrosa*' ISfrOl« p* 1*
2Ibld.. pp. 1-2#
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oajor industrial producta."* But gradually* the Chinese 
Communists realized that instead of a "continuous leap* in 
1959 there had been an abrupt "tumble* from the Great Leap 
of 1555*
Failure of The Grout Leap Forward
First* the regime was forced to admit in August* 
1959 that the figures for agricultural production in 1953 
had been grossly inflated and that targets for 1959 
would h,ve to be scaled down accordingly. Then* in the 
spring of 1959* a widespread food oriole developed* which 
became so serious that the Ministry of Agriculture conduc­
ted an investigation and concluded that "the shortage of 
foods has net bean mitigated*"** 
confirmed by on editorial in the June 11* 1959 issue of 
the Peking Psot lo*o Dally which urged the farmers to "cul­
tivate every available bit of land*"* She reference to 
planting all available land wao an urgent reversal of IIao*a 
onll surlier in 1959 for a planting oyctora to be adopted 
whereby "one-third of land 3hould be used for growing
Shat this was true wao
p* 5#
2
Cunra* pp, 160-161*-
^"Agricultural Problems in Communist China," 
A.liu Konkya. No. 226* Tokyo, July 19* i960* translated in 
JPilS jDocuj-'icnt #5415* September 1* I960* p* 6*
4Ibid.
•f
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Crops, another one-third to be left Idle ond the remaining 
one-third for greening the landscape. 
ly been oo impressed with the doubling of food production 
in 1958, which he thought had taken plaoe, that he indioa- 
ted it was time to give some of the land a rest. By the 
time the Party loaders realised that the 1958 figures wore 
erroneous and ©ailed for the planting of all land* it was 
too l.ta. Experts in Hong Kong estimated that food grains 
production in 1959 foil below the revised figures of 1953 
by at least 50 million teno, despite Communist claims of a 
20 million ton inoreaoe.^ Hoaoons behind the decline in 
output of 1959 were* "drought* floods* difficulties with 
the communes and the reduotion of planted aoreag©*"4 
These same experts predietod a further decline in I960 pro­
duction over that of 1959*
Early in I960 the Chlneoe Communists reversed 
the proviouo policy of top priority for industry and adop­
ted a now policy and slogan which confirmed both that 
agriculture vns in serious trouble and that the deoisicn 
to go all out for induotriaUzation had boon wrong. The 
new policy was that "agriculture is the foundation of the
Kao had apparent-
*Ycn Tu-kai* "launching Large-Area High-Yield 
Movement," Red Pl.‘g, No. 12* Poking* November 16, 195-3* 
translated in J1R3 Bc-cunont #7836* May 17, 1961, p. 78.
2Ibid.
*jfcw York Times. August 7* I960.
4Ibld.
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national economy,"^ and the new slogan beo.use, "the whole 
Party und the -whole people go in for agriculture in a big 
way.*2
Statistics in I960 wore difficult to obtaint and 
those which were releaoed were at variance ?>'ith known con­
ditions in the country* But a number of events and actions 
by the Party in I960 and 1961 served to indicate that 
China by then was in the throes of an extremely sorioua 
economic crisis, the moot severe aspect of which was a 
prolonged food short:ge. The Party*a publication giving 
the new lino on agriculture gave heed to the food crisis 
with this comments
While agriculture is the foundation of 
the national economy , grain must be made the 
key lovor in agricultural development. "Pood 
ia the first necessity of the people," as the 
saying goes, and grain is a treasure of trea­
sures. It ia the basic of the growth of the 
various branches of agriculture. She liveli­
hood of the people is in the main scoured if 
grain production grows* « • • If we can raise 
our grain output by another 100 poroent or oo 
in the next ton years, thon there will bo a 
radical change In the comparatively lev? amount 
of grain for eaoh {;cr 
to achieve this end*3
son. We must do our best
The publication wont on to point out, in oaee 
the impression had been given that Mao waa responsible for 
the priority previously given to industry, that "Liao
*Liao Lu-yon, The Whole P xty and the Whole Peo­
ple Co in For Agriculture ia a Big Way tPa^igovol'.ca1 
L .nguugoa Proa..;, l‘jb:Jj, p.' 1.
2lbia.
5riM., p* 7*
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lae-tung [has] always attached groat importance to agri­
culture *" and that he had "const antly and repeatedly" 
urged that "tho condition of agriculture has a tremendous 
bearing on the economic developnont of our country.In­
deed* said tho author in a most interesting comment* "all 
the social changes in the Chinese countryside* from tho 
land reform to agricultural ooofior ition and tho oot^blioh-
oont of people's oomaunea* wore carried out under tho di-
2reot leadership of Comrade Hao Tae-tung." 
ditiona in I960 wore oonoernod* tho author of The Whole 
P rt;/ :.u;d the t/hclo People was quits voguet "She yield of 
ounnior crops thio year," he said* "is in the main on a par 
with last year's [1959] production level." Ho did not men­
tion that the 1959 level had boon low. Instead* he Indica­
ted that "the autumn orops this year* with the exception 
of some ureas hit by natural calamities* arc growing quite 
well and u bumper h arvest io in sightConcluding* ho 
said* "5ho situation is extremely favorable
The situation wao, In fact* anything but favor­
able * A combination of the worst natural disasters in a 
century^ anti the turmoil o ojoed by mass agitation, confusing
So far as oon-
1Itjid f. 14•f
5Ibid.
*2ho docignution "worst natural calamities in 
100 years" la that of the Communists* and it is unconfirmed 
by external experts# If the calamities occurred, the 
not mentioned at all until November* One authority*
y were 
Irvine*
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policies ,m? tho vast influx of inexperienced people Into 
rural areno^ resulted in what nay have been the worst crop* 
relatively speaking* since the Communists cane to power.
3?Ue regiiso evontmilly admitted that the I960 or op wao only 
slightly better than that of 1957* which was a bud year|2 
but the population wna increaolng at an annual ruts of at 
least 15,000,000.** 
estimated that food grain production in I960 fell off ap­
proximately 80*000,000 metrio tons from that of 1959* Shat 
the blame was not entirely to be placed on nature was indi­
cated by ths groat number of articles in the mainland 
proas during the year berating cadres for insufficient 
•contact with the naoses,B charging bureaucratic fumbling 
and laxity among Party officials in agriculture, und
According to official data* it onn be
oj.., cit.. pp. 26-27* discounts the •calamity" lino saying 
taut "natural disasters -wore oited to explain why tho in­
crease n not larger ... probably ufter it had become 
a;, p-.rant that tho horoulenn efforts made to increase pro­
duction wore not going to produce mlraoleo." Cf. "Agri­
cultural Problooa," Alia Kcnkya. JPRS Dooungnt. #5415* op. 
cit.* pp. 1—4.
^Obocrvore in Hong Kong, estimated that from 
10,000,000 to 20,000,000 urban workers were moved to rural 
areas between 1959 and I960. How York glmos. Ifciroh 23, 
1962.
2?Iov7 York Sines, January 15, 1961. Grain output
in 1Q57 v/r.u officially aimounoed as 185,000,000 metrio tons, 
(open to speculation), and 270,000,000 for 1959 (likewise 
highly questionable).
^Ilo.f York linos, January 24, 1961. She article 
notes that, by official data, "tho agricultural output of 
i960 la dangerously near a paoe Just parallel with the pop­
ulation increase," If production figures were inflated, 
population growth w e probably greater than food produc­
tion. .................... -...................... ..................................
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hailing the Party as the ohampion of the peasants,^ 
over* Chang Te-uhang, Party seoretary of Shensi province ,
Moro­
ns sorted that In sons consumes there were "antagonistic 
elements usurping the leadership and woz’king deliberately 
to a .botage the polioies cf the party," Thus, by the end 
of I960, three years after the Great leap Forward, Comniu- 
nict China was no better off, and perhaps worse off, than 
it had been 3t the start of the drive. While noting that 
natural disasters may have been the nain faotor in preci­
pitating the agricultural crisis, the Committee on Connu- 
nist China of the Japanese periodical, Ekafuo Toushln,^ 
after studying the problem reported "three factors of 
human responsibility" whioh ore quite illuminating*
(1) Shortcomings in the people*3 commune 
system and poor administrative management—due 
to a lack of experience and hi£h-handodne33 of 
the administrative committee or production 
loaders, the production platoons were restric­
ted in their activities, losing their will to 
work , , •
(2) Fault3 in the economic planning—due 
to the gre t preponderance in tho economic 
planning towards heavy i.dus tries, investment 
of capital in agriculture was negligible and 
the modernisation and technical reform of 
agriculture was slowed dovm. Also tho enor­
mous investment and construction in industry 
since 1950 resulting in a heavy demand for 
munpo'.ver in the construction industry* causing
^ITow York Times, January 15, 1961,
2Ibid,
3"Emergency Import of Food and Agricultural 
Problems in Communist China," Ekafuo Taushln, Bo, 265, 
Tokyo, May 1, 1961* translated in Jxiih EscTuaont #3909, 
September 21, 1961, p, 11,
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a shortage of labor In the agricultural fields
(3) Such methods as deep plowing, danse 
planting and uoa of new species require suf­
ficient fertilizers, water and labor. More­
over, a balance aunt be maintained between 
these essentials. Apparently, however, the 
new methods brought revorso results because 
of the natural disasters. For instance, the 
new species were probably weaker in resis­
tance to natural disasters than the older 
species.
She Japanese exports went on to point out that 
tho abrupt shift of first priority from industry to agri­
culture had caused an ideological ehook in the Party, and 
that "the Cadres and the masses could not make a quick ad­
justment to the new policy which was put into practice in 
1960."* Tho report conoludedi
... The economic strain resulting from many 
yo ru of priority to heavy industry was appar­
ently not corrected to any groat degree by tho 
sUi*ort to agriculture. In other words, it 
seems that tho new polioy of I960, together 
with the numerous measures taken, came too 
late to oope with the unprecedented disas­
ters. ... The food oituation in China is
^Tbid____ _ p. 16* This is confirmed by a lengthy
editorial in Red'Flag. November 16, 1958, "Refutation of 
Doubts Concerning the Adoption of The Mass Line in Indus­
try," JPRS Document #7836, o■-« cit. Tho editorial noted 
that there were ' lta few" in ihe Party "who are still 
doubtful and h^vo even voiced oriticloms" of tho policy, 
arid who "deVito their small number have proved to be no 
small obstacle." The editorial continued* "The views 
held by those who are •blocking the tide* on the all-peo­
ple Industrialization movement are as follows* First, the 
movement has •disturbed the order of production*• Second, 
it has •destroyed the proportion and equilibrium.• Third, 
it haa •created tension.* Fourth, »>vh t io gained onnot 
oorapenouto what is lost.* All in all, they consider that 
this movement hao created a 'nation-wide disturbance••"
It is remarkable that, as it turned out, the cx’itioa wore 
right on each count# ............ ........ ............. .........
• *
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seriously acute and it is doubtful whether a 
bountiful orop this year [1961] will alluviate 
the situation rapidly**
But the crop of 1951 did not turn out to be 
"bountiful." On the contrary* available evidence indi­
cates that it was no better than that of i960* perhaps not 
as good.2
statistics on production or future targets have been re­
leased by the regime sinee eurly 1961**—but a number of 
lndioa'*ora point to a disappointing crop in 1961* One of 
these signs is thet the National People*3 Congress met in 
March ana April of 1962 in complete secrecy,* although its 
meetings are usually accompanied by widespread publicity 
and prop.ig .nda. Ihi3 would indicate that tho Communists 
ha! no good news to ropoi't on 1961. In a communique is­
sued on April 16, 1962 Premier Chou En-lai made no mention 
of the 1961 crop but put forward "ton ta.'ks for the ad­
justment of the national economy in 1962" in which the 
first item wis, "strive to inorease agricultural produc­
tion , first of all tho production of grain, cotton and
e
oil-bearing crops.
on tho need for implementing tho shift of first priority
No hard statistics are available—indeed no
She remainder of tho tacks centered
1IMd
2!Tow York Tines, October 1, 1961* 
jv York Tinas. April 22, 1962. 
4Ibid.
^Ne-T Yorh Time a, April 17, 1962.
pp. 16-17*• f
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to ugi'iculture, including much greater investment in agri­
culture* the transfer of large numbers of urban workers to 
the countryside, and the improvement of planning so a-j "to
insure an all-around balance between the branches of the 
national economy Significantly * Chou's report made no 
mention of launching a third Five Yo;ir Plan In 1963* de­
spite the f act that the Second Plan wr ia supposed to end in
that year* Actually* little or no mention of any Plans 
had been made since the Second Plan wae reported to have 
been fulfilled three years early in 1959, immediately be­
fore the agricultural dioastera and prolonged economic 
crisia sot in.
By the late summer* 1962, however. It was appar­
ent that the Chinese Communist regime had shelved inde­
finitely its plana to build China into an Industrial giant 
within a few years. An article in the September isnue of 
I.c.1 Fl.y? admitted that industry had been In a state of 
virtual collapse since the failure of the Great Leap For­
ward* and confirmed that agricultural need3 required an 
all-out effort,2 The journal, which la a publication of 
the Party Central Committee* also ii.diouted that the rele­
gation of industry to a minor role in the economy waa not 
morely temporary. Industry* it said* would have to get
1Ibid.
ONow York Timas. September 20* 1962.
ZV2
along Indefinitely without major oupit.:l investment.*
"The process of realining socialist industrialization a ;n 
only bo a gradual process," the article emphasised, "and 
the process of improving working equipment, too, o.ji only 
be a gradual prcooss." Even "gradual progress" wa3 a 
highly optimistic torm to apply to China’s industrialisa­
tion because industry in much of the country had oome 
practically to a standstill*
Tho Prolonged Pood Shortage
The most serious comment on the eoonomio condi­
tion of China after ten ye .-.rs of development guided by the 
Maoist ideology w.ia that hunger was widespread* There was 
disagreement betveen first-hand observers and also between 
external on-lookers as to the extent of tho food shortage 
in i960 and 1961 in China, but the consensus was that the 
Chinese were not getting enough to eat, and that this fac­
tor had seriously depressing political and eoonomio ef­
fects. During the late fall and early winter of I960,
Iluk .a Heiberg, Asian correspondent for the Swedish-lrm- 
guage paper 51oa3• ho 1 - s-Tidnlnr,'.n visited China and dis­
patched a series of articles describing conditions* In­
terviewing a Polish diplomat in Peking, Hedberg quoted his 
informant as saying*
1Ibid.
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The Chineae are eo tired this fall. Ex­
hausted. They have been forced to work 30 hard, 
insanely hard, and still one can see no improve­
ment, She Chinese are instead more hungry than 
ever since the Communists came to power eleven 
years ago.1
Another Ea.t European diplomat woo reported to have said!
J
The Chinese are hungry just nowj they have 
been hungiy for several months, und in the win­
ter which is now approaching they will be hun­
grier than the Hew China has ever experienced.^
Still another observer who was described as "not an anti-
co^)^^uni.;t,, was reported as sayings
Crop failures and natural oatistrophee pro­
vide no complete explanation of the present fa­
mine* The peasants are apathetic. Hao Tse- 
tung’s greatest mistake was to take the land 
away from the peasants anl create people*a com­
munes • I believe Uuo now realizes that the 
ooramuno3 were a mistake. But what can he do?
He cannot afford to beat a retreat.3
Among Hedborg'a own comments on the conditions he observed
were the following!
... The people become more emaciated ... It 
appears that the groundowcll of apathy drowns 
out the loud and fanatical enthusiasm among the 
13 million party members ... Behind the rum­
blings and famine lie mainly three factors* 
one destructive natural catastrophe aftor an­
other, poor planning and the undermining influ­
ence of the commune system of the will of the 
formers to work ... Sensible observers are 
... in agreement that the enthusiasm of the 
mooses has cooled, that there is grumbling among 
the people who have been driven much too hard 
for too many years and who have much too little 
to eat ... Hundreds of millions of people this
*"Worst Winter Awaits Chinese,* November 22, 
I960, translated in JfES Booumcnt #6658, January 31, 1961,
P • 6 •
2Ibld. 3Ibid.
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year must suffer for tho lack of sound planning, 
for the mad tempo which has put ito mark on the 
leap of the Chinese giant toward tho position 
of a great power « • ,1
Piecing together an analysis of the situation in 
China from mainland, Hong Kong and Soviet sources, Barry 
Sohwarta, tho Bow York Time5 * erainont expert on Communist
affairs, concluded that "tho Chinese Communist economy la 
in very deep trouble*1,2 What ho described in effect, was 
a vicious cycle of under-nouriahed Chinese being unable to
produce the quantities of food they needed for nourishment, 
ani ur. :blo to produce industrial products which might be 
exchanged for food. On the basis of indications of tho 
situation at the end of 1961, Schwarts said}
Communist China is a land of ma3.;ivo mal­
nutrition and hunger* Three successive years 
of poor harvests have reduced the food available 
to moat Chinese to little above the subsistence 
level. Industrial production has been reduced 
sharply below the peak levels of 1999 and i960, 
in part because malnutrition has seriously 
sapped the energies of industrial workers and 
in part because the Peiping authorities have 
conducted intensive resettlement of millions 
from cities to the countryside a3 part of a 
frantio effort to put the maximum possible num­
ber of hands to work raising food**
Even without statistics on 1961 agz*icultural 
production, Schwartz noted, tho communique issued by Chou 
after the PoOi.le»3 Congress session in March, 1962 "made
^Ibld PI># 7-16#
2How York Times# April 22, 1962# 
5ibid.
• #
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clear that this year will see another round of balt-tight- 
oning in Communist China." Moreover* it was a significant 
commentary on the invalidity of Mao*a ideological approach 
that* as a consequence of events through 1961* economic 
priorities were "in the exact opposite order both of the 
Stalinist tradition and of the Chinese* ov/n ‘great leap 
forward.*" For Chou*a "ton tasks" for 1962 had placed 
agriculture, consumer goods production, and heavy industry 
in that order of importance, which, oo Schwartz commented, 
was "unusual for Communist economics." Discounting the 
view that natural calamities were the main cause of the 
economic crisis, Schwartz oontendedi
The more irai ort nt explanation ... la 
that the Chinese Communist regime has been 
reaping the fruits of an unwise, ideologically- 
motivated and fanatical "groat leap forward" 
movement ... Peiping*a troubles icon be traced] 
primarily to the 1958 attempt to attain complete 
communism quickly bp the formation of the rural 
people's communes ... It is the disorganiza­
tion of agriculture and the peasant resistance 
and sabotage that those dractio changes brought 
about ... that are at the root of Peiping's 
difficulties.*
The Communists* decision to abandon the commune 
scheme in an effort to placate tho poaajinta and revive 
agriculture, however, wae too little and too lata for any 
immediate solution to the problem. By the time the Party 
relaxed its policies, said Schwartz, "the weakening brought 
on by the lack of food [had] prevented the remedial mea­
sures from attaining their end,"
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Another source of information which observers of 
China have relied upon in an effort to do tormina the ex­
tent of the eeononio oriels are refugees from the main- 
land# One such account wan reported and commented on by 
Albert Ravanholt, an experienced student of Chinese af­
fairs and full tine Associate of the American Universities 
Field Staff in Asia* The refugee on whose account Raven- 
holt reportod wao Dr* Stephen Wang, a physician who began 
his education in Western schools in China, and completed 
his training under the Communists* As a specialist in 
parasitology, Wang*3 responsibilities required that ha 
travel widely in Anhwei, Ssechwan, Hunan, Fukien, Shan­
tung and Kiangsu provinoeo* It was Wang*3 hopeless at­
tempts to fight the physical effects of malnutrition in 
those areas together with the increasing difficulty of 
getting enough to eat himself between October, I960 and 
April, 1962 that Induced him to leuvs the oountry.
For several years Wang had been participating in 
a concentrated effort, sponsored by the government, to
oort iin amount of caution must be used when 
dealing with refugees* accounts* First, it is difficult 
to obt in objective reports from people who are so dissa­
tisfied und desperate us to uproot themselves from their 
homeland* Also, Chinese refugees are usually aware of the 
difficulties they face in finding asylum and are therefore 
sometimes inclined to toll interviewers whatever they 
think they want to hear* Moreover, the experience of leav­
ing China is frequently so harrowing that refugees are of­
ten left tense and emotionally distraught for sometime af­
terward. Refugee accounts must be read in light of those 
factors. The report referred to bolo.v hao been examined 
carefully in order tc determine as high a level of credi­
bility a.- possible*
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eradicate a host of parasitic diceaoes in Fukien. To the 
Communists' credit, Wang noted that considerable progress 
had been aside until the physical effects of prolonged food 
shorta ge beg >n to be felt in the autumn of I960. Rabidly* 
there was a widespread riao in tha inoidence of edema, or 
dropsy, which is a disability associated with inadequate 
nutrition, and which, according to Wang, was encountered 
"everywhere in China" at the time. Another ailment Wang 
reported vv is "nutritional hepatitis" which is brought on 
by deficiencies of i^rotoin and sugar in the diet. Raven- 
holt reported*
In Shantung find several other provinces of 
north China, where food shortages are even 
wore acute [than Fulien] and the right to 
g-tiior mountain gras jo a and bark from selec­
ted trees for grinding into do.iI is jealous- 
ly sought, this condition ia more advanced 
in patients observed.*
In an of fort to combat tills problem, the Communists in 
I960 had restored to peas <nts the right to cultivate their 
own g rdon plots. But because the rural economy had be­
come "so totally disorganised," it was "not readily re­
stored and [Wang'e] medical colleagues on the mainland so
far hid found scant evidence of a resulting improvement in
2
the health of the populace."
One of the moat serious offecta of malnutrition, 
according to Wang, is that upon obstetrical conditions*
^RaVuaholU, op, cit.. p* 9* 
2Ibid.
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3oth In urb in and rural areas oven women in 
their twenties are ceasing to ovulate. Among 
those who give birth, prolapse of the utcru3 
is commonly observed. Raro is the mother who 
no-7 has onough milk in her breasts to suckle 
a newborn infant
Ao a result of these conditions, Wang retorted that in one 
of Shanghai*s bettor padlatrio hospitals during 1961 the 
mortality rate among live-born infanta was approximately 
ono-third during the first three montho of ago. While 
such circumot .nco3 may offer grim satisfaction to authori­
ties worried about the population problem, there could be 
little else to contend widespread malnutrition#
Another significant effoot on the people of pro­
longed undernourishment which Wang noted was fatigue and 
apathy. These results could be seen in official circles 
as well as in the general public, ho reported. Wang cited 
"growing corruption and inertia creeping up the political 
hierrrehy," as the demoralising effects of "the failure of 
their gigantic g mole on the oomraune3" set in among the 
Communists, and as they became preoccupied, as millions of 
others were, with personal survival.
Even if the aocount of Dr* Wang io not taken at 
full value, and is substantially discounted,** what remains
*
2IMd., p. 11*
^It may be pertinent to tho objectivity of 
Wang#3 account that he was not especially hostiLo to the 
Communists to begin with, and that ho and other "Intellec­
tuals and professionals remained disenoirmtod with the Na­
tionalists” and did not bcliovo that CUiang Kai-shek of­
fered a "viable alternative." bid.
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i3 etill indicative of an extremely serious economic cri­
sis in China, manifested most oevorely in tiie shortage of 
food. Recently the New York Times* reported that tho av­
erage Chinese now subsists on about 1,350 calories per day 
us oom^ured with a healthy intake of from 2,200 to 2,300, 
"To rules this semi-starvation diet to only 1,500 calories 
a day," said the report, "would coat tho stupendous sum 
[in imported grain] of $700 million annually," Commented 
C, L, Sulzberger, foreign affairs analyst of the Times*
The Chinese thus appear condemned to sub- 
oufficiancy [in food] at least until next year's 
harvest. Ac a result, in their weakened condi­
tion, they are increasingly threatened by the 
danger of Oi-ldemica, They can perhaps endure 
the sc hardships one mors year, but if oropa 
don't improve in 19o5i a critical period must 
st rt.2
Thus, after two Five Your Plano and a three year 
"Great Leap Forward," the Chinese Communists under Mao 
Tso-tung, who had conceived of oconcmio development in 
terms of the ideological objective of "boundloaB power," 
surveyed tho economy and found it in disarray, Hass agi­
tation, mass manipulation, and ma30 self-deception had not 
ov.n come close to producing sustained economic growth. 
Ironic lly, tho oon who had been so perceptive as to see 
the imperative of finding a solution to China's agrarian 
ills in tho 1920's and 1930'a, once they achioved power, 
turned their interests to industrialization instead. The
*July 23, 1962, 
2Ibid.
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cost of this fundamental error to the economic development 
of China will have to be rockoned in yearo, perhaps de­
cades»
?'hat the Chine no Communists, then, had proved to 
the world in 1961 wan that thoir approach to oeonumio de­
velopment did not work* It remains to ba oeen whether the 
approach will be changed, fund mentally and permanently, 
whether the Chinese Communists will return to the pragma­
tism -;n i flexibility, which wore cardinal features of Mao's 
philosophy during the early years of tho revolution. If 
they do, it will constitute a rejection of tho later Mao­
ist ideology which placed theory above practice and In­
sisted on obedience to dogmas tho viability of which had 
boon repeatedly disproved.
Some observers have detected signs that the fail­
ure of tho Great Leap Forward has already brought about a 
return to more realistic policies on the part of Chinese 
loaders, Richard Hughes, Far Eastern correspondent for 
tho London TIt'km, has interpreted the Forty admissions of 
economic failures uni the official retreat from industrial 
priority to mo n that "Oriental flexibility" has triumphed 
in Communist China,* But there is by no means incontro­
vertible proof of this. On the contrary, although Mao and 
hie supporters have unquestionably bowed to the necessity 
of dropping industrial priority in favor of agriculture,
*5e-.? York Times, October 10, 1962,
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there are strong indications that tho retreat haa been 
made grudgingly and that it may be viewed by tho Maoists 
as only temporary. This was the substance of a communi­
que iaauad by tho Party Central Committee on September 28, 
1962.^ The oommuniqua called for resist >.nco to "revision­
ist" and "opportunist" ideological tendencies in the Party* 
indicating that those who had criticised the Great Leap 
Forward were still out of favor. Further affirming the 
apparent continuation of a "hard line" within the Party, 
the communique announced that two members of the Secretar­
iat of the Central Comrdtteo had been dismissed and that 
three mon noted for their strong support of Mao's stern 
policies had been named to tho Secretariat. The three new 
members wore Lo Jui-ohing, Army Chief of Staff and former 
head of tho soorot police, lu Ting-yi, the Party's propa­
ganda chief, and Kins Shong, an alternate member of the 
Politburo and a specialist in intelligence work* Their 
election to the policy-review body of the Party oontrol 
organ oouid hardly be interpreted as indioatlng a funda­
ment :1 change in outlook on the part of the highest lead­
ership. Moreover, an assertion in the communique that 
"inooEpot-'nse of some leading cadres" had been responsible 
for tho difficulties which tho economy had experienced wa3 
a sign that tho Great Leap theory had not been discredited 
in Party councils.
1gevv York Times, September 30, 1962*
.//. :
.. j
y*. 0 /
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Still another omen pointing to a continuation of 
dogmatism in the Chinese Communist ideology was contained 
in a speech delivered by Chou En-lai,* September 30, 1962 
on the eve of the thirteenth anniversary of the People*a 
Eepublic* Chou declared*
Contrary to the expectations of imperial­
ist reactionaries of various countries and 
modern revisionists, the Chinese people have 
become not weaker but stronger* She*facts of 
the past thirteen years prove that the orien­
tation and road followed by tho Chinese people 
arc entirely correct ana that the Chinese peo­
ple *o lofty aspirations and great resolve to 
build their motherland into a prosperous and 
strong Socialist country can certainly be ful­
filled.
Chou also claimed that readjustments in the economy had 
yielded "remarkable results," and that the economy as a 
whole hud "improved year to year*" Although it is posai- 
ble th ;t his remarks were made merely for the purpose of 
blunting the iaj, aot of reversalo and retreats which had 
been forced on the regime during tho previous three years, 
it is just aa reasonable to conclude that so far as the 
Chinese Communists arc concerned, ideology still governs 
econ.-mio policy, and that even after tho moot aevere f .11- 
uros, Party leaders still cling tonucioualy to dogmas 
whioh they cherish even v/hile thoy endeavor to recover 
from disasters brought on by those dogmas*
In short, while economic policies oinoo the 
Great leap seem to suggest a more flexible approach by the
^Nav York Tines* October 1, 1962*
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Chinese Communists, recent actions and statements by Party 
leaders indicate that the author of the Great Leap is 
still considered infallible, that hie ideological doc­
trines are not to bo challenged, and that any failures 
which nay have boon encountered are not the fault of his 
policies but rather are due to inept or incorrect imple­
mentation of those policies. It may be that Mao and his 
supporters were so strongly comsiittcd to the Great Leap 
Forward and the ideological premises on which it was based 
that it was simply Impossible for them to admit that the 
whole scheme had failed. But, realising that the polloy 
could be continued only at great peril to the regime, Mao 
decided to separate theory from reality, continuing rit­
ualistic deference to the old lino for politioal reasons, 
while actually replacing it with a more workable policy 
based on the economic realities. If this is the explana­
tion behind the very evident contradictions in Chinese eco­
nomic find political behavior since 1959# it suggests a 
strange mixture of absolutism and flexibility which would 
seem hardly more promising of orderly development and sus­
tained oconomio growth than policies based on absolutism 
alone.
The Indian Plans and The Status of Agriculture
Although its start in the initial decade of eoo- 
nomio development may have been slower than that of China,
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India*o finish was perceptibly stronger. That strength* 
however, tvaa relative to China’s weakness, and it should 
not bo counted an final proof either of India’s "take 
off," economically, or of India’s victory over China in 
the ideological competition. Such conclusions, however 
satisfying, would be premature.
When India’s leaders scrutinized the national 
economy during the pro-Plan years, 1947-1951* endeavoring 
to determine the proper course for planned economic devel­
opment, they were confronted with some unpleasant problems 
and obliged to make some crucial decisions. The chronio 
problem of large-scale unemployment and underemployment 
suggested the urgent need for industrialization which 
would produce jobs, relieve seme of tho pressure on land, 
and help to diversify on economy which badly needed diver­
sification. But if industry wore given first priority the 
cost would h iva to be borne by rural naoues already under­
fed and under-rewarded. Such a policy would have been 
antithetical to the welfare concept inherent in the Indian 
ideology. Moreover, it would have been impolitic* The 
Vast majority of Indians' were impoverished villagers—-83 
percent of the population was dependent upon agriculture 
cither directly or indirectly—and in a democracy where all 
adults had the right to vote in free elections this wu3 a 
powerful influence on the government. Furthermore* 
Javrahnrlul Kehru had been committed since 1920 to give 
first priority to raising the standards of India’s
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miserable peasants* It was imperative, therefore* that 
the First Five Year Plan concentrate on increasing agri­
cultural productivity* Even though the First Plan wa3 
little more than a oot of guidelineo for futui-e develop­
ment, the Indian government waa wine* economically as well 
as politically* to concentrate initially on the develop­
ment of agriculture* For it was the agricultural eeotor 
of the economy which produced the bulk of the nation's in­
come, and without groat improvement of that sector there 
would have been littlo prospect for the accumulation of 
capital for industrialisation* Said the Planning Commis­
sion!
The moot Immediate need waa to relievo 
the serious food shortage and the rising in­
flation [of food pricesJ* Little progress 
could be ffi .de in the country as a whole* in 
industry or elsewhere* unless food became 
more plentiful, and unless the groat mass of 
b.okwnrd and impoverished rural people were 
awakened to nev/ farming methods, to a now 
outlook* to a new vitality*’*1
But there was no attempt to disguise tho difficulty which
India faced in attempting to rejuvenate agriculture* Ac
it was pointed out in the Plan*
The problems of Indian agilculturo are far 
more fundamental than ia commonly apprecia­
ted* This is apparent, for inot ;noe* from 
th3 fact that, in recent years* in spite of 
high prices, public investment on a scale 
never attempted before, and legislation de­
signed to give greater eeourity to tho til­
ler, there have been no marked gains in pro­
duction* The conditions of Indian agriculture 
arc typical of a static, backward economy*
*Tvie flow India, pp* 17-13,
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which ia unable to expand and keep pace with 
the growing population.*
She allocation of funds in the First Plan accu­
rately reflected the decision to emphasise the develop­
ment of agriculture. Whereas the allocation for industry 
amounted to 7*6 pei’cent of the total Plan outlay, that for
Agriculture and Community Development came to 15.1 por- 
c:nt.2 Actually, the difforonoe was much greater than 
these figures Indicate* For a major it sat in the Plan was 
the allocation for irrigation and rural electrification, 
which, if added to that for agriculture, amounted to 43.2
percent of the tot .1 outlay. As a result of irrigation 
development and land reclamation projects, the area under 
cultivation increased by 26 million uoroo during the Plan. 
Food grain production increased by nearly one quarter, 
and agricultural production as a whole rose by 19 porcent.5 
It should bo noted, however, that a major factor in these 
increases was the very favorable monsoons which coincided 
with the First Plan.
Other successes achieved by the Plan included 
thesei^ (1) inflationary pressures were oheokod, the
^Flrrit Five Year ?lan--A Draft Outline, Planning 
Commission, Government of India' '(How tic Ini, i'jylj, p* 94*
O
‘~Irv:1i A Soforcnoo Annual. 1061. p# 187*
^ghe How India, p. 13.
^Compiled from data in India. A Reference Annual,
1961. pp, 133-186.
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price level at the end of the Plan standing at 15 percent 
lower than at itc comricnearaont} (2) national income (at 
oonst ant prioos) Increased by 13*4 percent; (3) por capita 
Income rose by 10*3 percent; (4) per capita consumption 
increased by approximately eight percent; (5) the rate of 
oapit il investment in the economy ao a peroont ge of na­
tional income was estimated to have increased by more than 
two percent. But these gains, significant as they wore, 
did not obacuro the important fact that India at the end 
of the First Five Year Plan still was not self-sufficient 
in food production. So long as this continued to be the 
case, rapid economic development would remain a hope 
rather than a reality. Summarising the disappointments, 
the Planning Commission stated*
... The pace of development wus still too slow 
and many urgent proolom were yet unsolved. Ho 
real g ins were made on unemployment, which ap­
peared to be increasing. Investment in indus­
try, in development programs of all kinds that 
would create new wealth, Jobs -and opportunities, 
was still small or uneven, although considerably 
higher them before tho Plan. Income and living 
standards, although higher, still left India a 
nation of impoverished people.*
But the First Plan wno "only a preparation, a
first start toward growth," It was the Second Five Year
Plan which constituted "the real beginning in the colossal
ot uk of rebuilding the nation," said India’s planners.
*The Hew India, p, 20*
2M P, 21.•9
3C8
However* an extremely important change marked the adoption 
of the Scoond Plan—a shift whioh roflectod impatianeo and 
fruutration -with the alow pace of development* It was* 
moreover* a change whioh very likely came a a a result of 
Nehru*s visit to China in 1954* reflecting the influence 
of Chinoso priorities on Nehru* and indicating hie heigh­
tened av.ureneaa of the Sino-Indian competition* For* 
agriculture gave way to industry in the first priority of 
the Scoond Indian Plan* Nehru* whose influonoo so Prime 
lliniator and Chaim in of the planning Oonraioaion io cru­
cial in the planning procooo* indicated two years before 
the Second Plan that ho w ;a determined to cee industriali­
sation emphasised in that Plan, Before the National De- 
velopment Council on November 9* 1954^—just a few weeks 
after returning from China—-Nehru "spoke liko an impatient 
man* eager for more rapid and more comprehensive economic 
improvement," Although ho apolce in cautious toneo and 
warned against an over-ambitious Scoond Plan, it was in 
this speech that Nehru made clour his decision to shift 
from agricultural priority to induatry.
Although the objectives of the Scoond Plan 
listed "rapid industrialisation" after "a sisable increase
^Tho text of Nehru*a apeeoh is included in 
Jawahurlal Nehru* Planning and Bovolopncnt (Delhi* Indian 
National Congreaa*“T95T)* pp, 13-hU# It is also excerpted 
in Fisher and Bonaur.mt* Indian Ai-proachca, o;;. clt,* ap­
pendix I,
2Brocher* o;>. oit P- 527*
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In national income oo mi to raise the lovol of living In 
the country,"* the two wore actually one. 
planners pointed out, thoy viewed the two aim aa inter­
dependent* "A significant increase in national income and 
a marked improvement in living standards cannot be secured 
without a substantial increase in production and invent- 
ment." So, although the first priority of development 
was still linked to the baaio aim of the people's welfare, 
India's planners shifted fundamentally from the earlier 
premise that very substantial agricultural improvement 
would have to be achieved before the economy would be in a 
position to commence the industrialization process. It is 
remarkable that agriculture and Community Development, 
which stood first in the aims of the First Plan, were not 
evon mentioned in the list of four "principal objectives" 
of the Second Plan, The priorities centered around "rapid 
industrialization with particular emphasis on the develop­
ment of b iaio and heavy industries, "such as steel, ma­
chine building, coal and heavy chemicals,"3 Thus, whereas 
tho Planning Comciiouion had held in the First Plan that 
"little pregroea could bo made in Industry or elsewhere 
unless food b-joamo more plentiful," it declared in 1956
For, as the
^Second Five Year Plan—A Draft Outline. Plan­
ning Commission,' fcoverijaent ox Inula (Low Delhi, February, 
1956), p. 7.
2Ibid.
3Ibld.
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that "Rapid industrialisation io the coro of development*"'*- 
She change of mind wan thus complete, and the 
alloc >.tions of the Second Plan verified it* 
lay for agriculture dropped from 15*1 to 11 *3 percent of 
the total Plan outlay, that for industry was more than
WMle tho out-
doubled over the First Plan, rising from 7,6 to 16,5 per­
cent,'* The allocation for irrigation and power dropped 
from 26.1 percent of the Pirot Plan outlay to 19,0 percent
of tho Second* It should bo made clear that the actual 
amount of money spent on agriculture did not diminish in 
tho Second plan* On the contrary, it increased from So*557 
crcrou to Ra,563 croreo. But the shift to industrial pri­
ority was strongly emphasized by tho five t that the appro­
priations for agriculture in the Second Plan were only 
59*1 percent moro than in tho First, while the increased 
expenditure on industry in the Scoond Plan amounted to 
397*2 poroent,**
On the basic of the outcome of India'a Socond 
Five Year Plan, it may bo Justifiable to quoation the wis­
dom of tho decision to base development upon industry 
rather than agriculture, because tho Plan fell ohovt of 
tho paco not in the Pirot Plan and failed to moot some 
important objectives. Overall, tho Socond Plan fell 25
2Indla« A Roferenoo Annual* 1961, p* 167* 
•'ibid, mo word orore represents 10,000,000*
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percent below the original t ..rgeta*^ 
in the fact that national income rone only two percent
This was reflected
over the First Plan, whereas it increased by six percent 
in the First Plan over the 1951 level#2 Where is foodgrain
production rose by 24.3 percent in the Firot Plan, it in­
crease! only 15*7 pez-cont in the Second#^ This factor,
however, wau influenced by less favorable monsoons from
1956-1061. Bather than continuing the check on Inflation, 
the Second Plan period saw the Rupee decline in value some 
30 percent#* Instead cf creating eight million jobs out­
side of agriculture, it created approximately 6.5 million#^
The rate of increase in per capita inoose dropped by a 
fraction of one percent from the Firot Plan period#® ■'
Dcopita these shortcomings, Indians Second Five
In induo-Year Plan was by no means a complete failure# 
trial production, especially, it marked significant gains. 
Industrial production from 1956 to 1961 increased by 55 
percent, whereas it rose 39 percent from 1951 to 1956#
^Uav York Times# January 10, 1961#
^India On the Harsh# Information Servioe of 
India (7/ashington i.O.» j, pp# 10-11#
^"The Economic Development of India* A Presen­
tation of the Third Five Year Plan and A Review of Pro- 
gi’oaa During the First axid Second Plano," India Economic 
Hev.Qottor# So# 12 (June, I960), p# 3,
*So.v York Tines# January 10, 1961#
"’"The Economic Dovoloprsont of India," o;j# cit • *P* 6#
®Indla On the !!:rch» £itti !>• XX •i #
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Bortilizor production and railway freight loadingo recor­
ded similarly impressive gains • Theae achiov orient a, how­
ever, had to he considered in the light of ooveral crucial 
problems which either were not solved or were created dur­
ing the Second Plan* The major problem left unsolved by 
the Second Plan was food production* Despite a record 
total of 79*3 million tons of foodgrain produced in 1961, 
India still had to import sono three million tons.* The 
rate of increase in food production way not keeping pace 
with the population lnoroaoo* Tho principal problem cre­
ated during the Second Plan was inflation* Economists 
disagreed ao to tho causes but they were worried about the 
effects
ourred a serious bal:mco-of-payment3 deficit during the 
Second Plan period#^
Belated to this wao the fact that India had in-
It may be concluded, then, that on the whole 
Indiana Gocond Plvo Year Plan was a disappointment, Al­
though the causes for its shortcoming3 wore multiple, and 
some were beyond tho control of planners, it would appear 
that the major fault was in tho attempt to proceed with 
industrialisation before a sound foundation of agricultur­
al development had been laid* In 1939, after nearly a 
do cade of development, the vast majority of people in
York Times* January 9, 1962#
2IMd.
;,Iniia. A Deference Annual. 1961, p# 197#
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India wore not getting enough to eat. India*a nutrition 
Advisory Committee has indicated that the minimum por oapi- 
ta daily needs are 2,123 o«lorie3 and 61 gmc* of protein.
But in 1559 the per capita availability in India was 1,398 
calories, 11 poroont below the minimum.*' 
iouo, sail the nutrition expert3, was the faot that the
Even Bore esr-
por oapita availability of proteins »vaa only 49*3 gma., 
19 percent below the minimum. Horeovor, "the averages re­
veal only a part of the real shortage, bocauso the econo­
mically .stronger oootions of the population consume more 
and richer food,"1" meaning that the pooror olaoaos hove a 
con. ider ibly greater deficiency than the averages indioate.
No reaponolble government could have been un­
moved by such a baaio human problem, certainly not a gov­
ernment committed to the welfare concept. Boflooting its 
concern, and aloo giving evidence that it had been in er­
ror on tho Second Plan prioritioo, the government of India 
took steps in formulating the Third Five Tear Plan to 
overcome the food problem. Tho Third Plan, inaugurated in 
April, 1961, returned agricultural development to firot 
priority. The major aim of tho Third Plan was "to achieve 
oelf-aufficlonoy in foodgraina and inoreaced agricultural
*U* 0. Panuo, "Proopocta for India*a Agricul­
ture, * All-India Congreef? gommittco Eoonei-ic Bcviov/. XIII, 
Iloe* 14-IS'TJonua'ry 4, I'joi'j, p. i>I,
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1production*" while increasing national income at more 
thtvn five percent per annua. In a fundament ril ravorool 
from their position on the Second Plan* the planners at \t- 
ed in 19611
In the pattern of development envisaged in the 
Pivo Year Plans the basic objective ia to pro­
vide sound foundations for sustained economic 
growth* for increasing opportunities for gain­
ful employment* and improving living standards 
and working conditions for the masses. The 
first priority necessarily belonge to agricul­
ture and agricultural production has to bo in­
creased to the highest lovels feasible*2
But the shift in priorities wa3 not represented 
oo strongly in figures as it was in words* Agriculture 
and Community Development wore allocated 14 peroont of the
total Third Plan outlay* whereas industry waa allocated
-:-l percent» However* if the category of irrigation i3 
aided to agriculture the combined figure represents 23
percent of the total* which is a more accurate comparison 
with industry*^ In other words* agriculture and industry 
received approximately equal allocations in the Third Plan*
But the change in priorities was reflected in the fact 
that* whereas the outlay in rupees for agriculture and 
Community Development increased by slightly more than 
100 percent from the Second Plan to the Third* the
1 •Summary of Third Five Year Plan*" India !Tca-’3 
XV* No. 17 (September 1, 1961)* p* 2*
2Ibid p* 3*• *
P • 2#
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allocation for Industry increased by only 73 percent.* 
Thus, the switch from industrial to agricultural priority
was genuine.
After a decade of development, then, it was ap­
parent that the economic growth of India had been anything 
but spectacular. In terms of real gains, there was little 
room for satisfaction' as illustrated by the fact that al­
though average per capita income increased by 16.2 percent 
during the decade, it was still only $69.00 per year in 
1961, one of the lowest in the world, 
most important index of all, the Indian people, after ten
Moreover, on the
years of intensive effort in economic development, wore 
still not getting enough to eat. No list of impressive 
figures indicating industrial growth or percentage in­
creases could mitigate this shortcoming. That the Indian 
people had produced signlfio nt growth, that they had made 
many remarkable strides forward economically, without re­
sorting to regimentation and -without violating human digni­
ty could not be donied. But whether this growth and these 
strides, in the face of almost unbelievable poverty and 
enormous population, were sufficient, whether if sustained 
or only slightly increased they would lead eventually to a 
viable, self-sufficient economy -was by no means certain.
Yet, in comparison with China, India was in
^Computed by the writer from figures given in 
ibid, and in India. A Reference Annual. 1961. p. 202.
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quite eatiafactory condition following ten years of inten­
sive efforts in both countries to develop. If India had 
failed to achieve self-sufficiency in food production, at 
least it had not brought about the nearly complete disrup­
tion of the rural economy a3 the Chinese Communists had. 
The reduction in priority for agriculture in India*s 
Second Five Year Plan may have been a mistake, but it was 
not an irrational, headlong rush to disaster as the Great 
Leap Forward and oomrtune drive in China were* If the peo­
ple of India were still receiving less than a satisfactory 
diet in 1961, at least there were no widespread effects of 
prolonged and serious malnutrition as there were in China. 
If the Indian economy at the end of the Second Five Yoar 
Plan had demonstrated lose growth than ha-.i boen antici­
pated and needed, it wa3 oti.ll an economy in relatively 
good balance, with industry and related seotora showing an 
especially vigorous advance. But the Chinese economy in 
1961 was d .ngeroualy closo to a breakdown. So calamitous 
were developments in agriculture during the Great Leap 
Forward that uooroo of millions of urban workers in China 
had to be rushed to the oountryaide in a frantic effort to 
grow more food; the efficiency of factory workers was 
hampered by inadequate diet; and many industries were se­
verely crippled by the shortage of capital and raw materi­
als which agriculture was supposed to provide but did not.
Although the Chinese Communists were not neces­
sarily in a position from whioh they could not eventually
317
recover, their economic condition was so serious that it 
would probably require another ten years of concentrated 
effort to repair the damage done in the previous decade. 
The leadero of India, despite their troubles and disap­
pointments, could at least t ske some comfort in the fact 
that India had moved ahead slightly or held its own.
China had f lien back, 
the development of China and India some important lessons 
ooull ba dra.vn regarding political approaches to economio 
growth.
From thedo and other results of
CHAPTER EIGHT
Lessons From China and India
Nations such as China and India vlth enormous 
populations, deep-rooted poverty and etatio economies are 
faoed vlth staggering problems vhen they embark upon pro­
grams of economic development. The difficulties besetting 
these two countries, like those of other underdeveloped 
areas, are many-faceted and interlocking. The prevalence of 
vlsespread illiteracy, high unemployment, low productivity, 
and Inadequate methods constitutes such a formidable set of 
obstacles to progress that any effort aimed at making rapid 
Improvement is likely to bring disappointment. Perhaps this 
is why the leaders of ohange tend to develop and rely upon 
ideology. To the extent that Ideology can stir dlsoontent, 
generate energy, enthusiasm and commitment to ohange, and 
oreate hope in the future, it is probably an indispensable 
faotor in the effort to overoome the tremendous problems of 
eoonomlo stagnation. There oan be little doubt that a 
government whioh seeks to conduot far-reaching social, polit­
ical and economio transformations requires oonsiderable 
momentum. Because ideologies possess the oapaoity to move 
vast bodies of people and to bring about a reallocation of 
values, they are exceedingly useful,
let, one of the most important oonoluslons to be
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drawn from the experience of China and India is that there 
are no panaceas for the problems of underdevelopment. It 
is here that the other face of Ideology must be reoognised. 
There is a strong tendency, as Arendt and others have noted?' 
for ideologies to evolve into self-contained idea-systems, 
in whioh the world and its processes are viewed, problems 
are explained, solutions determined and polloles set in 
motion on the basis of a set of dogmas. Although this may 
simplify the process of Inspiring and energising the masses, 
it has not been demonstrated to work as a viable approach 
to economic development. The best example of this is Com­
munist China.
The ideology of Communist Ohina, as formulated by 
Mao Tse-tung over the span of four decades, evolved in the 
direction of increasing rigidity. Whereas during the long 
campaign of resistance against the Kuomintang, Communist 
polloles showed some tendency to flexibility and innovation 
Mao's proclivity to dogmatise emerged as the dominant in­
fluence on polloy following victory in 1949. After the 
fashion of Stalin, Mao beoame the personification of the 
"oorrect line," the omniscient seer whose wisdom and ability 
to formulate "Infallible" polloles were the basis of China's 
Inexorable maroh to "prosperity and boundless power." In 
his ideological traot in 1957, On The Correct Handling of 
Contradictions Among the People. Mao wrotei
*300 supra, pp. 24-25^ 
g07). Clt.« P.. 11* ______
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What is this [Communist ] dictatorship for? Its 
first funotlon is to suppress the reactionary 
classes and elements and those exploiters in 
the country who range themselves against the 
socialist revolution, to suppress all those who ' 
try to wreck our socialist construction
It was precisely this totalitarian spirit and 
unbending attachment to his own biases and Interpretations 
which led Mao to Insist on a policy of developing heavy 
industry first. It was this same devotion to an ldeologl- 
oally "correct line" which led to the conoept of driving 
the Chinese people to make a great leap into industrializa- 
tlon and Communism on the basis of a tremendous, mass 
agitation campaign. The Inevitable result of an Ideology 
based upon the "correct" ideas of an "infallible" leader is 
self-deception, Kao eventually came to believe that the 
greatest restraint on China's rapid development into a place 
of power was simply that the people lacked faith,1 If the 
Party, the oadres, and the people would just stop consider­
ing things impossible, said Kao, there was almost no limit 
to what could be done. It was apparently this conviction 
whioh Induced Kao to call for the Great Leap Forward* He 
apparently believed that the 630 million people of China 
under his leadership could literally perform miracles,
Mao's Ideology overcame his reason, and the result was that 
the Communists drove the Chinese people in a gigantic cam-
■ ■ V
palgn which was based upon fantasy. But rather than
t I •
^See Mao's 1955 speeoh "On The Cooperatlvizatlon 
of Agriculture." op. clt. Also his preface to Socialist 
Upsurge, op. clt.
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produoing fantastic results* it produoed failure*
What China's experience in self-delusion points up 
is that Ideologies based upon a closed idea-system and dom­
inated by an "infallible" leader cannot be applied suooess- 
fully to the complicated and intricate problems of economic 
development* Such intricacies require an idea system which, 
although it may necessarily place a certain amount of faith 
in some basic beliefs* is predicated upon a maximum of 
flexibility* The principal flaw in a totalitarian Ideology* 
so far as its application to economic development is con­
cerned, is that it is not only a closed system prone to 
stubbomess and rigidity* but because of the reputed omnis­
cience of the leader it cannot admit fundamental mistakes 
and errors of judgaent without jeopardising the whole 
political structure* Thus* when the drive to oooperatlvize 
China's agriculture encountered serious resistance in 1955* 
instead of reassessing and possibly revising the policy* 
the Party merely slowed down* briefly* then proceeded to 
force an even faster pace* Similarly when the campaign to 
collectivize agriculture was met by serious peasant opposi­
tion in 1957* rather than evaluating the validity of the 
policy and admitting that it may have been ill-advised, the 
Party conducted a "rectification campaign," which, in a 
sense* implied that everybody was out of step except the 
Party* Then* after having experienced considerable diffi­
culty in oooperativlzlng and collectivizing agriculture* 
the Communists moved into the Great leap Forward and the
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eommunization of agriculture. Reasonable men would not have 
Ignored such bold handwriting on the wall* But the people 
responsible for the Great Leap policy were no longer guided 
by reason. They were driven by seal born of ideological 
fanaticism and self-delusion born of arrogance. That they 
were heading for disaster should have surprised no one but 
themselves.
Beoause China desperately needed eoonomio assist­
ance by the spring of 1962* there were indications that in 
order to obtain aid from the Soviet Union* Mao was ready to 
concede to a oertaln extent that the Great Leap had been ill- 
timed. Soviet Communists had been oritloal of the Great 
Leap from the beginning,* and their opposition had been a 
major element in the Slno-Soviet ideological dispute which 
deepened between 1958 and 1961* It is interesting to note
i. *
that an editorial in the Peking People1 s Dally of Karch 29* 
1962* entitled "Lay Firm Foundation* Walk Calmly* Advanoe 
Gradually, "2 was reprinted three days later in Pravda. and 
preceded by one month the signing of a Soviet aid agreement 
with China.^ The editorial hinted strongly at "resolute 
contraction!"
Some projects must be realised only later;
*ffew York Timas. April 4, 1962. For a detailed 
aooount of 'Che origins' and development of this dispute see 
G. F. Hudson* Richard Lowenthal, and Roderlok KaoFarquar, 
The Slno-Sovlet Dispute (Mew Yorki Frederlok A. Praeger,Isfcl).
2Nqw York Times. April 4, 1962.
%ew York Times. April 20, 1962.
------------1
323
for their Implementation the time Is not yet 
ripe. If. nevertheless, steps are taken for 
their Immediate realization, it may happen 
that a great deal of effort is spent but re­
sults are small and there may in fact not be 
any progress at all.1
But by no means did the editorial sound a full 
retreat. On the contrary, it continued to insist that there 
are several roads to Communism. Speaking allegorloally, the 
editorial declared that "there are no absolutely identical 
rivers in the world and therefore there are no absolutely 
identical methods for Gaining them." The article contended 
that "final victory" would be achieved if the "oorrect 
course" were followed. In other words, although the Chinese 
Communists were making a tactical retreat dictated by neces­
sity, there were no admissions of error so far as the overall 
validity of the Great Leap concept was conoemed. On the 
contrary, the implication was clear that the policy would be 
resumed eventually. In view of the long established prac­
tice of "one step backwards, two steps forward," it would 
seem reasonable to oonclude that even in the aftermath of 
the Great Leap's failure, the Chinese Communists were not 
willing to ooncede any fundamental error.
Speculating on the possible meaning of the taotl-
eal reverse which the Chinese Communists appeared to take in
April, 1962, the Kew York Tlnos in an editorial stated*
If extremist dogmas have, in faot, been abandoned 
in favor of a moderate pragmatism, the [Chinese] 
Communists have a ohanoe of reversing the present
*Bew Tort: Times. April 4, 1962.
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downtrend* Otherwise the adverse population-to-
food ratio may well mean ultimate failure*1
But not since 1951 when they oommenoed upon the drive to 
Oooperativize, then colleotivize agriculture had China's 
Communist leaders given any lndloatlon of abandoning dog­
matism for pragmatism* On the contrary, Mao'a ideology 
became increasingly doctrinaire and increasingly predicated 
on the principle of his infallibility* It was therefore 
exceedingly difficult for the Chinese Communists to deviate 
basically from the "oorreot line" for fear that such a r 
treat would weaken severely the entire political structure* 
There was, then, strong Indication by 1961 that 
the Ideology of Communist China, when applied to the criti­
cal needs of economio development, was not merely in tempor­
ary trouble* It was reaping the Inevitable oonsequenoes of 
its fundamental invalidity. The Chinese Communists, thus, 
were in the unhappy position of either pressing forward 
with an approach which had repeatedly demonstrated basio 
weaknesses, or else admitting by actions, if not by words, 
that the whole ideological foundation, on whioh they had 
endeavored to build, was unsound* They might mark time, 
temporarily, and vacillate awhile, but sooner or later they 
would have to make the painful choice* Whatever the oholoe, 
it offered little consolation and little promise for the 
future* The Ideology of the Chinese Communists had proved 
to be self-defeating when applied to eoonomlo development.
lApril 20, 1962,
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The Factors of Stability and Incentive
For all its shortcomings and disappointments In 
bringing about rapid eoonoraio development, India has at 
least shown substantial successes to balanoe off the fall* 
urea. China, too, has achieved Important gains, most 
notably In Industrial construction. But China's self-imposed 
disasters have left many Industries at a standstill, hun­
dreds of millions of people suffering from serious under­
nourishment, and the eoonomy In a state of confusion} 
whereas India's set-backs in agriculture have at least been 
manageable, and the other sectors of the eoonomy have en­
joyed a relatively uninterrupted rise In growth rate and 
productivity. Perhaps the most important product of India's 
determination to move forward gradually—at no faster paoe 
than the people oan be persuaded to advano 
Sadiq All, editor of the Congress party's publication, 
Economic Review, put It simply and accurately when he said, 
"India needs stability as muoh as rapid progress."1. It may 
be noted that rapid progress and stability are difficult 
alms to reconcile. Indeed, they may be Irreconcilable.
But moderate progress and stability are possible to achieve, 
and this, In essence. Is what India's political approaoh to 
economic development has accomplished, China, by contrast, 
in its determination to make spectacular growth, achieved
la stability.
lnSome Criticisms," AICC Economic Review. XIII, 
ho. 19 (February 22, 1962), 3.
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neither rapid progress nor stability*
In one Important respeot India'* achievements in 
development have been far more impressive than those of 
China. For India set out to accomplish much more than 
eoonomio growth, India determined to achieve economic deveV
opment, social justice end individual freedom, simultane­
ously. Moreover, the aims of sooial justice and political 
freedom were not subordinated to those of eoonomio growth* 
The Indian Constitution made no allowanoe for suspending the 
rights of people or for olroumventing democratic prooesses 
in the interests of eoonomio expediency* Considering this, 
if India had merely held its own with China during the 
initial decade of development, it would have been an im­
pressive feat* For it is one thing to regiment people and 
moke gains at the expense of their welfare and from their 
involuntary sacrifice! it is quite another thing to advanoe 
economically while at the same time improving the people's 
status* But India did more than hold its own* Although it 
was neither strong nor out of danger in 1961, India was in 
substantially better oonditlon than Communist China, with 
every indication that it would oontlnue to be so indefi­
nitely* This fact has not gone unnotioed in Asia* As The 
Ration of Rangoon commented recently!
India has experimented successfully with 
the theory that dignity and decency in human 
relations, equality before the law, and the 
framing of just laws are productive of a society 
that will have the vitality and the incentive to 
progress* The results so far attained are by no 
means as spectacular as in some countries where
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harsh laws* and harsher methods prevail, hut 
there can he no doubt which of the systems is 
more conducive to human happiness and would he 
preferred by men and women everywhere if given 
a choice*1
It might be added* at least so far as China is concerned 
that "spectacular results" are not necessarily lasting 
results*
This comment by an Influential Asian newspaper in 
a country which is neutral in the cold war contains a most 
interesting observation* It holds* contrary to what is 
sometimes assumed* that a dictatorial political system 
employing techniques of regimentation does not necessarily 
enjoy any special advantages so far as economic development 
is concerned• On the oontrary* although such a system may 
be able to herd people into shock-labor projects and "per­
suade" them to submit to inhuman sacrifioe thus contributing 
to "spsotacular" accomplishments, this approach is distinctly 
lacking in an element which is indispensable to genuine* 
sustained economic growth. That element Is incentive. What 
the Ideology of India ultimately aocepted and what the Chi* 
nese Communist Ideology falls to accept is that human beings 
are aoquisitive* and that although this trait oan be tern* 
pered and kept within certain bounds by laws and regulations 
■o as to prevent man's exploitation of man* nevertheless 
acquisitiveness cannot be totally eliminated from the human 
make-up* Generalising from the bitter experience of the 
Ohlnese Communists* It may be oonoluded that any Idea-system
1Froa an editorial in the January 26, 1962 edition*
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which refuses to aoqulesoe in nan's desire to acquire and 
own material things will probably fall in the long run.
It is a testimony to the blind dogmatism of their 
ideology that while the Chinese Communists haws repeatedly 
recognized what they call "capitalist tendencies," J-.e,, the 
desire for private ownership and material comforts, among
the masBea, they will not alter their dootrlnes to aocom-
Mao's earlymodate this apparently inherent human quality* 
decision to give "land to the tiller" temporarily to appease
the peasants, and his later references to "an ocean of oapl- 
talism” among the peasants is evidence that he is aware of 
man's acquisitiveness. But theory must supersede reality*
In effect Mao says, "The people are not really acquisitive; 
they can be made to see the evils of private ownership and 
the virtues of Communism* They must be made to see it*
They will be made to see it." Such unbending obedience to 
a theory which is continuously refuted by experience is 
probably the most baslo reason why the Chinese Communist 
Ideology is not viable, economically, and oannot sustain 
eoonomio development,1
By contrast, even though Nehru's early socialist 
views led him to call for equalization of wealth, and even
1An indication of a greater amount of flexibility 
on the part of Soviet Russian Communists is the reoent an- , 
nounoement of a "revolutionary overhaul of [Soviet] economy­
planning procedures * , * designed to lnorease the produc­
tivity of industry by stimulating the profit motive*" See 
New York Times. October 15, 1962, The dispatoh from Mobcow 
Indicates that Soviet planners have beoome convinced that 
the only way to get workers to produce more is to offer them 
attractive Incentives*
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though the government continues to recommend cooperativiaa- 
tion of agriculture, tho ideology of tho now India ocoopta 
aoquisltlvoneoo, While it does not endorse this quality.
the Indian system seeks only to eliminate tho most extreme 
manifestations of it and to keep it within bounds by regu­
lation. Thus, although India oalla its system "socialist," 
ao of t'..o end of the Second Five Year Plan, 90 poroont of
India*o enterprise, including agriculture, was privately 
oontroilod, and accounted for 92 percent of tho national 
income,* It may be fair to question, ao acme observer a 
havo questioned* whether or not tho Indian approach of 
voluntarism and gradualism will goneruto tho sonaa of 
urgency and the concentrated effort which may be needed if 
ccononio development is to be achieved. But though this 
approach cay luck tho necessary vigor, it has at leaot 
avoided tho pitfalls of the totalitarian approach. In 
other word3, if tho democratic and voluntary course towards 
economic growth token by India is handicapped by slowness, 
it would appear, thus far at any rate, that this handicap 
is a much loss serious obstacle than the inadequately con­
trolled and inconsistent speed demonstrated by Communist 
China,
*Vera Micheles Dean, Builders of flat lor a
(Hew York* Holt, Rinehart and Kinston," IjklJ, p, 220, tii, 
Joiin Kenneth Galbraith, Eoonorilo Bovelopmont in Poraoeetivc 
(Cambridgei Kamu’d University1 5rroos," lbbi)
2Goo Galbraith, op, clt.« p, 22, 
p, 460,
• P*
Also Rolnick,
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The Persistent Problem of Agriculture
Despite the great oontrast of their Ideologies and 
programs of development, China and India are similar in one 
important respeett neither has been able to produce enough 
food to feed Its mounting population. Hot only are the tvo 
countries similar in their failure thus far in the most 
essential of all development seotors, both have shovn evi­
dence of serious frustration and despair over their diffi­
culties with agriculture. The best indication of their 
impatience is the fact that the leaders of both China and 
India decided within the first five years of their respec­
tive development programs to give first priority to industry. 
Both nations learned the hard way—by a disastrous food 
shortage in China and deficient production in India—that 
eoonomio growth in underdeveloped nations with exceedingly 
large populations cannot be aohleved until self-suffioiency 
in food produotlon has been accomplished.*’ This is one of 
the dearest lessons to be learned from the experience of 
Ohina and India.
*Wu Tuan-11 has commented. "There is no immutable 
logio why any nation should be able to feed Itself entirely 
with its own produce." This is technically correct, but as 
b'u also notes, Communist China's leaders determined at the 
outset that self-euffiolency in food produotlon was a neces­
sity. Indian plans likewise plaoe great importance on 
agricultural self-sufficiency. The reason is simply that 
unless they oan meet their own food needs, these countries 
must divert foreign exohange from other development schemes 
in order to buy food abroad. So long as they have to do 
this, their endeavors to industrialise will be handicapped. 
For Ku's analysis see "Farm Crisis in $ed China." Current History. XUZl, Ho. 253 (September, 1962), 162-168.
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It la perhaps understandable that the planners In 
China and India grew Impatient with the progress In agrleul- 
ture and sought a short-cut to "take-off11 by attempting
rapid industrialization without first securing the agricul­
tural base* But* in fact, there Is simply no way for 
countries like China and India to circumvent the problems 
of agriculture* They must be faced* and they must be solved 
if economic development is to take place*
One of Japan's leading specialists in under-devel­
opment economics* Harry T* Oshima of Hitotsubashi University* 
has examined oarefully the whole problem of accelerating 
economic growth of backward areas in Asia and has concluded 
that the key to suooess lies in agriculture** But he is 
aware that agriculture is also the most difficult of many 
complex problems* Oshima points out that whereas it is rel­
atively easy to modernize and apply technology to existing 
Industry in urban areas* and to add new industry* it is 
exceedingly difficult to implement modern technology in the 
agricultural sector* As a consequence* there is a natural 
tendency for savings and oapital to be diverted to industry* 
oauslng distortions and maladjustments in the overall pro­
gram of development* He cites as proof the faot "that the 
rate of growth of agriculture and the rural sectors has 
lagged far behind that of manufacturing and ether businesses
lwA Strategy for Aslan Development," Economic
(Aprll|Development and Culture Change* II, No* 3 
29E3I2* '
332
In most Asian countries* For example* in India* Pakistan* 
Ceylon, Cambodia* South Korea and the Philippines the net 
product in agriculture and allied pursuits rose on the 
average of only about ten peroent between 1952 and 1958* 
while the net product in manufacturing rose about 50 percent* 
This is not surprising, because the prevailing 
techniques being used in most Asian countries today are the 
same as those in use generations and centuries ago* Speak* 
ing to this point* and revealing the frustration of those 
who attempt to lead the foroes of change was Prime Minister
Nehru, who stated in December* I960)
What kind of plough is used in ag 
is the basic test of our progress* If 
plough continues to be used* it is a defeat* no 
matter how one explains it* A society changes 
as a result of the method of production* *
You cannot expeot anything of a person who is 
using a plough which is a thousand years old*
It amazes me that after 12 years of Independence* 
there should be millions of these old ploughs 
[ in usej in India* Even at some loss I should 
like to make a bonfire of them, Just to induce 
the people to feel that it means the discon­
tinuance of things* The new plough is not 
frightfully expensive* It will cost 50* 60 or 
70 rupees [ $2*35 • #3*351* A State Government 
should not wait for some private party to make 
[ raoderrj ploughs and sell them on the market*
It should manufacture improved ploughs by it­
self in every dlstriot* and realise the value 
after harvest* Within 12 months from now there 9 
should not bs a single old plough left in India.
rlculture 
the old
• •
But the old ploughs are still in use* and this illustrates 
Oshima's point that the slow rate of technical change in
1Ibid«* p* 296,
2From a speech at the State Minister's Conference 
on Community Development, Deoember 9* I960* excerpted in 
Kurukshetra. IX, No* 9 (January 26, 1961), 23*
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agriculture is a major factor in leading planners and prl- 
▼ate individuals to emphasize and Invest in industry* This, 
in turn, starves agriculture, creating a vicious cycle*
Industrial products, unfortunately, have little 
market at home whore the vast majority of potential cus­
tomers, most of whom engage in agriculture, are too impov­
erished to buy them* Moreover, markets abroad are increas­
ingly difficult to come by* What this tends to oause is a 
chronic balanoe-of-payments problem, whioh in turn, retards 
development at home* What produots are bought internally 
tend to be consumed by urban dwellers, thus increasing the 
gap in standards between urban and rural people*
Public policy and development plans whioh center 
on industrialization intensify the maladjustments and distor­
tions whioh characterize underdeveloped economies, according 
to Oshlma, and work at oross purposes to the aim of healthy 
balanced eoonomlo growth and eventual self-sufficiency*
Says Oshlmai
In view of all the problems besetting Aslan coun­
tries at their present state of development, it 
is premature to adopt a policy favoring industrial­
ization* For the present period, a plan to devolop 
the rural sectors, especially to overcome the stag­
nation in agriculture, should be the prime objective 
of public policy, leaving industrialization to 
private capital* Such a program should bo contin­
ued for a decade or so, until suoh time as full 
employment [in rural areas ] is reached, and the 
rural sector has "taken off*" After this, there 
can be a switch to a policy of speeding up Indus­
trialization and urbanization*1
In other words, the underdeveloped areas of Asia,
clt.* p. 30S.
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fundamentally hampered by overpopulation, unemployment and 
undernourishment, simply cannot afford the luxury of Indus­
trialization, Oshlma holds that Man 'agriculture-fIrst* 
policy may be the key to the 'take-off* of first the 
agricultural sector, and then in the next stage, the non- 
agricultural sectors, as was the case in the West, 
the experiences of China and India in attempting to proceed
..1 From
into industrialization without first securing agriculture, 
it would appear that Oshlma*s thesis is correct. Moreover,
China, which went in sooner and more strongly for industry 
than India, ended up in more serious difficulty.
Ideology is undoubtedly a factor at this point, 
because the political aims of China put power first, sub­
ordinating ell other interests to that aim. It was evident 
to Mao that in the modern world power Is held by the nations 
most highly industrialized. Why not, then, drive China into 
a great leap to industrialization and power? The beet 
reason for not attempting this is that it cannot be done.
If anything appears certain about the economio development 
of China and India, it is that it oannot be accomplished in 
great leaps, giant strides or any other form of rapid ad­
vance. To attempt it is not only bad economics but bad 
polities. As Oshlma points out.
From a political and cultural point of view, 
any attempt to industrialize rapidly at the ex­
pense of the peasantry • , , will not be compatible 
with democratio development. And from the point 
of view of competitive coexistence in Asia, a free.
p. 308.
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intelligent peasantry, amply assisted by the 
state, can probably be a match for China's
• Most of the advantages of com-communes,
mune agriculture can be obtained without its 
disadvantages,!
• •
The great problem of communes and oolleotivization 
and the whole system whioh fostered them is that they take
i . I
away tangible incentives, £•£•, adequate inoome, and an 
attractive variety of outlets for spending of incomes, and 
replace them with intangibles, e.#., "greater glory for 
cultural construction,■ and "power to struggle 
against imperialism," It would appear that peasants are 
not greatly inspired by euoh histrionics, and that through 
it all they remain acquisitive. It would thus seem wise 
for the formulators of ideologies in emerging nations to 
pay heed to the desire of peasants for immediate and tan­
gible rewards. Says Oshima,
Agriculture under Aslan conditions is the most 
arduous type of work and requires large doses 
of incentives to draw out the best from each 
worker. Without {. incentives] 
tendency for work intensity and organisation 
and quality of woifc to deteriorate,2
So far as China is concerned, this comment might be the
understatement of the decade.
tt itChina,
there will be a
The leaders of change in India have understood 
much more than their counterparts in China the important 
role of incentive in farming. Proof of this is the fact 
that they have neither forced oolleotivization nor followed
1Ibid., p. 312, 
2Ibid., n. 53.
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confiscatory policies with respect to produce* Sven though 
agricultural production and yields were considerably in­
creased between 1951 and 1961* 75 peroent of foodgrains were 
still retained by the producers in 19*1* If the peasants 
were not much better off than a deoade before* at least they 
were no worse off* The same oould not be said for the peas­
ants of China*
That Indian planners are increasingly aware of the 
incentive factor is indicated by an authoritative artiole in 
the Congress party's Economic Review, The article statedi
A basic condition for full exploitation of 
technical nosslbllities for increasing agricul­
tural production is that produoers must have the 
necessary oapaoity and incentive* Apart from 
supplying to them technical guidance and financial 
assistance* the farmers must be assured of e 
mle returns for their labor and initiative*1
One of the most fundamental ways of providing 
initiative for farmers la to give them land* But both China 
and India have failed to exploit* productively* the appar­
ently universal desire of farmers to own land* China has 
failed because of the adamant refusal of the Communists to , 
admit that private ownership is wanted and ie productive* 
India has failed not out of any desire to oollectlvlze* but 
rather because its gradualist approach to land reform has 
been slow in developing and* as a consequence, the govern­
ment decided to urge adoption of agricultural cooperatives*
cono-
1Panse* on* clt*. p* 55*
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But India's land reform and cooperative programs thus far 
have been disappointing* On the vital matter of land reform* 
both China and India oould profit from the example of Japaxt1 
whose agriculture is among the most productive in the world* 
Since World War II the Japanese farmer has managed to meet 
the nation's food requirements effectively*
Though land reform in Japan began in 1920* its 
pre-war progress was slow* But following serious food 
shortages after World War II the government adopted far- 
reaching measures and carried them out in three stages 
between 1945 and 1955* The first stage provided for ooow 
pulsory transfer of leased land beyond five hectares from 
land owners to tenants and oreated a new policy whereby 
payment of rent for leased land would be in cash rather 
than the traditional method of paying 50 percent of the 
produoe. The second stage saw adoption of laws abolishing 
completely the right of absentee landlords to own land* and 
Uniting resident landlords to holding one hectare of land 
except on Hokkaido where the maximum was thres hectares* 
Holdings In excess of three hectares In Japan proper and 
12 heotares on Hokkaido were purchased by the government 
and resold to tenants and others to be operated as Individ­
ual farms with mortgages of 30 years* As a result of these 
steps* the area of leased land in Japan was reduced 36 per­
cent between 1941 and 1950* The final stage of post-war
^The summary of Japanese land reform which follows 
is based on ibid** pp* 55-57*
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land reform had as Its principal feature the adoption of 
measures to step up the flow of oapltal to farms, whloh had 
dropped as a consequenoe of the abolition of landlordism*
The ohlef means by whloh oapltal was dlreoted Into the rural 
economy was very liberal loan laws and government-admlnl 
tered finance programs*
Even despite the differences in topography, cul­
ture and other conditions between Japan, China and India,
It would appear that both China and India would stand to 
gain much by emulating some features of Japanese land 
reform polloles* Whether operated separately or in volun­
tary cooperation, Individually owned farms, well fertilised 
and intensively cultivated by farmers given every opportun­
ity to enjoy immediately a fair portion of Increased pro­
duction, appear to offer muoh more hope for eventual solution 
of the agriculture problem, than either collectivisation or 
cooperatlvlsatlon* This is not to say that a polloy of 
lal3oes fairs should be adopted* Indeed, government-dlreoted 
extension programs, technical assistance and finanoe schemes
* i
cure essential* But the point is that even though small, 
fragmented fame may be less economical than large, oomblned 
holdings farmed as a unit, the peasants of China and India 
are not sufficiently devoted to the cooperative scheme to 
put into it the kind of effort and energy required to make 
it work* Indications are, however, that they are suffi­
ciently motivated by the ownership of land to be substan­
tially mors productive, especially if given the necessary
339
technical and financial assistance* In terms of else* 
Japan's farms would generally be Judged as uneconomlcally 
small. But In terms of self-sufficiency In food* Japanese 
farms* based on the Individual economy* are quite economical, 
China* India and other developing nations would do well to 
take note of this fact*
CHAPTER BINS 
Conclusioni
Towards an Effective Ideology for Development
Any analysis of eoonomio development of baokward 
areas, whether undertaken from the standpoint of polities or 
economies, would he hard-pressed to conclude on a note of 
optimism. The forces operating against the accelerated 
development of statio economies and societies are so great 
that the prospects for the rapid elevation of the world's 
impoverished masses to a position of prosperity and dignity 
seem highly remote. As the eminent eoonomio historian 
Robert Heilbroner observed, "The metamorphosis from poverty 
into decency will be a struggle of Herculean proportions and 
Sisyphian discouragement, 
the post World War II revolutions for rapid Improvement of 
conditions in underdeveloped areas are so compelling that 
the attempts to advance have to be made, Henee the evolu­
tion of Ideologies dlreoted at creating schemes for success­
fully meeting the challenge, nevertheless, it staggers the 
imagination to oonoeive of suoh countries as China and India, 
with some 650 million and 450 million people respectively, 
bringing about in just a few decades what the relatively 
sparsely populated nations of the West managed to accomplish
«1 Yet the pressures released by
^The Pvture es History (Kew York! Grove Drees, 
Ino*, 1961), p, to.
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after nearly a century of effort* Assuming that somehow 
the giant nations of Asia manage to slow the rate of popu­
lation growth,1 if they continue the paoe of development 
achieved during 1951*1961 their people can look forward to 
having their inoomes raised to an average of 1200 a year by 
the beginning of the 21st century,® What this means is that 
the masses of people in Asia would still be living on the 
borderline of human subsistence after some fifty years of 
"economic development," All the while the advanced nations 
of the West will presumably have continued to progress, 
widening the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots," 
and at the same time international communication and oontaot 
will have Increased, thereby intensifying the "revolution of 
rising expectations" In underdeveloped areas. Such a pro 
peot is so unpleasant to contemplate that the leaders of 
these nations understandably insist that it need not happen. 
They promulgate plane which oall for a steady aooeleratlon 
of the growth rate rather than merely a continuation of the 
present rate, and they place great faith in the ability of 
industrialization to energize the transformation prooess. 
But, thus far, while the plans have been mads and some 
progress has been achieved, neither China nor India has 
succeeded in solving even the baslo problem of feeding
1Thus far, this is an unwarranted assumption. For 
a detailed and sobering analysis of the population problem 
as it relates to underdevelopment see Harrison Brown, The 
Challenge of Ken1s Future* chaps, ill and vil,
®Hellbroner, op. clt*. p, 84,
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adequately the growing population* Great efforts In agri- 
culture have been undertaken. But the results so far have 
been most disheartening.
All of this is not to say that the aspirations of 
peoples in underdeveloped areas are impossible to a o hi eve* 
But it does suggest that no matter haw sincere and how 
Herculean the efforts* they are not likely to produce rapid 
progress. Moreover* as the perception of this reality in* 
creases* frustration is likely to rise accordingly. For* 
actual advancement will probably lag signifioantly behind 
the people's desire for progress* It is precisely this 
situation whloh led Heilbnoner to comment* "Economic devel­
opment in its early stages is not a process of alleviating 
discontent* Initially it is the cause of deepening it*"1 
Thus, the path of progress* says Hellbroner* "may well be 
more terrible than the roadless and mindless existence of 
the past." Yet* unpromising and difficult as the course 
of development may be there la no reasonable alternative 
to it* States Hellbroner*
• * * Once the great march of progress has begun* 
it is no longer possible to turn baok* The 
changes in the balance of the old static society 
cannot be undone. There is no oholoe but to 
tread the road to its conclusion—.however long 
and agonising the Journey may be.2
1Ibld«. p. 85. 
gIbld.* p. 84.
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The Heed for Realism
Inasmuch as there la no alternative hut to under­
take the slovt tedious process of transformation* under­
developed eountrles would be well advised to give long and 
serious consideration to the fundamental problem of how 
economic development Is tar be aohieved* Because this great 
task Is likely to be the most Important venture these 
nations will ever undertake* it deserves the most careful 
planning and preparation. In the construction of an ideol­
ogy for eoonomlo development every consideration should be 
given to the diffloulty of the challenge* and the resouroes 
available for meeting it. If a nation Is to have any pros­
pect of ultimate success, it should* before embarking upon 
a program of development* formulate with great oars the 
political* eoonomlo and sooial framework within which 
planned growth is to take plaoe. It Is essential that the 
system adopted be one that provides the means by which the 
leaders of ohange may ellolt a maximum effort from the 
people. For anything less than a maximum effcrtwlll likely 
lead to falltire. There Is great danger, however* In as­
suming that an Initially fast paoe resulting from mass 
agitation or regimentation is the same thing as sustained* 
ooncerted effort* or that it le the only means of generating 
the neoessary momentum. In fact* such an approach may 
result In the alienation of people from ohange* and rule 
out the possibility of their snergetlo participation in the
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development process* Despite the enormous inertia whioh 
leaders may encounter and despite the temptation to force 
the pace of change in the name of eoonomio necessity, the 
experience of China and India indloates that If people 
oannot be persuaded to participate in development schemes, 
in the long run those sohemes will not suooeed. In other 
words, the development process cannot be expected to proeeed 
much faster than it requires to change long established, 
deep-rooted traditions and customs. Moreover, some of these 
traditions— such as the desire to own land—may not be sus­
ceptible to change and will therefore have to be accepted 
and adjusted to.
Because of the enormous difficulty and uncertainty 
of endeavoring to bring about the conversion of static econ­
omies and societies into dynamio ones, and because circum­
stances and conditions vary greatly from one country to the 
next, it would be impossible to set down a blueprint for the 
transformation prooess which would be squally applicable to 
all emerging nations. But, considering the sxpsrlenos of 
China and India, it is possible to draw oertaln conclusions 
which, although they are directed primarily at China and 
India, may be applied with some benefit more generally to 
other underdeveloped areas.
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Conclusions
First of all, It must be emphasized that no natter 
what system may bs adopted In pursuit of it, eoonomlo ad­
vancement of large, densely populated* underdeveloped areas 
cannot be aohleved rapidly* This la a bitter faot that the 
leaders of change may find difficult or perhaps Impossible 
to accept. But If China and India are taken as the examples, 
the observer Is hard pressed to find any firm lndloatlons 
that Industrialisation and mechanisation will be aohleved 
any more rapidly there than they were achieved In the West* 
It Is true that the emerging nations today have the benefit 
of the vast technological accomplishments of the advanced 
nations on which to rely In hastening their growth* But 
countries like China and India also have the gargantuan 
problem of population to eontend with, as wsll as traditional
oultures which were never conducive to technological advance 
or industrialisation*^ In addition, these countries are 
starting on the process of development with the problems of 
almost overwhelming illiteracy still to bs ooped with,
which. If It Is to be solved, will require an effort in 
education the scope of whloh has no precedent In world 
history. Moreover, as these countries desperately endeavor 
to break out of the oyole of poverty, they must try to 
produoe ever lnoreaslng quantities of food from soil whloh 
was seriously depleted years ago and for whloh embryonlo
1Supra. pp* 31-34, 37*38, and 41-42*
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industry la unable to produoe the neoeaeary amounts of 
fertilisers* In other words, although developing nations 
have the assiatanoe of the great technical advanoea of the 
best to aid them in growth, this advantage la probably at
least balanced off, if not negated, by the huge handicape 
which operate to hinder rapid advancement. Thus, while 
eoonomlo growth in underdeveloped areas may not be Impos­
sible, it is nevertheless exceedingly difficult and it 
cannot be expected to come about quiokly, An Ideology which 
promises rapid development la, therefore, quite unlikely to 
suoceed. .........
Secondly, it should be noted that the transition 
from medieval to modern sooiety involves the nearly total 
transformation of cultures affeotlng almost all human insti­
tutions. Consequently, political considerations are cer­
tainly as Important as the economic. In view of this, an 
effective ideology for eoonomlo advancement must embody a 
socio-political philosophy whioh will facilitate these 
great transitions the most readily. From developments in 
China and India it would appear that an ideology whioh is 
respeotful of human dignity and whioh is primarily and 
genuinely direoted at the betterment of individual welfare 
is more conducive to the transformation prooess than one 
whioh is not. Even in soolstlea where the majority of 
people have never enjoyed fair treatment by the government, 
there is reason to believe that people will respond more 
positively to a government demonstrably interested in their
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welfare than they will to one which is not* This is not to 
say that masses of people who have been the victims of 
degradation, poverty and abuse for generations will suddenly 
respond with great vigor to enlightened treatment* The 
burdens of centuries are not so easily thrown off* But it 
is to suggest that suoh treatment may eventually provide a 
sound basis for that "productive society with the vitality 
and lnoentlvs to progress" of whioh The nation* spoke* At 
any rate, there is much more reason to believe that an 
Ideology embodying this approaoh is more likely to suooeed 
than one which replaoes an anoient form of oppression with 
a modern form*
A third factor, whioh may be counted as essential 
to an effective Ideology for economic development is that 
the scheme be based on an open idea-system. The reasons for 
this are several* First, such a system has the practical 
advantage of being able to borrow and employ the most pro- , 
ductive ideas, methods and approaches from a variety of 
sources even though these eouroes may operate from different 
polltioal and eoonomlo premises* Thus, a developing nation 
may borrow the idea of long-range, government-directed 
economio planning from the Soviet Union, while at the same 
time take advantage of the stimulus of private gain as an 
inoentive to entrepreneurship whioh is such a vital part of 
the private enterprise system in the Vest* There is no 
reason why the emerging nations, if they are discriminating.
1 Supra, pp, 331-332,
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should not have the best of both worlds* But they cannot if 
they are imprisoned by dogmatlo ideologies which insist that 
there is only one way of doing things*
Another reason for adopting an open idea*system 
is that it allows for constructive oritioism and continuous 
modification of approach internally* without the risk of 
serious political upheaval* The prooese of economic devel­
opment by its very nature Involves a certain amount of trial 
and error* The open soolety can tolerate error* and the 
government responsible for suoh mistakes can survive to try 
something else* But the authoritarian polltioal system does 
not have this toleranoe* So* it must either expend much 
effort and energy in trying to make schemes work whioh will 
not* or else waste effort and create confusion by covering 
up errors and disguising new approaohes as old ones* Hon 
over, the totalitarian regime must constantly disrupt the 
political and social order by oonduotlng scapegoat hunts and 
purges in an effort to transfer blame for errors onto those 
other than the responsible parties* In short* the intoler­
ance of error in the olosed Ideology is a serious handicap 
to development, and* oontrary to the belief that totalitari­
anism oan be equated with effloleney* the waste* delay and 
disruption whioh oomea of suoh a system oan only be regarded 
as serious inefficiency*
Moreover* there is a strong tendency for olosed 
ideologies to impel ooiztrles toward self-imposed isolation 
from the world* Onoe it is out off from the mainstream of
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Ideas and events, a government gets out of touch with 
reality end runs the serious risk of formulating polioles 
based more on hysteria than reason* Few countries In the 
world today are more Isolated than China* This isolation 
Is not only dlplomatlo and political, but Intellectual and 
psychological as well* The Chinese Communists, as a result 
of their tightly closed Ideology, have thus chosen a form 
of solitary confinement, leaving themselves without effec­
tive communication with the world of experience on vhioh 
developing nations are greatly dependent*
Still another praotloal reason for adopting an 
open ideology Is that suoh a philosophy will be auoh more 
likely than the totalitarian approaoh to win the sympathy 
of the advanced nations which are In a position to offer 
orltloally needed financial and teohnloal assistance. . A 5 '
developing nation oan 111-afford to Ignore the faot that 
Communist China in the depths of a desperate eoonomio crisis
i
and food shortage slnoe 1959 has had no friends rushing to 
her aid* The only Communist nation in a position to offer 
any real assistance is the Soviet Union, whloh has its own j 
ohronle agricultural failures and food shortages to oontend ,
with* Indeed, a major factor in Sino-Soviet eoonomio agre 
mente since 1949 has been that China trades food to the
USSR in return for equipment* Even in the pact between 
China and the Soviet Union signed in the spring of 1962, 
the Chinese Communists were given little to mitigate their 
eoonomio problems* They were permitted to omit food from
I
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their exports to the Soviet Unlont hut otherwise the agree­
ment was of little consequenoe so far ae the immediate ori­
els was concerned,^*
By contrast, when India has experienced critical 
problems suoh as a crop failure or a crisis in foreign ex­
change, her Western benefactors have been generous in giving 
assistance to ease the pressure. For example, India's 
planners discovered in the spring of 1962 that they would 
need an additional $250 million to finance the second year
of the Third Five Year Flan, By August 1, 1962 they had
oassurances that the consortium of countries which aid India 
would deliver the neoessary funds, over and above amounts 
already pledged.^ In addition, India's annual foodgraln 
shortages are alleviated by purchases and gifts from Western 
countries which are troubled by enormous surpluses of these 
commodities. It is probably not a coincidence that the 
nations in the world which are best able to offer vital 
assistance to underdeveloped areas are all nations with 
democratic political systems and that they look with con­
siderably more favor on emerging nations which genuinely 
endeavor to develop within the framework of political, 
social and economic freedom, than on those which do not.
*Kew York Times. April 21 and 22, 1962,
Nations participating in the consortium are 
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.
^Indla News. The Information Service of India, 
Washington, D. <J,’, August 13, 1962, p. 1.
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Thus, In several crucial respeots, developing nations which 
adopt a democratic Ideology enjoy substantial advantages 
over those which adopt an authoritarian Idea-system.
A fourth lesson to be drawn from the experience 
of China and India is that government alone oannot bring 
about economic growth. However much government leadership, 
planning and finance may be necessary for development, there 
are sound reasons for avoiding the conclusion that the state 
should take over the economy completely. For one thing, the 
government Is not physically able to bear the entire burden. 
There simply are not enough bureaucrats, eadres and expert 
government servants In underdeveloped countries to man ade­
quately the vast offices of a managerial state whioh em­
braces all of industry, agriculture, transportation, banking 
and commerce. India's leaders were wise to recognise that 
they could not nationalize all of these things and still 
have them managed properly. Therefore, despite Its "social­
ist pattern," India's economy is still largely privately 
owned and managed. As a consequence, though its paoe of 
change may be frustratlngly slow, India has avoided most of 
the eooio-aconomlo upheavals and managerial breakdowns whioh 
have plagued China.
Hot only do governments of underdeveloped nations 
lack the capacity to handle adequately all facets of a state- 
oontrolled economy, they also find it exceedingly difficult 
to replaoe, completely, the profit motive with patriotism. 
Feasants and industrialists alike seem prone to work harder
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for their own gain than for the state* Thus* even If It 
were possible for a completely nationalized economy to ell- 
mlnate duplication and Increase efficiency—and It has yet 
to be demonstrated that it can—there would still be the 
problem* as China discovered* of how to induce farmers* mer­
chants and managers to produoe more for the state* Because 
nationalization adds greatly to the burden of government 
while at the same time It tends to eliminate the vital 
element of incentive* it should be used only when It is 
essential to developmental alms* and when the positive 
results of its Implementation more than off-set the negative* 
Again* this does not mean that developing nations should go 
to the other extreme of the lalssez falre philosophy whioh 
has largely guided economlo growth In the Vest* On the 
contrary* if they are to achieve the coordination and plan­
ning they need* and if they are to accumulate capital out 
of economies desperately short of it and oversee its invest­
ment to assure balanced growth* developing nations will 
inevitably have big governments playing a predominant role 
in the growth process* But this role cannot be oontlnuolly 
expanded without reaohing the point of diminishing returns* 
It is this point that the planners of eeonomlo development 
must keep in mind*
A fifth eonoluslon to be drawn from the experience 
of China and India during the first deoade of development 
is that* to a great extent* plans succeed or fail depending 
upon how effectively the people oan be persuaded to aooept
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Innovation* A basio cause of economic stagnation in the 
first place is that some cultures are characterized by 
features which greatly inhibit growth* Both the Chinese 
and Indian traditional cultures contain these souroes of 
economic retardation* It stands to reason* then* that one 
of the most fundamental problems whioh the leaders of change 
confront is to Induce people to accept the practices which 
are essential for economic advancement. In agriculture* for 
example* farmers must adopt modern techniques if yields are 
ever to be Increased significantly* The substitution of 
line-sowing for scatter-sowing of seed in India* if it eould 
be accomplished* would greatly improve cultivation* Like- I 
wise* the adoption of Japanese techniques in rice cultiva­
tion could bring about tremendously enlarged yields* If 
farmers could be convinoed that Improved seeds* even though 
initially more expensive than ordinary seed* produce con­
sistently richer crops* food grain production oould be 
greatly increased*
But to bring about these ohanges requires an enor­
mous undertaking in education and information* The Chinese 
Communists have attempted to by-pass such programs by simply 
ordering the new techniques to be employed and relying on 
the ever-present cadres tc see that they are* But* even 
though this has worked to some extent* the Chinese Commu­
nists have apparently failed to bring about genuine conver­
sion to new techniques by decree* India's endeavor to 
eonduot rural rehabilitation through the Community Develop-
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ment and National Extension programs appears to have much 
greater prospects for success in the long run, hut thus far 
the response has not been equal to the challenge* Ford 
Foundation experts in evaluating India's rural programs 
have concluded, in essence, that the ideas are sound but 
they will require much greater effort if they are to be 
implemented. Most Village Level Workers are severely over* 
burdened with responsibilities, the result being that their 
influence is often only superficial. In other words, if 
planners are to make substantial headway in bringing about 
innovation, they must give whole-hearted support to the pro­
grams of education and information which are essential to 
the propagation of modern methods. An effective Ideology 
for economic development must be one which bases change on 
genuine persuasion, as India's does. But the ideology 
should also be one in which priorities are made sufficiently 
dear that the most essential problems can be solved first. 
In this respeot both India and China have fallen short of 
the mark.
This brings up a sixth oonduslon of great impor­
tance which developing nations may draw from the experience 
of China and India. It is that Ntake-of4" the coveted 
achievement of eoonomlo self-sufficiency and sustained 
growth, cannot be achieved in heavily populated countries 
until the baslo problem of agriculture is solved. Any de- ■ 
velopment scheme which does not recognise this overriding 
reality and does not oarry out its plans accordingly, is
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foredoomed to prolonged frustration and probably to eventual 
failure. Unfortunately* even though the reasons for this 
are obvious* the task of bringing about solutions to the 
enormously difficult problems of agriculture is so tremen­
dous and so slow to show progress that there is a great 
temptation to attempt* somehow* a circumvention of it. Both 
China and, to a lesser extent* India have made this attempt 
without suocess. Had they given uncompromising first pri­
ority to agricultural development and had they been deter­
mined to see the effort through to fruition*. both countries 
would probably be closer to the goal of "take-off" than they 
are at present. The greater strength and stability of 
India's economy after a decade of development may to a great 
extent be explained by the fact that Its brief endeavor to 
Industrialize without first solving the problems of agricul­
ture was nothing like the full-scale flight from reality 
whloh took place in China.
From the experience of China and India* then* it 
may be concluded that the advancement of underdeveloped 
countries cannot be achieved rapidly. Because the factors 
Inhibiting rapid development are so formidable* advancement 
is almost oertaln to be slow* or at best* under optimum 
conditions* moderately fast. But even under the best of 
circumstances* nations like China and India cannot be ex­
pected to aohleve Industrialization* and the high living 
standards whloh It brings* any more quickly than did Western
nevertheless, with a oombln-Europe and the United States
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ation of patience, an open idea-system, n pragmatic outlook* 
benevolent government* sound planning, effective extension 
programs, realistic priorities* and attraotlve inoentlvee 
for the people* it may be possible for underdeveloped na­
tions* mired in economic stagnation, to advanoe* gradually*
If these conclusions have a somber tone* there Is 
at least some comfort to be taken in the highly significant 
fact that In the competition between China and India for 
eeonomie development, the demoeratlo Ideology of India has 
proved to be an advantage over the totalitarian ideology of 
China. Both nations still have a great dietance to travel 
before they reach the goal of sustained eeonomie growth* but 
after a decade of effort, India actually demonstrated great* 
economic strength, greater social and political stability* 
and greater individual welfare than China. To say the least* 
this was no mean accomplishment. What is more, this did not 
oome as a surprise to India*e leaders. They have had the 
faith which is born of ideology. As early as 1953* the
Congress party declared!
It is wrong to think that the totalitarian method 
is always fast and the demoeratlo way is necee*
Given the will and olarlty of vision*sarily slow.
democracy can be as fast as, if not faster than, 
dictatorship. Demooratlo functioning of a State 
is also more rare, steady and lasting. ... India 
is a land of destiny and has a definite message 
to give the world. That message is the message 
of Gandhi, Nehru and Vlnoba [Bhave], It is our 
saored duty to . • • implement that message with 
humility* faith and determination.!
History has seldom witnessed an undertaking of
1 India and China, on. clt.. p* 87.
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greater eignlfloanee than thlej for the future of economic 
development and democracy, and to tome extent, the future 
of mankind Itself, may ultimately be determined by the 
outcome of this unique experiment#
%
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